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New hardware device can RAM into encrypted memory, expose your data
Researchers built a $200 DDR5 interposer that silently drops memory writes to break TDX, SGX, and SEV-SNP confidential VM integrity, requiring physical access.
Researchers from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google demonstrated DDRop, a hardware interposer costing under $200 that corrupts DDR5 bus commands to silently drop writes to encrypted memory, enabling replay attacks on confidential VMs. Because scalable memory encryption lacks freshness checks, protected VMs keep computing on stale attacker-selected data; on an Intel TDX server the attack forces debug mode for plaintext memory reads or forges attestation reports, succeeding in under two minutes without crashing. Intel and AMD both called the attack out of scope for their cloud threat models, with no mitigation planned, and proposed cache line versioning appears still vulnerable. The full interposer design is being released as open-source hardware.
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New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP Confidential Computing
DDRop uses a sub-$200 DDR5 interposer to drop memory writes, breaking Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidentiality guarantees.
Researchers at KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google will present DDRop at ACM CCS 2026, a first active interposer attack on DDR5 that silently drops memory writes so processors keep reading stale encrypted data, exploiting the missing freshness guarantee in Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP. On Intel TDX's default logical integrity mode it enabled reading victim VM memory, toggling debug mode, and forging remote attestation; AMD SEV-SNP was limited to copying pages between VMs. TDX's stronger cryptographic integrity blocks cross-VM attacks but likely not attestation forgery. The team will release board designs, firmware, and attack code on GitHub; no evidence of real-world use exists and no simple patch is available.
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New GPUThor Rowhammer Defeats ECC on NVIDIA RTX A6000 to Gain Host Root Access
University of Toronto researchers present GPUThor, a Rowhammer attack that defeats ECC on NVIDIA RTX A4000-A6000 GDDR6 GPUs and achieves host root access.
GPUThor uses non-uniform hammering to bypass Target Row Refresh and overcome SECDED ECC on NVIDIA Ampere workstation GPUs with GDDR6 memory, inducing 72,000 to 377,552 bit flips per gigabyte across RTX A6000, A5000, A4500, and A4000 cards. Triple-bit silent data corruption enables host privilege escalation to root with the IOMMU enabled, reusing GPUBreach page-table corruption techniques, and double-bit DUEs allow escalation when the IOMMU is disabled during a ~10 ms lazy-service window. The attack cut end-to-end escalation time on the A6000 from 21.9 hours to 1.1 minutes. Reported to NVIDIA, Google, Microsoft, and AWS on April 29, 2026; findings were embargoed until August 25, 2026, and no CVE identifier was assigned.
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Windows 11’s strongest security defenses can be bypassed without a screwdriver
Researchers found a script-only attack, 'Download More RAM', that rewrites DIMM configuration chips to bypass Windows 11 VBS and HVCI security boundaries.
Researchers at the University of Birmingham and Durham University showed that overwriting configuration data on unprotected DDR4/DDR5 module chips creates memory aliases that let attackers with existing privileged access defeat Virtualisation-based Security and HVCI, re-enable blocklisted drivers, kill EDR, and bypass group policy. Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-23670 and shipped mitigations in its April 2026 updates; systems with Secure Boot enabled are protected. Affected unprotected product lines are estimated at more than half of the high-performance consumer memory market and over 70% of the gaming segment.
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