Search: “StrongestLayer”

Attackers hijack HBO Max’s Reddit account for 48-hour malvertising blitz

Attackers hijacked HBO Max's verified Reddit account to push 108 ClickFix infostealer ads delivering AMOS, MacSync, and crypto clippers.

Threat actors compromised the verified u/hbomax Reddit account and ran 108 ClickFix malvertising ads in 48 hours as part of the PasteSwitch operation, analyzed by Hudson Rock and ADAMnetworks. macOS victims received curl-to-zsh payloads (MacSync, AMOS Helper, fake Ledger/Trezor/Exodus wallets harvesting BIP39 seed phrases); Windows users got Amatera via mshta and PowerShell loaders. Clipper C2 addresses are stored in Binance Smart Chain smart contracts, with 36 mainnet changes observed between March and July 2026.

Help Net Security·updated Sep 15, 11:51 UTC · 21h ago·first Sep 15, 10:10 UTC · 22h agoMalware in the wild 7 sources

Pick Your Poison: Learning to Select Poison Sets for Stronger LLM Backdoor Attacks

SAILS learns to select poison sets for LLM backdoor attacks, showing attack success ranges 3% to 80% at fixed poison counts across LLaMA-3-8B settings.

The paper shows existing backdoor evaluations that randomly sample a fixed number of poisoned examples severely underestimate worst-case vulnerability: across three LLaMA-3-8B settings, attack success ranges from 3% to 80% depending only on which poison set is chosen. SAILS formalizes poison selection as oracle-budgeted set optimization, learning a set scorer from a few hundred finetune-and-evaluate runs to rank millions of candidate sets and audit a small shortlist. It improves held-out attack success by 30 percentage points over the strongest influence baselines and transfers from small-scale to full-scale finetuning, extending to code-generation, agentic, and API-only backdoors.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 04:44 UTC · 2d agoAI safety & security 2 sources

The longitude problem: In the AI era, detection is won on facts, not guesses

Opinion piece argues defenders should beat AI-era attackers by carrying verified ground truth about approvers, domains, and vendors instead of relying on inference.

CSO Online contributor Alan LeFort, CEO of StrongestLayer, uses the historical longitude problem to argue that AI-era detection should rely on carried facts—authoritative records of payment approvers, owned domains, and legitimate vendors—rather than probabilistic inference that both attackers and defenders can now perform with comparable reasoning models. He illustrates with a CFO wire-fraud example defeated by checking the approver of record and the reply-to domain against ground truth. The piece stresses that ground truth decays and must be continuously maintained, like chronometers kept wound on every ship.

CSO Online·Sep 10, 10:00 UTC · 5d agoIndustry

ToxicRAG: Compromising Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems via Single-Shot Knowledge Poisoning Attacks

ToxicRAG shows a single narrative-form poisoned document can steer RAG answers, achieving 0.61-0.91 attack success rates across four LLMs.

The attack injects one document per target question written as a coherent knowledge-update narrative that acknowledges the previously accepted answer, introduces fabricated events that appear to invalidate it, and attributes the attacker-chosen answer to purported authorities. An optional answer-focused self-validation loop revises candidates when a surrogate LLM fails to reproduce the target answer. Across 100 target questions each from Natural Questions, HotpotQA, and MS-MARCO, with four victim LLMs and four dense retrievers, ToxicRAG achieves attack success rates of 0.61-0.91 and matches or exceeds the strongest baseline by 0 to 11 percentage points.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 10, 04:42 UTC · 6d agoAI safety & security1

Emergence World: Adversarial Stress-Testing of Long-Horizon Multi-Agent Systems

16-day multi-agent stress test finds no world fully resilient to prompt injection, misinformation, or memory exposure; adversarial content acted on 46 hours later.

Emergence World is a continuously running multi-agent environment for adversarial stress testing of long-horizon autonomous systems. Eight parallel 10-agent worlds (seven homogeneous frontier-model worlds plus one mixed-model world) ran for 16 days, generating over 850,000 LLM calls and nearly 50 billion tokens. Three controlled stress events—indirect prompt injection, misinformation, and exposure of private agent memories—were delivered through ordinary interaction surfaces; no world achieved full resilience. Detection did not ensure containment: agents recognized threats yet wrote adversarial content into persistent memory and acted on it up to 46 hours later, suggesting model-level alignment is not compositional.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 14, 20:00 UTC · 1d agoAI safety & security

SloppyRAT: A New Tool For Ransomware Attacks

Zscaler details SloppyRAT, a new DLL backdoor delivered via ClickFix lures that stages CastleLoader and CastleRAT ahead of ransomware attacks.

Zscaler ThreatLabz analyzed SloppyRAT, a DLL-based backdoor distributed via ClickFix lures that abuses finger.exe over TCP port 79 to download a batch script. The malware copies curl.exe to download IronPython 3.4.2 from GitHub and executes zlib-compressed Base64-encoded Python to deploy CastleLoader and CastleRAT, then reflectively loads SloppyRAT in memory. It hinders analysis using XOR stack-string obfuscation, a modified affine cipher with modulus 127, and 13 runtime-decrypted code blocks, while communicating with C2 over a reverse SOCKS channel.

Zscaler ThreatLabz·updated Sep 11, 09:12 UTC · 4d ago·first Sep 10, 14:43 UTC · 5d agoMalware in the wild 3 sources

MarkSec: Capability-Aware Evaluation of Adversarial Attacks Against LLM Watermarks

MarkSec unifies evaluation of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks with quality-constrained success metrics under shared reporting protocols.

MarkSec is a framework unifying analysis of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks under shared detector calibration, metric definitions, and reporting protocols. It introduces a quality-constrained attack success metric that jointly assesses attack effectiveness and text quality. Experiments across representative watermark families, attacks, LLMs, and datasets show that attacks strongest by watermark removal alone can fall behind general rewriting when success requires acceptable text quality, and stealing-based scrubbers often underperform the best general-scrubbing baselines.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 06:02 UTC · 1d agoResearch

From 88 lines to 1: Detecting DLL hijacking with Elastic Defend

Elastic condenses 88 lines of detection logic into one Elastic Defend 9.5.0 rule catching the DLL hijacking used by a ClickFix campaign.

The ClickFix campaign side-loads a malicious mscoree.dll next to a signed Microsoft binary and also ships a driver to kill Elastic Endpoint. Elastic rebuilt the DLL as a NativeAOT library, dropped it beside the signed binary, and confirmed that Elastic Defend 9.5.0 flags the load. The post replaces 88 lines of detection logic with a single rule for DLL search-order hijacking.

Elastic Security Labs·Aug 28, 00:00 UTC · 19d agoTools in the wild

Perplexity Details Its GPU Embedding Stack: How Ivy, Tulip and ROSE Serve pplx-embed

Perplexity details its GPU embedding serving stack (Ivy, Tulip, ROSE), which reuses LLM prefill/decode kernels, CUDA graphs, and LazyTensors to cut launch overhead.

Perplexity engineers published a deep dive on the serving infrastructure behind pplx-embed, used across Perplexity Search and its API platform. The stack comprises Ivy (Rust HTTP gateway), Tulip (gRPC scheduling and batching), and ROSE (Runtime-Optimized Serving Engine), which reuses LLM prefill and decode kernels rather than running a separate embedding engine. Optimizations include whole-model CUDA graphs with lazy capture and a LazyTensor abstraction that overlaps CPU batch preparation with in-flight GPU work. Benchmarks are reported against vLLM v0.22.0 in BF16, with FlashAttention 4 generally fastest but FlashInfer 3 winning on Qwen-based models at very long sequence lengths.

MarkTechPost·Sep 6, 03:20 UTC · 10d agoAI tools & infra1

Daisy-Chaining Trust: Investigating Faronics Deploy Abuse

Actors abuse Faronics Deploy in phishing campaigns to run PowerShell and deploy ScreenConnect while evading detection with trusted tools.

Huntress investigated attacks in which threat actors abuse Faronics Deploy, a legitimate remote management tool, as part of phishing-driven intrusions. The chain uses the trusted deployment tool to launch PowerShell commands and deploy ScreenConnect for remote access. Leveraging signed, legitimate software helps the actors blend in and evade detection.

Huntress·Aug 31, 21:00 UTC · 15d agoThreat actor in the wild

ACEA: An Adversarial Co-Evolution Arena for Head-to-Head Red-Team and Blue-Team LLM Testing

ACEA is a pluggable arena scoring LLM red-team attackers and blue-team defenses head-to-head with an LLM judge and verifiable leakage ground truth.

ACEA connects pluggable red- and blue-team adapters to a shared target LLM through the model-agnostic ASAP HTTP protocol and scores attack and defense rates per adversarial round. Canonical seeded secrets provide verifiable ground truth that separates real leakage from hallucination, and attacks are delivered to the target even when blocked to measure raw potency. The platform adds real-time battle visualization, failure-localizing end-of-battle reports, and an optional in-context improvement loop that feeds advisory hints between rounds.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 8, 04:57 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security1

HoneyRoute: Honeypot-Model Routing for Adversarial LLM Serving

HoneyRoute detects malicious LLM serving requests and diverts them to a honeypot model, reaching F1 0.911 with 38 ms median added latency.

HoneyRoute is an inference-serving layer pairing a streaming router (a frozen 0.8B embedding backbone with per-domain MLP heads) with a dual-implementation honeypot and an analysis loop that converts trapped interactions into attacker fingerprints for router retraining. On a production trace plus a seven-domain attack corpus it matches 96% of a two-tier guard-LLM cascade's F1 at 1/385th of its latency with 0% evasion under 13 adversarial transformations. Diverting malicious traffic cuts production token consumption under GCG-suffix flooding by 97.8%, and loop training raises detection F1 to 0.933.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 8, 06:26 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

Do Input-Level Defenses Transfer to Observation-Level Attacks on VideoLLMs?

A systematic study shows input-level adversarial defenses provide inconsistent, often near-zero protection against observation-level attacks on video LLMs.

Researchers introduce DefTEval, a controlled framework testing eleven input-level defenses against five attack types across five video LLMs. Harmful-content detection rates are frequently near zero, and defenses fail even when attacks embed harmful signals in every sampled frame. Token compression discards localized safety features and modality fusion down-weights weakened visual signals, with defense outcomes dominated by model architecture rather than the defense method.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 8, 06:59 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

N4D Mesh Controller: New infrastructure, a UPX-packed agent labeled "go-titan," and how to hunt for it

Datadog researchers detonated a new N4D Mesh Controller sample in microVMs, revealing rotated infrastructure, a UPX-packed go-titan agent, and persistence behavior.

Datadog Security Research executed a newer N4D Mesh Controller sample in isolated microVMs, uncovering rotated command infrastructure and a UPX-packed agent labeled go-titan. Runtime evidence showed MCP tool abuse, multi-service scanning, and persistence mechanisms. The report provides hunting guidance for defenders tracking this infrastructure.

Datadog Security Labs·Aug 20, 00:00 UTC · 27d agoMalware

[AINews] Fal’s H3 Max Live breaks the infinite videogen barrier

Fal post-trained MiniMax H3 into a 'Max' variant with 35x-faster inference, enabling faster-than-realtime AI video generation and infinite streams.

Fal post-trained MiniMax's H3 model into a 'Max' variant and optimized it for its in-house inference engine, achieving roughly 35x the speed of the official endpoint. The optimization enables faster-than-realtime video generation, demonstrated by an infinite interactive AI-generated stream productized by levels.io. The roundup also notes Meta Muse Code's general availability with an SDK, open DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Vision-Exp weights, GLM-5.3-Flash's strong agentic cost/performance rankings, and Tencent's 770B-parameter Hy4 Preview MoE with 49B active parameters.

Latent Space·Sep 1, 04:36 UTC · 15d agoAI industry

Decoy Direction Optimization: A Post-Hoc Defense Against LLM Abliteration

Researchers introduce Decoy Direction Optimization, a cheap weight-editing defense that blinds refusal-direction ablation attacks against open-weight LLM safety guardrails.

Refusal Feature Ablation bypasses safety guardrails in open-weight LLMs by projecting out a linear refusal direction, often with high attack success rates. Decoy Direction Optimization injects a high-magnitude nonlinear decoy into MLP neurons so attackers' contrastive estimators ablate a harmless orthogonal feature instead. Evaluated across six model families, DDO keeps ASR below 10% under standard RFA and on Llama-3-8B-Instruct reduces Heretic weight-level attack ASR from 88.7% to 18%. It costs 30 to 450 times less per configuration than trained defense baselines.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 13, 20:00 UTC · 2d agoAI safety & security

How Fragile Is Safety Alignment at Frontier Scale? A Single-Direction Attack on a 320B MoE

Researchers show directional ablation breaks refusal in GLM-5.3-Flash, a 320B-parameter MoE, cutting refusal by 41–89 points across seven benchmarks.

The study extends directional ablation, a white-box attack that removes an aligned LLM's refusal behavior, from dense models up to ~70B parameters to GLM-5.3-Flash, a 320B-parameter mixture-of-experts model with 288 routed experts, four-wide hyper-connection residual, and block-FP8 quantization. Editing attention, dense, and routed-expert writers jointly removes 0.776 of refusal, with 74% of the effect existing only under the joint intervention; the conventional module-name-based recipe reaches only 0.066 and fails silently on MoE architectures. The attack yields 41–89 percentage-point reductions in refusal across seven harmful benchmarks with no detected capability change, and a category-concentrated refusal residue survives all edits at ranks 1 to 12.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 9, 06:48 UTC · 7d agoAI safety & security

HollowFrame Loader Uses Fake Python DLL to Evade Defender

Infosecurity Magazine·Aug 3, 11:26 UTC · Aug 3, 2026Malware

WarmBloodAban/Minimax-h3_Singularity — new model trending #22 on Hugging Face

Community fine-tune Minimax-h3_Singularity enhances MiniMax-H3 video generation with HDR quality, distant face restoration, and improved motion, trending #22 on Hugging Face.

Minimax-h3_Singularity is a community fusion fine-tune of the MiniMax-H3 multimodal video generation model, built from multiple checkpoints and refined with pruning and weight optimization. It supports Text-to-Video, Image-to-Video, Reference-to-Video, and Video-to-Video workflows in ComfyUI, and claims improvements in HDR clarity, distant face restoration, motion fluidity, and fantasy VFX. The authors recommend pairing it with the minimax_h3_ref2v_turbo_4step_v0.1 LoRA for four-step accelerated inference, and an online demo is available via RunningHub.

Hugging Face trending models·Sep 5, 18:51 UTC · 10d agoModel release7· 1 read

Divide, Consult, Conquer: Capability Laundering Through Aligned LLMs

Attack shows unaligned orchestrators can launder capabilities from aligned frontier LLMs via benign subtask consultation, raising Gemma-4-31B CBRN rubric score from 62.3 to 83.1.

The paper introduces capability laundering, where a weaker unaligned model decomposes a harmful task into benign-looking subproblems, queries a stronger aligned model on each, and recombines answers locally, bypassing per-interaction safety evaluations. Evaluation used GPT-5.5, Claude Opus 4.8, and Grok-4.3 as consultants to four local orchestrators on CyBench, BountyBench, and CBRN tasks. On CyBench, Gemma-4-31B recovered 8/14 candidate tasks with GPT-5.5 and 7/9 with Opus, while Muse-Glimmer-30B recovered none. Across an eight-step hypothetical bioweapon attack chain, consultation raised Gemma-4-31B's mean rubric score from 62.3 to 83.1, exposing a gap in defenses that only refuse complete harmful tasks.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 11:10 UTC · 1d agoAI safety & security

InceptionRAG: Stealthy Poisoning Attack Against Retrieval-Augmented Generation

InceptionRAG fragments malicious payloads into dormant passages that trigger LLMs to self-deduce misinformation via multi-hop reasoning, bypassing existing RAG poisoning defenses.

Researchers introduce InceptionRAG, a stealthy corpus poisoning attack against retrieval-augmented generation that splits a malicious payload into a chain of individually harmless dormant passages. When retrieved together, the passages induce LLMs to self-deduce target misinformation through multi-hop reasoning, achieving over 80% attack success rate across three datasets and three LLMs under rigorous adversarial constraints. A zeroth-order suffix optimization (ZOSO) method automates authoritative suffix generation in black-box settings. The authors also propose HODOR, a document isolation defense that decouples adversarial logical dependencies.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 08:22 UTC · 1d agoResearch

VU#308749: Remote Code Execution and Arbitrary File Read Vulnerabilities in Kaltura Servers

Insecure deserialization in Kaltura's legacy HTML5 Player V2 (mwEmbed) allows arbitrary file read and remote code execution; Player V7 is unaffected.

CERT/CC issued VU#308749 for two flaws in Kaltura's HTML5 Player V2 library (mwEmbed/html5lib), both caused by the same insecure deserialization bug. The flaws enable arbitrary file read and remote code execution via the exposed mwEmbedLoader.php endpoint. Affected versions include html5lib v2.45, v2.103 and earlier, and other v2.x releases; the currently supported Player V7 is unaffected. No evidence of exploitation was cited.

CERT/CC Vulnerability Notes·Aug 25, 16:11 UTC · 21d agoVulnerability

Testing reveals Claude Mythos's offensive capabilities and limits

Help Net Security·Aug 5, 12:04 UTC · Aug 5, 2026Exploit / PoC

An Open-Source End-to-End FHE Implementation for Privacy-Preserving Llama 3 8B Inference

Odin runs Llama-3-8B fully homomorphic encrypted inference on a single H100 in 366 seconds, a 4.51x speedup over THOR.

Odin is an open-source end-to-end GPU CKKS implementation for privacy-preserving Llama-3-8B inference that co-designs ciphertext packing with model execution. A feature-major cross-layer layout unifies residual connections and layer interfaces, while transient intra-operator layouts serve linear projections and attention, avoiding intermediate repacking of QK^T softmax outputs. Minimax polynomial approximation with input-range control reduces polynomial degree and multiplicative depth for nonlinear ops. With 128-token input, Odin evaluates all 32 Transformer layers on one NVIDIA H100 80 GB in 366.4 s using 58.9 GiB peak memory, versus 1651.9 s for the THOR baseline, a 4.51x speedup.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 11, 02:51 UTC · 5d agoResearch