New hardware device can RAM into encrypted memory, expose your data
Researchers built a $200 DDR5 interposer that silently drops memory writes to break TDX, SGX, and SEV-SNP confidential VM integrity, requiring physical access.
Researchers from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google demonstrated DDRop, a hardware interposer costing under $200 that corrupts DDR5 bus commands to silently drop writes to encrypted memory, enabling replay attacks on confidential VMs. Because scalable memory encryption lacks freshness checks, protected VMs keep computing on stale attacker-selected data; on an Intel TDX server the attack forces debug mode for plaintext memory reads or forges attestation reports, succeeding in under two minutes without crashing. Intel and AMD both called the attack out of scope for their cloud threat models, with no mitigation planned, and proposed cache line versioning appears still vulnerable. The full interposer design is being released as open-source hardware.
VU#369611: ExLlamaV3 contains Denial of Service vulnerability via insufficient bounds checking on kernel dispatch index
CERT/CC details CVE-2026-84286, an out-of-bounds memory access in ExLlamaV3's CUDA extension causing denial-of-service crashes; fixed via merged pull request.
CERT/CC published VU#369611 for CVE-2026-84286, an out-of-bounds memory access in the exllamav3_ext CUDA extension of the ExLlamaV3 LLM inference library. A crafted input with kernel parameter K set to 0 produces a negative index into a fixed 24-entry kernel dispatch array, causing a CUDA illegal memory access and denial-of-service crashes. The vendor fixed the issue in the main repository via pull request #310, and maintainers of 49 downstream projects, including ezexl3 and MawDiscord, are advised to rebuild against the patched version. The issue was reported by Nathan Keys and impact is limited to crashes and instability, not code execution.
Skullcandy Dime 3 Bluetooth Flaw Lets Nearby Attackers Hijack Audio and Microphone
CERT/CC disclosed VU#859658: Skullcandy Dime 3 earbuds on firmware 1.0.0.28 accept unauthenticated Bluetooth pairing, letting nearby attackers hijack audio and microphone.
Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds (model S2DCW, firmware 1.0.0.28) accept Bluetooth Classic BR/EDR pairing requests from unknown devices without the owner activating pairing mode, a flaw linked to CVE-2025-20701 in Airoha Bluetooth audio SDK implementations and tracked as VU#859658 by CERT/CC. Attackers within Bluetooth range who know the device address can bond via the NoInputNoOutput configuration, establish A2DP or HFP/HSP connections, disrupt the owner's active audio session, and potentially capture live microphone audio. Firmware 1.0.0.30 addresses the issue, but Dime 3 earbuds do not support firmware updates through the Skullcandy mobile app, leaving affected users without a known upgrade path.
VU#859658: Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds contain an unauthenticated Bluetooth pairing vulnerability
Skullcandy Dime 3 earbuds (CVE-2025-20701) accept Bluetooth pairings without owner consent, letting in-range attackers hijack audio or capture microphone; no firmware update path exists.
CERT/CC's VU#859658 describes CVE-2025-20701 in the Airoha Bluetooth audio SDK, present in Skullcandy Dime 3 (Model S2DCW) firmware 1.0.0.28. A direct Bluetooth Classic pairing request with no PIN or physical confirmation completes via NoInputNoOutput, adding the attacker's device as trusted. Attackers in radio range can hijack the A2DP audio session, access the Hands-Free/Headset profile, and capture live microphone audio. Firmware 1.0.0.30 contains the effective patch, but Skullcandy says the Dime 3 does not support app-based firmware updates, leaving existing units unpatchable.
Jellyfin 12.0 security fixes arrive alongside the removal of legacy client logins
Jellyfin 12.0 ships security fixes for path traversal, first-run setup bypass, unsafe plugin names, and web client XSS, plus removal of legacy login paths.
Jellyfin 12.0 blocks requests built to reach files outside served folders, prevents setup-wizard re-runs on misconfigured servers, rejects unsafe plugin package names, and fixes web client cross-site scripting. The project published no CVE identifiers or severity ratings for the fixes. The release also drops legacy /emby/ and /mediabrowser/ endpoints, targets .NET 10, and breaks 10.11-era third-party plugins.
Cisco IOS XR Software Security Hardening Release: September 2026
Cisco released IOS XR security hardening fixes for multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities, grouped by CWE class, with no known active exploitation.
Cisco's IOS XR engineering team conducted a comprehensive internal security review and released hardening updates addressing multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The issues were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. Cisco grouped the vulnerabilities by CWE class and assigned a single CVE ID to each grouping to streamline patching and disclosure.
Cisco Crosswork Security Hardening Release: August 2026
Cisco released an August 2026 Crosswork security hardening update addressing multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities, grouped by CWE class with one CVE per grouping.
Cisco's Crosswork engineering team completed a comprehensive internal security review and shipped a hardening release fixing multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The issues were found during internal testing, are grouped by CWE class, and each grouping received a single CVE ID. Cisco states these vulnerabilities are not known to be actively exploited.
Cisco Secure Workload Software Security Hardening Release: August 2026
Cisco shipped August 2026 hardening releases for Secure Workload fixing multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities that are not actively exploited.
Cisco's Secure Workload engineering team completed an internal security review that found multiple vulnerabilities during internal testing. The issues are grouped by CWE class with a single CVE assigned per grouping, and none are known to be actively exploited. Cisco has released hardening updates for customers to patch.
Muhstik Botnet Attacks Tomato Routers to Harvest New IoT Devices
Unit 42 found a Muhstik botnet variant brute-forcing Tomato router web authentication to harvest IoT devices for crypto mining and DDoS attacks.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 researchers in December 2019 identified a new Muhstik botnet variant scanning Tomato routers on TCP 8080 and brute-forcing default admin credentials, targeting roughly 4,600 exposed devices found via Shodan. The variant also scans WordPress and Webuzo installations and exploits the Oracle WebLogic deserialization flaw CVE-2019-2725 for unauthenticated remote code execution. Muhstik, active since March 2018, self-propagates like a worm and typically monetizes infections through cryptocurrency mining and DDoS attacks controlled via an IRC C2 channel.
Campaign Evolution: EITest from October through December 2016
Unit 42 details the EITest campaign's late-2016 changes: gates and obfuscation dropped, with Rig EK variants delivering ransomware and infostealers.
Unit 42 tracks the EITest campaign through late 2016, noting it abandoned the gate between compromised websites and exploit kit landing pages after its October 2016 report, and stopped obfuscating injected script URLs by October 15. The campaign primarily uses the Rig-E (Empire Pack) variant and sometimes Rig-V of Rig EK to deliver Cerber and CryptoMix ransomware plus infostealers such as Gootkit, the Chthonic banking Trojan, Ursnif variants, and Latentbot. Tracked since 2014 by Malwarebytes Labs and others, EITest targets unpatched Windows systems without specific victimology.
Tech contractor for Brightly Software sentenced to 2 years in prison for insider attack
Cameron Curry sentenced to two years for stealing Brightly Software employee data and extorting the Siemens-owned firm for $7,540.92.
Cameron Nicholas Curry, a 27-year-old data analyst contractor at Siemens-owned Brightly Software, stole corporate and sensitive payroll data between August and December 2023 and sent more than 60 threatening emails to employees after his contract ended. He demanded roughly $2.5 million but received $7,540.92 in late January 2024, and was convicted of six counts of extortion in March. He was sentenced to two years in prison plus one year of supervised release, less than the 12-year maximum, after investigators traced him via operational security mistakes including a Coinbase account linked to family debit cards.