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Attackers use passkey-themed scams to hijack Microsoft 365 accounts

Microsoft tracks ongoing M365 cloud intrusions since May using passkey-themed helpdesk vishing, AiTM phishing, and device-code abuse.

Microsoft Security Research has tracked active cloud intrusions since May in which attackers posing as IT helpdesk staff lured employees with fake passkey/MFA enrollment requests. Attacks used adversary-in-the-middle phishing pages, device-code authentication flows, and Teams messages from compromised accounts. Attackers registered their own MFA methods, enumerated tenants via Microsoft Graph, and accessed SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange Online data, throttling activity below 1000 files/emails per hour.

CSO Onlineupdated · 4d agofirst · 5d agoThreat actor in the wild 9 sources1

Hackers Can Turn AI Workflows Into Privileged Data-Stealing Proxies Without Jailbreaking Models

Noma Labs describes Workflow Identity Hijacking, where unauthenticated external requesters abuse AI workflows' privileged service accounts to exfiltrate internal data without prompt injection.

Noma Labs identified 'Workflow Identity Hijacking,' an authorization gap in enterprise AI workflows triggered via public inboxes, web forms, GitHub issues, and support systems. Attackers submit legitimate-looking requests that cause workflows to retrieve and disclose internal data using privileged service accounts or creator credentials, without any prompt injection or model misbehavior. Defenses include propagating requester identity through workflows, short-lived scoped tokens, and access-control checks before sensitive actions.

Cyber Security News · 5d agoAI safety & security 2 sources

Identity-Based AI Attack Threatens Security of Enterprise Data

Dark Reading describes 'workflow identity hijacking,' an identity-based attack that hijacks enterprise AI workflows through unauthenticated entry points.

Dark Reading reports on 'workflow identity hijacking,' an identity-based attack technique targeting AI-driven enterprise workflows. The technique reportedly bypasses standard security controls by sending a basic request through an unauthenticated entry point to hijack an organization's data. The teaser provides no further technical detail, affected products, or attribution.

Dark Reading · 6d agoAI safety & security

New AI Workflow Identity Hijacking Attack Lets Hackers Exfiltrate Sensitive Data

Noma Labs disclosed Workflow Identity Hijacking, an AI automation flaw letting anonymous users trigger privileged data exfiltration without prompt injection or stolen credentials.

Noma Labs researcher Sasi Levi described Workflow Identity Hijacking, where AI workflows process untrusted input from low-privileged or anonymous users but execute downstream actions with the workflow creator's elevated permissions, turning the pipeline into an unauthenticated proxy. Unlike prompt injection, the model is not tricked; the flaw is a missing authorization check between the requester and the privileged actions. Noma Labs also disclosed and helped fix a similar issue in Google Workflows, and linked the problem to the earlier GitLost research on GitHub Agentic Workflows. Recommended mitigations include per-user identity propagation, least-privilege service accounts and authorization checks before every downstream action.

GBHackers · 6d agoAI safety & security

What researchers learned about building an LLM security workflow

Oslo and FFI researchers show structured agentic workflows lift LLM alert-triage accuracy from 0% to about 93% on malicious cases.

Researchers at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment tested GPT-5-mini, Claude 3 Haiku, Qwen3:30B, and Gemma 3:27B on alerts from the AIT Log Data Set V1.1; given only alert descriptions and log summaries, all four models correctly flagged zero percent of true-positive cases involving reconnaissance, brute-force logins, and initial access. Wrapping the same models in a workflow with constrained SQL queries over Suricata logs, an evidence summarizer, and a verdict stage with revision loops raised malicious-case accuracy to an average of 93 percent, with GPT-5-mini identifying every malicious case across 100 runs. The authors flag it as a proof-of-concept on one synthetic scenario and note models skewed conservative on benign alerts, with GPT-5-mini marking every benign case uncertain.

Help Net Security · 23d agoAI research1

Unmasking Cloud Identities: From Behavioral Clustering to Automated Detection

Unit 42 clusters behavior of 40,000+ AWS identities from 125 cloud environments to map functional roles and enable lightweight SQL-based detection.

Palo Alto Unit 42 built an unsupervised behavioral clustering model using UMAP and HDBSCAN on AWS CloudTrail logs to map cloud identities to functional roles such as administrators, backup services, security tooling and DevOps. The study analyzed over 40,000 identities across 125 cloud environments over two months. The researchers show that heuristics extracted from the clustering map can be implemented in standard SQL, enabling role classification at scale without running a continuous ML pipeline. The methodology extends to audit logs from other cloud providers, SaaS and Kubernetes.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 2d agoResearch

The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE

Unit 42 demonstrates that root access on a Kubernetes node lets attackers spoof SPIFFE/SPIRE attestation and harvest co-located workloads' SVIDs.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 describes post-exploitation techniques in which an attacker with root on a compromised Kubernetes node spoofs Linux cgroup metadata used by the SPIRE agent during workload attestation, tricking it into issuing a co-located workload's SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document to an attacker-controlled process. The research shows the core trust assumption of machine-identity systems—that the node is trusted—collapses once root is obtained, exposing all cryptographic identities scoped to that node. Unit 42 released an open-source tool, Spooffe, for defenders to test identity exposure, and notes the technique has not been observed exploited in the wild.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 6d agoResearch1

From Infostealer Log to Marketplace Listing: A Technical Walkthrough of the Credential Theft Pipeline

Cyble walkthrough maps how infostealer logs move from endpoint infection through aggregation and enrichment to dark web credential marketplace sales.

Cyble breaks the credential theft pipeline into stages: infostealer execution harvesting browser credential stores, cookies, session tokens, crypto wallets, and FTP configurations; aggregation of stealer logs via C2 panels into bundled archives; parsing and enrichment against previously leaked datasets; and final listing on dark web marketplaces. Enrichment adds employer and role context that raises prices and enables credential stuffing across reused passwords. The report advises SOC teams to monitor stealer logs and marketplace chatter early rather than waiting for breach alerts.

Cyble · 6d agoMalware1

AI supply chain risk is showing up in developer workflows first

Zentera Systems CEO says AI supply chain attacks currently hit developer workflows first, advising segmentation over tooling and citing the Phantom Raven campaign.

In an interview, Zentera Systems CEO Dr. Jaushin Lee argues that most active AI supply chain incidents target developer workflows and open-source package repositories, while poisoned model weights, compromised MCP servers, and poisoned vector stores remain largely in research and demos. He cites the active 'Phantom Raven' campaign, where attackers register AI-hallucinated package names in public repositories with malicious payloads that silently infect vibe-coding build pipelines. He recommends software-defined segmentation, semiconductor-style project enclaves with egress controls, and warns that self-hosting models without agent sandboxing leaves exposure unchanged.

Help Net Security · 22d agoAI safety & security

When AI infrastructure becomes the target: Securing gateways and control points

Microsoft Threat Intelligence details attacks on exposed AI workloads exploiting LiteLLM gateways for credential harvesting, persistence, and cryptomining.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence examines attacks targeting exposed AI workloads, including exploitation of LiteLLM gateway deployments. Post-exploitation activity includes credential harvesting, establishing persistence, and cryptomining. The post urges defenders to secure AI infrastructure gateways and control points; the available text does not name threat actors, CVEs, or provide IOCs.

Microsoft Security Blog · 20d agoExploit / PoC in the wild

Intezer adds native response automation without separate SOAR

Intezer launched Workflows, native response automation inside its AI SOC, letting teams automate remediation without a separate SOAR platform.

Intezer announced Workflows, a native automation and response builder inside its AI SOC platform that lets security teams run post-investigation actions such as closing alerts, isolating hosts, and updating tickets without a separate SOAR. Workflows are created through natural language via MCP, inherit full investigation context, and are logged for audit, with per-tenant routing and customer communications aimed at MSSPs. The announcement cites Intezer's AI SOC Report 2026 finding that nearly 1% of real incidents trace back to lowest-severity alerts.

Help Net Security · 28d agoTools

Harnessing LLMs for Automating BOLA Detection

Unit 42's BOLABuster methodology uses LLMs to automate detection of broken object-level authorization vulnerabilities, uncovering flaws in Grafana, Harbor, and Easy!Appointments.

Palo Alto Unit 42 details BOLABuster, a methodology combining large language models with heuristics to automate detection of broken object-level authorization (BOLA) flaws, which traditional fuzzing and static analysis struggle to find. The approach uses LLM reasoning to understand application logic, map endpoint dependency relationships, and generate and interpret test cases. It found CVE-2024-1313 in Grafana, CVE-2024-22278 in Harbor, and 15 CVEs in Easy!Appointments. The team is continuing to hunt for BOLAs in open-source and internal projects.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 29d agoResearchCVE-2024-1313CVE-2024-22278CVE-2023-3285+14 CVEs

Hackers Impersonate IT Support on Microsoft Teams to Take Control of Employee PCs

Microsoft warns of a human-operated campaign where attackers pose as IT support in Teams to gain remote PC control and reach domain controllers.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed attackers abusing Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT/helpdesk staff, persuading employees to grant screen control via Quick Assist or RMM tools. Operators deploy malicious MSI packages via silent msiexec, run encrypted JavaScript implants through portable Node.js, and persist via EdgeUpdate Run keys or Startup folder entries. The Node.js backdoor uses HTTPS long-polling C2, captures screenshots, enumerates Active Directory, and moves laterally over WinRM (TCP 5985) to domain controllers and certificate authorities. Initial access maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1566.003 (Spearphishing via Service); no Teams vulnerability is exploited.

GBHackers · 7d agoPhishing & fraud in the wild

Securing AI agents: Key controls and best practices

Security experts warn AI agents with employee-level privileges outpace human access controls and advise layered enforcement, sandboxing, and approval gates.

CSO reports that enterprises granting AI agents credentials, tools, and network access face risks that human-focused identity controls cannot contain, including machine-speed action chaining and sub-agent spawning. Experts from Strike Graph, Veracode, Delinea, and XBOW recommend treating agents as privileged insiders with hard technical boundaries: egress proxies with allowlists, short-lived brokered tokens, separated read/write rights, and approval for high-risk actions. XBOW describes a layered architecture with a guardian model reviewing agent actions and per-agent audit files. OWASP guidance on excessive agency urges limiting agent functions, permissions, and autonomy with authorization enforced downstream.

CSO Online · 8d agoAI safety & security

U.S. CISA adds a MLflow flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

CISA added actively exploited MLflow SSRF flaw CVE-2026-64849 (CVSS 9.3) to its KEV catalog; attackers are stealing cloud credentials from exposed instances.

CISA added CVE-2026-64849, a critical unauthenticated server-side request forgery in MLflow, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The flaw affects MLflow versions before 3.15.0 and allows unauthenticated attackers to reach internal services including cloud metadata endpoints, exposing temporary cloud credentials. watchTowr observed in-the-wild exploitation exfiltrating credentials and secrets, plus widespread scanning of exposed MLflow instances within hours of the CVE's assignment on August 17, 2026. MLflow is an open-source platform for managing the machine learning and AI development lifecycle with over 60 million monthly downloads.

Security Affairs · 27d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-64849

The modern attack chain: Rethinking Google Workspace security in the age of AI

Analysis of Vercel and Composio breaches shows stolen OAuth tokens, not phishing email, now open Google Workspace attacks — a path authorized AI agents follow.

The author analyzes the Vercel and Composio breaches as the same OAuth-first attack chain run twice: a stolen OAuth token, obtained via a compromised supplier, becomes the entry point rather than email. These tokens survive password resets, are hard to observe, and let attackers read Gmail and Drive data, take over accounts, and pivot laterally using stored credentials and password-reset magic links. The piece warns that authorized AI agents with overbroad OAuth grants can unintentionally traverse the same path — accessing inboxes, reading sensitive content, and exfiltrating data downstream — without any malicious actor or compromised credential.

Help Net Security · 5h agoResearch in the wild

Attackers Exploit MLflow SSRF Flaw to Steal Cloud Credentials and Secrets

Attackers exploit MLflow SSRF CVE-2026-64849 (CVSS 9.3) to steal cloud credentials; CISA added it to KEV; FUXA flaw CVE-2026-25895 is being scanned.

watchTowr observed exploitation of MLflow CVE-2026-64849, an unauthenticated SSRF (CVSS 9.3) affecting versions below 3.15.0, within hours of CVE assignment on August 17, 2026, with attackers abusing model-registry webhooks to reach cloud metadata endpoints and exfiltrate credentials and secrets. CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on August 19, 2026, with a September 2 patch deadline for federal civilian agencies. VulnCheck reported scanning of FUXA CVE-2026-25895 (missing authentication plus path traversal, CVSS 9.5, versions through 1.2.9) beginning August 18; about 60 FUXA instances are exposed and no RCE payloads have been dropped yet.

The Hacker News · 27d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-64849CVE-2026-25895CVE-2026-25939+1 CVEs

[webapps] Langflow 1.10.0 - RCE

A public proof-of-concept demonstrates remote code execution in Langflow 1.10.0, the open-source AI workflow builder.

Exploit-DB lists a remote code execution proof of concept targeting Langflow version 1.10.0. Langflow is a widely used open-source tool for building AI agent and LLM workflows. The listing does not include a CVE id or evidence of in-the-wild exploitation, but RCE in AI development tooling is relevant to teams running it in production.

Exploit-DB · 14d agoExploit / PoC1

IDORacle: Template-Guided SQL-Sink Mediation for Object-Level Authorization in Java Applications

IDORacle intercepts MyBatis/JDBC SQL sinks to block horizontal privilege escalation in legacy Java apps with sub-millisecond guard latency.

IDORacle is a template-guided SQL-sink interception and rewriting framework that prevents IDOR/BOLA horizontal privilege escalation at runtime in Java database applications. It propagates authenticated identity context across HTTP requests, asynchronous tasks, and data-access boundaries via a server-side trace identifier, and computes dual SQL fingerprints at the MyBatis/JDBC boundary to generate reusable mediation plans. On a Java-SQL benchmark grounded in real-world CVE reports, it blocks tested violations with worst-case guard latency of 0.17 ms, reduced to 0.017 ms average for hot templates via redundancy-aware optimization.

arXiv cs.CR · 5d agoResearch1

ToolLoop: Closed-Loop Tool-Use Data Synthesis via Decomposed Generation and Dynamic Self-Feedback

ToolLoop introduces a closed-loop synthetic data framework whose 11K examples lift a 4B model to 86.40% on BFCL tool-use evaluation.

ToolLoop decomposes tool-use data synthesis into function-name sampling, backward derivation of user queries, and forward derivation of tool calls, with dynamic self-feedback at each stage. This shifts the paradigm from generate-then-filter to generate-verify-refine, reducing inefficient and imbalanced synthetic data. A 4B model trained on 11K synthetic examples reaches 86.40% accuracy on BFCL non-reasoning mode (86.07% in an Isolate variant excluding BFCL-overlapping functions) and 72.1% on ACEBench using only 18.3% of baseline training data.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL · 7d agoAI research1

MIT creates method to force AI to comply with safety rules

MIT researchers published HardFlow, a method enforcing hard safety constraints on flow-matching generative models' final outputs without retraining.

MIT researchers led by Zeyang Li and Navid Azizan developed HardFlow, a trajectory-optimization method that enforces strict, non-negotiable constraints on flow-matching generative models by checking rule satisfaction only at the final generation step. Published in IEEE TPAMI, it outperformed six rival projection and guidance methods on four simulated benchmarks including D3IL robotic manipulation, Maze2D, physical process control, and image editing. All results are simulation-only, with no independent reproduction yet reported.

Hacker News · security · 1d agoAI researchHN 24↑ · 25 comments

Honeypot-Omaha and batch.py [Guest Diary], (Wed, Sep 2nd)

A SANS ISC guest diary describes batch.py, a Python tool that consolidates honeypot logs and enriches IOCs with threat intelligence data.

Written by a SANS.edu BACS intern, the diary explains analysis of the DShield Honeypot-Omaha sensor, which uses Cowrie to emulate SSH and Telnet and log attacker activity. The author's batch.py script implements a four-phase pipeline with SHA-256-generated master and guest authentication to consolidate JSON and log files, correlate data via external APIs, and produce MITRE, CVE, geolocation, threat-score and fingerprint enrichment for investigated indicators.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 13d agoTools1

Impersonating IT support: how threat actors turn a remote session into enterprise-wide access

Microsoft details Teams IT-support impersonation campaigns deploying Node.js implants, AD reconnaissance, and WinRM lateral movement toward domain controllers.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes a human-operated campaign where attackers impersonate IT/helpdesk staff via Microsoft Teams external collaboration, talk users into granting remote sessions, and use RMM tools for interactive access. During the session they run PowerShell to silently install a malicious MSI that stages a portable Node.js runtime and obfuscated JavaScript implant for C2, executing follow-on payloads via rundll32. Operators then perform host and Active Directory reconnaissance, capture desktop screenshots, and pivot via WinRM on port 5985 to domain controllers and certificate authorities. The hands-on-keyboard chain, which can precede data theft and ransomware, blends into normal operations by relying on Teams, Quick Assist, msiexec, and Node.js; Microsoft shares hunting and mitigation guidance.

Microsoft Security Blog · 13d agoThreat actor in the wild

Introducing context-aware vulnerability discovery and remediation with Cloudflare Managed Defense and OpenAI Daybreak models

Cloudflare launches invitation-only Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation within Managed Defense, using OpenAI Daybreak models and WAF context to prioritize and patch vulnerabilities.

Cloudflare announced early access to Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation, an invitation-only service within Cloudflare Managed Defense. The service uses OpenAI Daybreak models, including GPT-5.6 Cyber, via the Daybreak Defense Network to hunt and validate vulnerabilities in customer-authorized codebases across Workers and proxied applications. Findings are prioritized using production traffic, WAF rule, and security event context, and proposed patches and WAF mitigations are automatically checked before customer review.

Cloudflare Blog · 12d agoTools

The Hidden Instructions That Can Hijack AI Agents

Hidden prompt injections embedded in documents and metadata can hijack autonomous AI agents, causing data exfiltration and out-of-policy actions at machine speed.

Bowbridge warns that hidden indirect prompt injections, embedded in documents, metadata, emails, images, and code repositories, can cause autonomous AI agents to treat attacker-controlled content as trusted guidance. Because agents inherit user privileges, act silently, and lack human judgment, injections can lead to data exfiltration or file poisoning that traditional security controls cannot detect. A real-world example involved a supplier quote whose metadata instructed an agent to override guidance and select the most expensive option. Bowbridge recommends scanning documents before agents process them.

SecurityWeek · 7d agoAI safety & security

Researchers found a way to hijack devices through Zoom screen sharing

Researchers used a public AI tool to find a Zoom flaw enabling device hijacking via screen sharing in under 20 prompts.

Security researchers discovered a serious vulnerability in Zoom that can be used to hijack devices through the screen-sharing feature. The flaw was reportedly found by a publicly available AI tool in fewer than 20 prompts, highlighting the role of agentic AI in vulnerability discovery. The article does not report active exploitation or assign a CVE in the provided text.

Ars Technica · Security · Aug 12, 2026Vulnerability

Zero trust has a big AI agent problem ahead

Experts argue agentic AI undermines zero trust: chained authorized actions create exfiltration paths, unregistered agents evade identity controls, and agent-to-agent messages stay opaque.

Security practitioners including Nik Kale (CoSAI), Krti Tallam (Kamiwaza.ai), and Mike Wilkes (Aikido Security) argue that agentic AI breaks zero trust assumptions because individually authorized actions can compose into unauthorized outcomes, such as chained reads and writes creating an exfiltration path. Most enterprise agents are unregistered shadow IT or third-party launched, subagents inherit privileges without recognized identity, and agent-to-agent communication, sometimes embedding instructions in media files, remains invisible to security teams. Proposed mitigations include short-lived delegated credentials modeled on OpenPGP subkeys, rate limits, sandboxing, approval gates, and immutable activity trails.

CSO Online · 13d agoAI safety & security