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11 stories in the last 3d

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CategoryAllResearch 7Advisory 1Data breach 1Industry 1Phishing & fraud 1
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German Manufacturer Shrinks Security Alert Response While Protecting 10,000 Endpoints

Vendor case study: a German manufacturer's five-person SOC cut alert triage time using ANY.RUN's cloud sandbox across 10,000 endpoints.

ANY.RUN published a case study in which a five-person security team at an unnamed German manufacturer replaced an air-gapped forensic laptop with its cloud-managed interactive sandbox, protecting roughly 10,000 endpoints and 10,000 users. The vendor claims a median 15 minutes saved per alert, 20-40 daily tasks processed, a 2.5-minute alert-to-isolation target, and a 95% agreement rate between analyst and sandbox verdicts; all figures are vendor-supplied with the customer identity withheld. The writeup also describes detonating a multi-stage phishing chain from a PDF link to a password-protected ZIP to malware execution.

Cyber Security News · 16h agoIndustry 2 sources

1Password's AI patching benchmark is misleading

Trail of Bits reanalysis says 1Password's 26% AI clean-fix rate is misleading; 86% of eligible patches blocked exploits.

Trail of Bits critiques 1Password's FLAWED AI patching benchmark, arguing its 26% clean-fix headline mixes trials where agents were instructed to apply wrong fixes (22% of data) with trials that prohibited compiling or testing (36%). Restricting to reasonable conditions, 2,634 of 3,067 patches (86%) blocked the supplied exploit. Trail of Bits also reports 12.5% of 2,265 developer first fixes failed in its own 2024-2026 assessments, and released post-patch-validation and review-walkthrough agent skills.

Lobsters · security · 1d agoResearch1

MarkSec: Capability-Aware Evaluation of Adversarial Attacks Against LLM Watermarks

MarkSec unifies evaluation of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks with quality-constrained success metrics under shared reporting protocols.

MarkSec is a framework unifying analysis of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks under shared detector calibration, metric definitions, and reporting protocols. It introduces a quality-constrained attack success metric that jointly assesses attack effectiveness and text quality. Experiments across representative watermark families, attacks, LLMs, and datasets show that attacks strongest by watermark removal alone can fall behind general rewriting when success requires acceptable text quality, and stealing-based scrubbers often underperform the best general-scrubbing baselines.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

Attacker Hijacks AI Coding Assistant Session, Spreads Shai-Hulud Across About 100 Repositories

Mandiant says an attacker hijacked an AI coding-assistant session at a SaaS provider and spread the Shai-Hulud worm across roughly 100 repositories, stealing secrets.

Mandiant's September 2026 report describes an attacker hijacking an active AI coding-assistant session at an unnamed SaaS provider, then getting a poisoned package recommendation accepted and installing an infostealer via a malicious PyPI package. The attacker stole GitHub OAuth tokens, deployed the self-spreading Shai-Hulud worm across approximately 100 internal repositories, and stole repository secrets and product source code. Poisoning a package in the company's official namespace caused a second employee to pull the compromised version and become infected. Mandiant recommends verifying AI-recommended dependencies against checksums and allowlists, keeping secrets out of extension reach, and routing dependency traffic through internal repositories.

The Hacker News · 17h agoData breach in the wild

Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs

Researchers demonstrate exfiltration through nominally input-only analog pins in mixed-signal ICs, recovering data at 10 kbps on a 55nm PPG front-end.

The paper identifies a directionality-based attack class in analog/mixed-signal (AMS) ICs where data-dependent circuit-offset modulation converts a nominally input-only pin into an outbound information channel. Three host conditions enable the attack: a closed-loop amplifier, an exposed amplifier input, and sufficiently high impedance at that pin. Silicon validation on a photoplethysmography analog front-end in 55nm CMOS showed exfiltration at up to 10 kbps with error-free PRBS recovery, under 0.001% area overhead, and only 0.03 dB SNR reduction.

arXiv cs.CR · 13h agoResearch

The MAL Simulator: Cyber Operations Simulation based on Attack & Defense Graphs

MAL Simulator grounds attack-defense graph simulations in a CRATE-emulated network, training RL attacker and defender agents where attackers outperform search methods.

The MAL Simulator is a cyber operations simulator built on the Meta Attack Language (MAL), enabling decision-driven attack and defense simulations adaptable to new domains without modifying source code. Case studies trained defensive and offensive agents, grounded in data collected from an emulated network implemented in the CRATE cyber range. The trained attacker policy reached designated targets more efficiently than compared search methods, and the trained defender induced lower costs than a naive heuristic under noisy alerts, though defender performance dropped significantly against an RL attacker.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

Automating Attack Graph Construction for Agentic Pentesting. Towards Neuro-Symbolic Vulnerability Hunting

Semi-automated pipeline converts Trivy, Semgrep, Nmap output into MulVAL attack graphs for agentic pentesting, 53.7% mean vulnerability coverage in CyBench.

The paper presents a semi-automated pipeline that parses Trivy, Semgrep, and Nmap findings into MulVAL predicates and uses an LLM-assisted process to build domain-specific Datalog rules linking scanner evidence to attack techniques. MulVAL/XSB then performs symbolic inference to generate structured, auditable attack paths for agentic pentesting. Evaluated on 54 web CTF tasks from CyBench, every task produced at least one goal-reaching graph with 53.7% mean ground-truth vulnerability coverage, 51.9% full coverage, and an 83.9% noise-path rate. Median end-to-end runtime was 24.9 seconds, making the pipeline runtime-practical for agentic workflows.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

Most Fraudulent Hires Receive Credentials Before Detection

HYPR report finds 42% of fraudulent hires pass screening and receive corporate credentials, averaging 5.73 days of unmonitored network access before detection.

A HYPR study of 500 US HR executives found 42% of fraudulent candidates pass pre-hire screening and get hired, with only 3% detected on their hire day and 20% remaining undetected up to three weeks. This gives fraudulent hires an average of 5.73 days of unmonitored corporate network access, and 98% of surveyed executives said they had experienced candidate fraud firsthand. The report follows a September 9 CISA update to its Insider Threat Mitigation Guide warning that malicious actors use AI tools to obtain remote IT jobs, a tactic long used by North Korean actors for data theft and extortion.

Infosecurity Magazine · 1d agoPhishing & fraud

Can We Stop The Ads? Taxonomy and Characterization of Smartphone Splash Ads and Existing Countermeasures

Study of 108 ad-defense implementations finds only one tool blocked splash-ad navigation across ten popular apps, and it required Accessibility permission.

The paper taxonomizes smartphone splash ads — full-screen ads at app launch that trick users into trigger mechanisms such as moving the phone — and analyzes 108 documented advertising defenses for deployment barriers. Many defenses require device rooting, jailbreaking, runtime code injection, or application modification; others need extra permissions, rule maintenance, compilation, or payment. In evaluating 13 configurations of 11 tools across 10 popular apps, only one prevented ad-triggered navigation across all ten apps, requiring Accessibility permission and leaving ads visible roughly one second before dismissal. Documented harms include delayed emergency response, driver distraction, and degraded accessibility for vision-impaired users.

arXiv cs.CR · 1d agoResearch

AI agent authorization risks remain a gap in new NIST-CISA token security guidance

NIST and CISA release IR 8587 guidance on securing signed tokens, but AI agent authorization and delegation risks remain out of scope.

NIST, with CISA support, published 'Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse' (NIST IR 8587), recommending continuous monitoring and tighter token lifecycle controls for SSO and API access. The guidance does not yet fully address AI agent identity, delegation chains, or prompt injection steering agents with valid tokens, and NIST says new or expanded standards are needed. Experts recommend treating AI agents as low-trust non-human identities, maintaining agent inventories, expiring credentials after task completion, and requiring human approval for high-risk actions. The report references shared-signal mechanisms like CAEP and RISC, and follows a May incident where a CISA contractor GitHub repository exposed AWS and GitHub tokens.

CSO Online · 15h agoAdvisory

Forgery of C2PA on a Pixel 10

Researcher forged a Google Pixel 10 C2PA content credential with genuine signatures, showing root-level attackers can fake photo provenance.

A Hacker Factor blog post demonstrates an AI-generated 'unicorn glitter milk' news photo carrying a valid, cryptographically signed C2PA manifest traceable to Google's Pixel camera certificate chain, passing validation in Adobe Inspect and the CAI Verify tool with a verified timestamp. The author, working with UMBC's PASAWG working group, reported to Google and C2PA in November 2025 that root access on a Pixel device could sign arbitrary images as camera captures; after 90 days without resolution, details were published. The finding undermines C2PA Assurance Level 2 claims made for Pixel 10 Content Credentials.

Lobsters · security · 17h agoResearch