LLM-Based Penetration Testing in the Presence of Honeypots
Studies honeypot-aware budget allocation for LLM attack agents, showing detector-guided policies let agents skip deception and compromise real hosts efficiently.
The paper formalizes LLM attacker behavior against honeypots as a budgeted decision process, where agents choose to continue or skip targets when honeypot suspicion arises. A detector-guided policy lets LLM agents allocate execution budget effectively across a mixed host pool in a controlled testbed. Findings show LLM-driven attackers can reason about heterogeneous artifacts and use honeypot suspicion to guide target selection, challenging traditional deception defenses that rely on realism and obscurity against human or script-driven attackers.
Honeypot-Omaha and batch.py [Guest Diary], (Wed, Sep 2nd)
A SANS ISC guest diary describes batch.py, a Python tool that consolidates honeypot logs and enriches IOCs with threat intelligence data.
Written by a SANS.edu BACS intern, the diary explains analysis of the DShield Honeypot-Omaha sensor, which uses Cowrie to emulate SSH and Telnet and log attacker activity. The author's batch.py script implements a four-phase pipeline with SHA-256-generated master and guest authentication to consolidate JSON and log files, correlate data via external APIs, and produce MITRE, CVE, geolocation, threat-score and fingerprint enrichment for investigated indicators.