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Major Cyber Threat Detection Vendors Shift from MITRE to UK Testing Program

SE Labs launched PIVOT, a six-month vendor detection testing program backed by CrowdStrike, Fortinet, Palo Alto Networks and Sophos, as major vendors exit MITRE evaluations.

SE Labs unveiled PIVOT on September 15, a six-month testing program in which its ethical hackers replicate nation-state and criminal attack chains against participating vendor products, with results due January 2027. Broadcom (Symantec/Carbon Black), CrowdStrike, Fortinet, Palo Alto Networks and Sophos have confirmed participation, and Gartner and Forrester analysts will verify the underlying evidence before publication. The launch follows declining participation in MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluations: Enterprise, which fell from 30 vendors in 2023 to 11 in 2025 after public withdrawals by Microsoft, SentinelOne and Palo Alto Networks.

Infosecurity Magazineupdated · 16h agofirst · 17h agoIndustry 14 sources

UltraViolet Cyber Equinox measures detection coverage against MITRE frameworks

UltraViolet Cyber launches Equinox, an AI-automated platform mapping SIEM and EDR detection coverage against MITRE ATT&CK and ATLAS frameworks.

UltraViolet Cyber announced Equinox, a detection engineering platform from its TIDE team that maps existing detections and log sources against MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATLAS. It performs coverage analysis in under 30 minutes and recommends vendor or custom detections to fill gaps, with engineers reviewing and backtesting each recommendation. In one customer trial, mapped technique coverage rose from 59 of 222 techniques (26.6%) to 136 of 222 (61.3%) without increasing alert volume.

Help Net Security · 1d agoTools2

Using Cyber Decoys to Strengthen Detection and Response

CISA released guidance on cyber decoys—tripwires, breadcrumbs, honeytokens—to help defenders detect adversaries using valid credentials and living-off-the-land techniques.

CISA published guidance to help defensive teams of varying maturity plan and implement cyber decoys—assets that mimic legitimate systems, accounts, or data, such as tripwires, breadcrumbs, and honeytokens—to detect adversaries using legitimate credentials and living-off-the-land techniques. The guidance frames decoys as complementing Zero Trust by producing high-fidelity alerts, reducing alert fatigue, and exposing post-compromise activity like discovery, lateral movement, and data access. It maps decoy operations to the MITRE Engage and MITRE ATT&CK frameworks with low-complexity implementation steps.

CISA Advisories · 14h agoAdvisory

Iranian cyber targeting of dissidents, activists and journalists

UK NCSC, FBI, and Dutch AIVD expose CHOSEN BRICK spyware used by Iranian state actors against dissidents, activists, and journalists worldwide.

A joint advisory from the UK NCSC, FBI, and Dutch AIVD details CHOSEN BRICK, a Windows spyware family used by Iranian state cyber actors since at least 2025 against dissidents, activists, and journalists in the UK, US, and Netherlands. Actors build rapport on WhatsApp and Telegram impersonating known contacts or platform support, then deliver disguised payloads resembling apps such as Telegram, Norton, RunwayML, or fake MRI results. The malware persists via HKCU Run registry keys, adds Microsoft Defender exclusions, and uses a unique Telegram bot C2 per victim. Capabilities include screen capture, microphone recording, process enumeration, email and messaging data theft, file deletion, and system wiping; victim data has appeared on pro-Iranian leak sites.

NCSC UK · 1d agoThreat actor in the wild2

Attack Chains, Not Just Attack Surfaces: Why Testing Individual Techniques Misses the Point

Filigran introduces Attack Chaining in OpenAEV to continuously simulate multi-stage attack paths, exposing gaps that isolated MITRE ATT&CK technique testing misses.

Filigran announced Attack Chaining, a new scenario type in its OpenAEV platform that links individual techniques into automated, continuously-run multi-stage attack paths, using each step's real output (credentials, tokens, open ports) to branch dynamically toward a final objective. The article cites Filigran's State of Threat Management report, in which 93% of security leaders reported a business-impacting cyberattack in the past 12 months, 88% said AI accelerates attackers, and 84% blamed siloed tools and disconnected testing. The 2025 DGFiP breach is cited as an example where individually survivable weaknesses chained into a major intrusion. The feature includes conditional chaining logic, live attack path mapping, structured findings for identifying chokepoints, and predefined scope and safety guardrails.

The Hacker News · 1d agoTools

Hackers Turn Windows Shadow Copies Into a Tool for Credential Theft and Ransomware

Attackers abuse Windows VSS shadow copies to delete recovery points before ransomware and to extract NTDS.dit/SAM credentials, demanding context-aware detection.

Threat actors are weaponizing the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) for two purposes: destroying local recovery points via vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, diskshadow.exe, wbadmin.exe, and bcdedit.exe before encryption, and accessing static copies of locked files such as NTDS.dit and SAM for credential theft. Ransomware families tied to shadow-copy removal include Akira, Black Basta, BlackCat, Conti, LockBit, Qilin, RansomHub, REvil, Ryuk, and WannaCry. Huntress's analysis of the Nightmare-Eclipse tool showed the BlueHammer technique chaining a Windows Defender timing issue with a VSS snapshot to dump the SAM database and decrypt NT hashes. Defenders should correlate VSS operations with parent process, hive access, and subsequent encryption activity, and maintain immutable off-host backups.

GBHackers · 1d agoResearch in the wild1

Mapping out your unknown: A threat hunter’s guide to GitHub

Datadog Security Labs publishes a threat-hunting guide with audit-log queries to detect GitHub token theft, device code phishing, and source code exfiltration.

Datadog's threat-hunting guide covers GitHub audit log queries for detecting compromised accounts, stolen personal access tokens, and malicious OAuth app authorizations. Attackers typically obtain credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, leaked secrets, or device code phishing, then map private repositories, exfiltrate source code, and pivot into connected cloud and CI/CD environments. The guide maps detections to MITRE techniques like T1078 and T1528 and documents GitHub logging quirks affecting attribution, token metadata, and visibility fields.

Datadog Security Labs · 1d agoResearch in the wild1

How Attackers Abuse VSS, and How Huntress Detects It

Huntress details how attackers abuse Windows Volume Shadow Copies for ransomware recovery sabotage and NTDS.dit credential theft, plus detection logic.

Huntress explains that attackers abuse VSS in three ways: deleting shadow copies to inhibit recovery before ransomware detonation, creating shadow copies to extract the NTDS.dit Active Directory database for offline credential theft, and manipulating shadow copy configuration. Because backup agents and RMM tools routinely create and delete shadow copies, raw events are too noisy to alert on alone. Huntress detections instead correlate VSS activity with lateral movement and credential harvesting over a time window, such as an observed sequence of PsExec spawning SYSTEM shells on a domain controller, vssadmin create shadow, a blocked deletion attempt, and DNS reconnaissance against another host.

Huntress · 2d agoResearch

AsyncRAT Malware Abuses AutoIt and PowerShell to Hide Inside Legitimate Windows Process

Point Wild details a five-stage AsyncRAT campaign using AutoIt abuse and process injection to hide a .NET RAT inside Microsoft's signed charmap.exe.

Researchers at Point Wild Threat Intelligence analyzed a campaign starting from a lure batch file ('Right-click to open Invoice Details.bat') that launches hidden PowerShell to reconstruct a Base64/XOR-obfuscated payload. The stage drops a renamed signed AutoIt interpreter and loader script into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp and achieves persistence via a batch file in the user's Startup folder (T1547.001). The loader decrypts the payload in memory with single-byte XOR key 0x36 and injects it into SysWOW64\charmap.exe using OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread, with PE-sieve confirming an in-memory implanted PE and patched AMSI modules. The final AsyncRAT payload performs screen capture and data theft, with observed C2 at 158[.]51[.]122[.]136:4944 over raw TCP.

GBHackers · 2d agoMalware3· 1 read