New hardware device can RAM into encrypted memory, expose your data
Researchers built a $200 DDR5 interposer that silently drops memory writes to break TDX, SGX, and SEV-SNP confidential VM integrity, requiring physical access.
Researchers from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google demonstrated DDRop, a hardware interposer costing under $200 that corrupts DDR5 bus commands to silently drop writes to encrypted memory, enabling replay attacks on confidential VMs. Because scalable memory encryption lacks freshness checks, protected VMs keep computing on stale attacker-selected data; on an Intel TDX server the attack forces debug mode for plaintext memory reads or forges attestation reports, succeeding in under two minutes without crashing. Intel and AMD both called the attack out of scope for their cloud threat models, with no mitigation planned, and proposed cache line versioning appears still vulnerable. The full interposer design is being released as open-source hardware.