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Airrived adds Agentic Observability to track AI agent actions and risks
Airrived launches Agentic Observability to give enterprises end-to-end visibility into AI agent actions, permissions, data flows, and costs.
Airrived announced Agentic Observability, an expansion of its enterprise Agentic OS that traces the full agentic lifecycle from enterprise data ingestion through agent reasoning to business outcomes. The platform surfaces each agent's creator, owner, permissions, permitted actions, and human-in-the-loop approval requirements, and tracks movement of PII, PCI, and PHI across agentic workflows. It also adds token- and model-consumption tracking to turn AI spending into measurable AI FinOps.
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Redtail Payload Analysis [Guest Diary], (Wed, Sep 9th)
SANS guest analyst detonated a RedTail Linux sample from a DShield honeypot, finding process masquerading as php-fpm, monitoring-kill behavior, and a TCP listener.
A DShield honeypot captured multi-architecture RedTail Linux executables (ARM, ARM64, i686, RISC-V, x86-64) deployed via shell scripts. Dynamic analysis of the UPX-packed, statically linked x86-64 sample (SHA-256 63be5f38...d35e) in an isolated Ubuntu 24.04 VM on Proxmox showed it renamed its process via prctl(PR_SET_NAME), killed a filesystem-monitoring process, and opened a TCP listening socket while surviving processes posed as php-fpm or PostgreSQL-like workers. Differential memory images pre- and post-execution were captured from the hypervisor for forensics.
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SolarWinds expands observability offering to provide enterprises with full visibility into databases
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Key Reasons Why Identity Fabric Matters in 2026
Identity sprawl and unowned machine identities leave enterprise access unobserved at runtime; identity fabrics aim to close the gap between policy intent and execution.
This sponsored explainer describes identity fabric as an architectural approach connecting identity providers, governance systems, applications, and infrastructure into one observable layer that compares designed access intent with runtime execution. It argues identity sprawl across SaaS, APIs, and cloud workloads, plus unmanaged non-human identities (service accounts, bots, workloads, API keys), leaves overprivileged, dormant, and unowned machine identities unmonitored. IdP-only monitoring misses application-layer attacks, and the piece advocates behavioral visibility and lifecycle governance for secrets and machine identities.
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Multiple ArtraDownloader Variants Used by BITTER to Target Pakistan
BITTER used three ArtraDownloader variants since 2015 to target Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, deploying BitterRAT and exploiting CVE-2017-11882 in one wave.
Palo Alto Unit 42 documents ArtraDownloader, a previously unreported downloader family used by the suspected South Asian group BITTER, with three variants and roughly 80 unique samples dating back to February 2015. Between September 2018 and January 2019, BITTER used spearphishing documents hosted on compromised Pakistani websites to target Pakistan and, for the first time, Saudi Arabia; one RTF sample exploited the EQNEDT vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. The downloader retrieves BitterRAT over HTTP, uses simple registry keys for persistence, and byte-level string obfuscation. Infrastructure overlap with the previously reported MY24 InPage-exploit payload was also observed.
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Unit 42 Researchers Discover Multiple Espionage Operations Targeting Southeast Asian Government
Unit 42 attributes three espionage clusters targeting a Southeast Asian government to Stately Taurus, Alloy Taurus, and Gelsemium APTs.
Unit 42 investigated espionage attacks starting in late 2022 against multiple governmental entities in a Southeast Asian country, including critical infrastructure, public healthcare, financial administrators, and ministries. Analysis revealed three distinct clusters: CL-STA-0044 attributed to Stately Taurus (Mustang Panda), CL-STA-0045 to Alloy Taurus (GALLIUM), and CL-STA-0046 to Gelsemium. The first cluster used a ToneShell backdoor variant, ShadowPad, China Chopper web shells, Impacket, and credential dumping tools across roughly Q1 2021 to Q3 2023. All three operated with distinct tools, infrastructure, and long-term surveillance tradecraft consistent with APTs.
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