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Siemens Reyrolle 7SR5

CISA advisory covers 14 vulnerabilities, CVSS 9.8, in Siemens Reyrolle 7SR5 energy-sector protection relays before V2.70.

CISA advisory ICSA-26-258-05 covers 14 vulnerabilities in Siemens Reyrolle 7SR5 protection relays before V2.70, used in the energy sector worldwide, with aggregate CVSS v3 of 9.8. Flaws include Cesanta Mongoose web server issues (CVE-2024-42384 through CVE-2024-42392) and new bugs such as web-interface session-ID exposure enabling authentication bypass (CVE-2026-62645, CVSS 9.8), predictable session tokens (CVE-2026-62646, CVE-2026-62647), and pre-auth out-of-bounds writes (CVE-2026-62648). Siemens has released V2.70 and recommends updating to the latest version.

E-Commerce Access, Vedicline Data, Langflow RCE, ASUS Claim, and Energy Shell Access

SOCRadar reports underground posts claiming a Bangladeshi e-commerce database, Vedicline data leak, Langflow RCE, ASUS breach, and energy-sector shell access.

SOCRadar's Dark Web Team identified several new underground posts, including an alleged Bangladeshi e-commerce customer database offered for sale. The roundup also covers a claimed Vedicline data leak, Langflow remote code execution, an ASUS breach claim, and energy-sector shell access sales. Details on record counts and victims were not provided in the excerpt.

SOCRadar · 10d agoData breach

FamousSparrow Exploits Public-Facing Exchange Servers to Deploy SparroWocky Backdoornew

ESET attributes a new SparroWocky backdoor to espionage group FamousSparrow, deployed via exploited internet-facing Exchange servers across Latin American governments.

ESET's Welivesecurity team reports FamousSparrow gained initial access by exploiting publicly reachable Microsoft Exchange servers, with roughly 90 percent of targets since mid-2025 in Latin America, including governments in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. The group's new modular C-language backdoor SparroWocky replaces SparrowDoor and uses a three-part loader: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL side-loaded in memory, and an encrypted payload. It persists via Windows services or Registry Run keys, supports screenshots, file operations, TCP proxying, Beacon Object Files, TLS/RC4-encrypted C2, and anti-forensics such as call-stack spoofing. IOCs including loader SHA-1 hashes and C2 IP addresses were published.

Cyber Security News · 50m agoThreat actor in the wild 3 sources