Search: “api-credentials”

Active Exploitation Attempts Target WSO2 API Manager JWT Bypass With Forged Admin Tokens

watchTowr observed active exploitation of CVE-2026-5430, a WSO2 API Manager JWT bypass using forged admin tokens, risking credential theft and account takeover.

CVE-2026-5430 (CVSS 9.8-10.0), an improper cryptographic signature verification flaw in WSO2 API Manager, lets JWT authentication be bypassed with unsupported algorithms, enabling administrative account takeover. watchTowr honeypots captured forged JWT tokens with baked-in administrator privileges on September 13, 2026, which could expose API credentials, consumer keys, and secrets for every registered application. Affected products include WSO2 API Manager 4.1.0-4.6.0, API Control Plane, Traffic Manager, and Universal Gateway. Fixes are available via GitHub pull requests and subscription update levels, and users are urged to patch immediately.

The Hacker News·updated 15:05 UTC · 4h ago·first 05:18 UTC · 14h agoExploit / PoC in the wild 3 sourcesCVE-2026-5430

CVE-2026-76187: Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: Any realm client's credentials mint an Airflow session JWT

Apache Airflow Keycloak provider before 0.10.0 lets any confidential client's credentials in the realm mint an Airflow session JWT.

CVE-2026-76187 affects apache-airflow-providers-keycloak before 0.10.0. The unauthenticated token endpoint accepts a client-credentials grant for any confidential client registered in the Keycloak realm, not only the client configured for Airflow. No allowlist restricts which client ids may authenticate, so credentials of an unrelated application can obtain an Airflow session JWT. Severity is rated moderate.

oss-security·Sep 15, 19:54 UTC · 23h agoVulnerability 2 sourcesCVE-2026-76187

Postman Passport controls API access without exposing credentials

Postman launches Passport, a secretless API access product keeping real credentials inside customer environments for humans and AI agents.

Postman announced general availability of Passport by Postman, a standalone API security product that keeps real API keys and tokens inside customers' own secret stores and issues inert secret references to developers, machines, and AI agents. It enforces grants down to exact action, host, and path, provides full call attribution and second-level revocation, and mints ephemeral task-scoped identities for agent fleets where sub-agents inherit only subsets of parent permissions. The product targets credential sprawl as AI agents call APIs at roughly 1,000x the rate of humans.

Help Net Security·Sep 15, 13:40 UTC · 1d agoTools

Securing Claude Code: The New Compliance API, Local Visibility, and Identity Governance

Anthropic's new Compliance API endpoints expose Claude Code local session transcripts, highlighting governance gaps for endpoint AI agents.

Anthropic added local session transcript endpoints to its Compliance API on August 11, 2026, giving security teams visibility into prompts, bash commands, file operations, and MCP commands run by Claude Code harnesses on endpoints. The article argues local harnesses break the classic shared-responsibility model, citing Token Security data that 68.6% of discovered AI agents run on endpoints, and a Cloud Security Alliance survey of 418 IT and security professionals in which 82% found an unknown agent within the past year. It outlines three governance layers: Anthropic managed settings as a policy baseline, the Compliance API for cloud-visible transcripts, and endpoint telemetry to connect agent activity to identity, credentials, and permissions.

The Hacker News·Aug 31, 11:31 UTC · 16d agoAI safety & security1

Password spraying campaign targets AWS root user accounts across 150+ organizations

Datadog researchers observed a password spraying campaign attempting to authenticate as AWS root users across 150+ organizations.

Datadog Security Research observed a large-scale password spraying campaign attempting to authenticate as AWS root user accounts across more than 150 organizations. The campaign targeted root credentials rather than standard IAM users, and no confirmed compromises are stated in the report. Root account access would grant full control of affected AWS environments, making this a significant credential-attack campaign for cloud defenders.

Datadog Security Labs·Aug 31, 00:00 UTC · 16d agoThreat actor in the wild

Cisco Identity Services Engine Information Disclosure Vulnerability

Cisco patched an ISE API flaw letting an authenticated administrator view sensitive data including hashed credentials via crafted API requests.

A vulnerability in the Cisco Identity Services Engine API allows an authenticated remote attacker with valid administrative credentials to view sensitive information, including hashed credentials usable in future attacks. The flaw is caused by insufficient validation of user-supplied API request parameters. Cisco has released software updates.

Cisco Security Advisories·16:00 UTC · 3h agoAdvisory 15 sources

Attackers are going after prominent individuals through OAuth phishing, FBI warns

FBI IC3 warns of ongoing OAuth consent phishing since late 2025 targeting prominent individuals to gain persistent, password-free account access.

Attackers register malicious applications with legitimate OAuth providers, impersonate journalists, academics, event organizers, or government officials on messaging apps and email, and lure targets into approving permission requests on real Microsoft or Google login pages. Once approved, the attacker's application can read and send emails and access sensitive files within granted permissions, bypassing both passwords and MFA. The FBI notes password changes do not revoke this access; victims must invalidate the OAuth token in application security settings, and no attribution or victim list has been disclosed.

Help Net Security·Sep 2, 00:00 UTC · 14d agoPhishing & fraud in the wild

A five-part inventory for your AI agent credentials

Orchid's CEO recommends inventorying five attributes of AI agent credentials to rein in over-privileged OAuth tokens and service accounts.

In a Help Net Security video, Orchid co-founder and CEO Roy Katmor argues that AI agents accumulate OAuth tokens, API keys, service accounts, and borrowed human credentials that sit outside normal identity review, leading to authority well beyond the agent's original purpose. He proposes treating each agent as an application and documenting owner and purpose, reachable tools, credentials, effective authority, and runtime behavior. Teams can then compare approved intent with observed behavior and apply scoped controls, including targeted kill switches.

Help Net Security·Sep 6, 14:15 UTC · 10d agoAI safety & security

A rant about phishing: It's not the user's fault (and not DNS either)

Opinion piece argues multi-domain login redirects make legitimate flows indistinguishable from phishing, urging organizations to standardize on one recognizable root domain.

The author shows a real-world login flow that chains through numerous third-party domains (identity providers, cloud auth endpoints, OAuth APIs, 2FA pages), none on the company's own domain, so credentials and 2FA prompts are trivially impersonable. The piece argues URLs are inherently confusing because the security-relevant second-level domain sits mid-string, and that users trained to ignore URLs cannot distinguish legitimate pages from scams. It proposes RFC 2119-style requirements: single recognizable root domain, internal services on its subdomains, emailed or SMS links on that domain, and local redirects instead of third-party hosted pages.

Lobsters · security·Sep 10, 15:14 UTC · 6d agoPhishing & fraud

This Key Will Self-Destruct: An Open Standard for Revocable API Keys

SecurityWeek opinion piece proposes ORKS, an open standard adding issuer prefixes, discovery files, and unauthenticated revocation endpoints to make leaked API keys quickly revocable.

The article argues that plain API keys leak frequently yet lack any standardized revocation mechanism, unlike OAuth tokens which gained RFC 7009 revocation in 2013, and that GitHub's Secret Scanning Partner Program solves this only in a proprietary, invite-only way. The author proposes ORKS (Open Revocable Key Standard), with a draft spec on GitHub, built on four parts: keys embedding their issuer domain in a fixed prefix format, a discoverable /.well-known/api-key-config JSON file, unauthenticated revocation by possession of the full key, and declared constraints such as IP allowlists, expiry, scopes, and mTLS. An optional quarantine mode inspired by Toyota's andon cord restricts a reported key to read-only and throttled operation for a default 24-hour window before automatic revocation. The piece frames AI agents as making this urgent, since agents hold many credentials, can exfiltrate them via prompt injection, and can leak secrets into logs at machine speed.

SecurityWeek·Sep 9, 10:00 UTC · 7d agoTools1

iAuthFlow v2: The $10,000 Phishing Toolkit That Survives Your Password Reset

Abnormal Security details iAuthFlow v2, a $10,000 phishing kit that enrolls attacker-controlled passkeys on Google accounts, persisting through password resets.

Abnormal Security analyzed iAuthFlow v2, a phishing toolkit sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum for a $10,000 base price with additional capability modules sold separately. Using a browser-in-the-middle relay behind a trycloudflare.com subdomain with valid TLS, it captures Google logins and uses the authenticated session to enroll an attacker-controlled passkey within six seconds of login. Because the passkey persists after password changes and session revocation, operators regain mailbox access even after victims reset credentials. The build examined targets Google, while the seller advertises versions for Microsoft, iCloud, and LinkedIn.

Security Affairs·Aug 24, 07:17 UTC · 23d agoPhishing & fraud1

VU#889462: Casdoor authentication server is vulnerable to authorization bypass

Casdoor IAM versions 3.115.0 and earlier allow organization admins to bypass tenant isolation through inconsistent authorization checks, tracked as CVE-2026-15630.

CERT/CC published VU#889462 describing an authorization bypass in Casdoor, an open-source access management platform, affecting versions 3.115.0 and earlier. The flaw (CVE-2026-15630) stems from controllers ignoring the ?id= query parameter used for authorization decisions and acting on JSON body fields instead, letting a single-organization administrator perform unauthorized administrative actions against arbitrary organizations in multi-tenant deployments. Impact can escalate to complete tenant-isolation compromise and potential compromise of the entire Casdoor instance, including SSO/SAML disruption. No vendor patch is available because researchers could not reach Casdoor; mitigations include least privilege, MFA for admin accounts, and alerting on cross-organization administrative activity.

CERT/CC Vulnerability Notes·Sep 3, 17:03 UTC · 13d agoVulnerabilityCVE-2026-15630

Leaked n8n API Tokens Exposed Live Instances to Credential Theft

The Hacker News·Aug 5, 10:35 UTC · Aug 5, 2026Exploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2025-68613

Bogus recruiters go after high-value corporate credentials on mobile

Zimperium details browser-in-the-browser recruitment scams stealing corporate credentials on mobile, impersonating Amazon, Apple, Boeing, and Deloitte.

Zimperium reports scammers posing as HR staff use browser-in-the-browser (BitB) phishing via fake interview scheduling flows to steal corporate credentials. The kit pre-qualifies victims by rejecting personal email addresses, then captures credentials that grant OAuth tokens, internal communications, and cloud access enabling lateral movement. Domains impersonating Amazon, Louis Vuitton, Apple, FIFA, Boeing, Deloitte and others were tracked for a year, mostly hosted on AWS and SEDO, with 46 previously unpublished IOCs released.

Help Net Security·Aug 26, 00:00 UTC · 21d agoPhishing & fraud in the wild

Product showcase: GitGuardian Honeytoken catches credential theft as it happens

GitGuardian now deploys honeytoken decoy AWS credentials across developer fleets via MDM, generating high-fidelity alerts when infostealers test stolen credentials.

GitGuardian extended its honeytoken platform so decoy AWS credentials can deploy fleet-wide to developer laptops through existing MDM tooling, with deleted decoys automatically replaced at the next sync. When a harvester tests a decoy, the platform logs the API call in the controlling AWS account and raises an incident naming the source machine and file, routed via email, Slack, Teams, ServiceNow, or webhooks. The capability responds to infostealers such as Shai-Hulud that scan entire filesystems and validate stolen credentials within seconds. GitGuardian is building decoys for Kubernetes and package registry credentials using random, structure-free identifiers that resist detection.

Help Net Security·Sep 10, 05:30 UTC · 6d agoTools

Impersonating IT support: how threat actors turn a remote session into enterprise-wide access

Microsoft details Teams IT-support impersonation campaigns deploying Node.js implants, AD reconnaissance, and WinRM lateral movement toward domain controllers.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes a human-operated campaign where attackers impersonate IT/helpdesk staff via Microsoft Teams external collaboration, talk users into granting remote sessions, and use RMM tools for interactive access. During the session they run PowerShell to silently install a malicious MSI that stages a portable Node.js runtime and obfuscated JavaScript implant for C2, executing follow-on payloads via rundll32. Operators then perform host and Active Directory reconnaissance, capture desktop screenshots, and pivot via WinRM on port 5985 to domain controllers and certificate authorities. The hands-on-keyboard chain, which can precede data theft and ransomware, blends into normal operations by relying on Teams, Quick Assist, msiexec, and Node.js; Microsoft shares hunting and mitigation guidance.

Microsoft Security Blog·Sep 2, 22:51 UTC · 13d agoThreat actor in the wild

CVE-2026-49364: Apache Artemis, Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: Pre-Authentication Cluster Credential Exposure to Discovered Peers

Apache Artemis CVE-2026-49364 exposes cluster credentials to network-adjacent peers discovered before authentication completes.

Apache disclosed a pre-authentication credential exposure issue in Apache Artemis and Apache ActiveMQ Artemis, tracked as CVE-2026-49364. Affected components span artemis-core-client and artemis-server from version 1.0.0 (ActiveMQ Artemis) and 2.50.0 (Artemis) through 2.44.0 and 2.56.0 respectively. An unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker can leverage credentials exposed to discovered cluster peers. Apache rates the issue as important.

oss-security·Sep 10, 00:43 UTC · 6d agoVulnerability 7 sourcesCVE-2026-493641

Nearly 1 in 10 Exposed LiteLLM Gateways Accepted the Example "sk-1234" Admin Key

Wiz found 294 of 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM gateways accepted the documented default admin key sk-1234, exposing provider API keys and cloud IAM credentials.

Wiz Research's February Shodan scan found 3,074 LiteLLM gateways, 294 of which accepted the setup guide's sk-1234 admin key; 191 had no master key set and would accept any credential. The master key doubles as the authentication switch, and before 1.82.0-stable a gateway started without one granted every request full admin rights, exposing stored provider API keys, prompts, and MCP-connected tools. A documented pass-through endpoint lacks checks against private and cloud metadata addresses, letting an admin-key holder retrieve cloud IAM credentials, though no real-world abuse is reported. Related LiteLLM flaws include CVE-2026-59821 (disputed guardrail code execution), CVE-2026-59822 (CVSS 8.8, added to CISA KEV on September 2 and observed against Wiz honeypots), and CVE-2026-42271, used to install a cryptominer.

The Hacker News·updated Sep 10, 12:56 UTC · 6d ago·first Sep 10, 07:12 UTC · 6d agoVulnerability in the wild 3 sourcesCVE-2026-59821CVE-2026-59822CVE-2026-42271+2 CVEs

RightCrowd Pass unifies mobile, physical, and biometric credentials

RightCrowd launched Pass, a credentialing platform unifying mobile, physical, and biometric access credentials, cutting credential revocation from 12.2 minutes to under 60 seconds.

RightCrowd announced Pass, a solution that issues and manages mobile, physical, and biometric access credentials from a single platform instead of fragmented badge programs. Mobile credentials are provisioned through a web-based API and can be suspended or revoked individually or in groups in under 60 seconds, versus an average 12.2 minutes for handling a lost or damaged physical badge. Each mobile credential is tied to a device via two-factor authentication, works with HID, Wavelynx, and LEGIC infrastructure, and counts toward LEED and BREEAM sustainability credits. The product is available now to new and existing customers and can be added to current RightCrowd SmartAccess deployments.

Help Net Security·Aug 26, 00:00 UTC · 21d agoTools

Attacker stole a METR API key, used $600K worth of credits, and no one noticed for weeks

Attackers stole a METR API key via an exposed agent-run EC2 instance and consumed about $600,000 in public model credits over three weeks.

AI evaluation nonprofit METR disclosed two incidents. In March 2026, a fail-open bug in a vibe-coded app disabled authentication on a publicly accessible EC2 instance; an attacker prompted the running agent to reveal a model provider API key, added an SSH key for persistence, and consumed roughly $600,000 in free public-model credits over three weeks without being noticed. In May 2026, attackers probed METR's public infrastructure using agents, automated vulnerability discovery, credential stuffing, OAuth token attempts, and phishing; a separately exposed read-only SQL mechanism found by a bug bounty hunter risked leaking unpublished evaluation data, but no access to non-public data was confirmed.

The Register · Security·Sep 1, 20:45 UTC · 14d agoData breach in the wild1

CREST Onboards First Cohort for AI-Enabled Pentesting Accreditation

CREST accredited 10 companies, including ImmuniWeb and Thoropass, in the first cohort of its new AI-Enabled Penetration Testing accreditation.

CREST granted its AI-Enabled Penetration Testing accreditation, an optional module added in July 2026 to its Penetration Testing Accreditation Standard, to a first cohort of 10 firms spanning Europe, India, the US, and Canada, including Closed Door Security, ImmuniWeb, JUMPSEC, Packetlabs, Pentesys, REDSECLABS, Risk Associates, SECNORA, Solusec, and Thoropass. The module lets providers that integrate AI into pentesting demonstrate responsible AI governance through independent assessment. A March 2026 CREST report found 76% of cybersecurity providers increased AI usage year over year and 69% already integrate it into daily service delivery; its June AI Charter has been signed by over 100 organizations.

Infosecurity Magazine·Sep 3, 13:00 UTC · 13d agoIndustry

Authorization Architectures for Tool-Using AI Agents

Review paper proposes an authorization reference architecture for tool-using AI agents, identifying runtime enforcement and delegation bounds as unresolved gaps.

This review examines authorization models for tool-using AI agents that invoke APIs, databases, browsers, and protocols like MCP, arguing every consequential agent action must be traceable to a human principal, bounded by delegation, and contestable. It introduces a principal hierarchy spanning human user, operator/deployer, orchestrator agent, sub-agent, and tool endpoint, and analyzes five layers including credential lifecycle, delegation propagation, runtime enforcement, prompt injection as authorization bypass, and auditability. Drawing on 89 primary sources from 2023-2026, it proposes seven structural requirements, a four-layer reference architecture, and three deployable configurations.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 17:21 UTC · 2d agoAI safety & security

AI agent authorization risks remain a gap in new NIST-CISA token security guidance

NIST and CISA release IR 8587 guidance on securing signed tokens, but AI agent authorization and delegation risks remain out of scope.

NIST, with CISA support, published 'Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse' (NIST IR 8587), recommending continuous monitoring and tighter token lifecycle controls for SSO and API access. The guidance does not yet fully address AI agent identity, delegation chains, or prompt injection steering agents with valid tokens, and NIST says new or expanded standards are needed. Experts recommend treating AI agents as low-trust non-human identities, maintaining agent inventories, expiring credentials after task completion, and requiring human approval for high-risk actions. The report references shared-signal mechanisms like CAEP and RISC, and follows a May incident where a CISA contractor GitHub repository exposed AWS and GitHub tokens.

CSO Online·15:42 UTC · 4h agoAdvisory

Wordfence Argus Finds Critical Authentication Bypass in WPMU DEV Dashboard Plugin

Wordfence researchers disclosed a critical unauthenticated authentication bypass in the WPMU DEV Dashboard plugin, enabling admin takeover and possible RCE.

During internal research on August 19, 2026, Wordfence discovered an authentication bypass in the WPMU DEV Dashboard WordPress plugin, which has roughly 350,000 active installations. Unauthenticated attackers can gain administrator access when Hub Single-Sign On is enabled, enabling complete site takeover. If an administrator-writable code mechanism such as the plugin or theme editor is available, the flaw can lead to remote code execution.

Wordfence·Aug 27, 17:41 UTC · 20d agoVulnerability

NIST Issues New Guidance to Protect SSO and API Tokens From Theft and Forgery

NIST released IR 8587 giving agencies and cloud providers recommendations to prevent identity token forgery, theft, and misuse in SSO and API environments.

NIST Internal Report 8587, released September 15, 2026, provides implementation recommendations covering token creation, signing, validation, storage, revocation, and lifecycle management for SAML, OpenID Connect, and OAuth 2.0 environments. It builds on SP 800-53 Rev. 5.1.1 and incorporates lessons from breaches involving stolen signing keys, abused OAuth applications, and replayed federated assertions. Recommendations include strong signing algorithms, strict claim validation, short token lifetimes, token binding, leakage prevention, and monitoring for abnormal token use.

GBHackers·07:44 UTC · 12h agoAdvisory 2 sources