Post-quantum migration gets harder when every user holds a key
Quantus CEO Christopher Smith discusses post-quantum migration pitfalls, including oversized keys breaking IPsec, SSH and TLS, and hard-to-migrate blockchain user keys.
Quantus CEO Christopher Smith describes post-quantum migration findings from banks and hospitals, including forgotten default passwords, orphaned admin keys held by former employees and hidden password hashes on user devices. Larger post-quantum keys and signatures break size assumptions in IPsec, SSH, TLS and libp2p, while migrating blockchain user keys remains hard because every user must act. He argues boards should fund quantum migration like insurance by quantifying cryptographic failure risk, and warns a silent quantum break would be difficult to detect from outside.
ZDI-26-622: Microsoft Windows IKEv2 AES-GCM Decryption Integer Underflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
ZDI disclosed CVE-2026-50696, a CVSS 8.1 integer underflow in Windows IKEv2 AES-GCM decryption enabling unauthenticated remote code execution on specific IPsec configurations.
The Zero Day Initiative published ZDI-26-622 describing a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Windows' IKEv2 AES-GCM decryption path, caused by an integer underflow. Authentication is not required for exploitation, but only systems using specific IPsec configurations are affected. ZDI assigned the vulnerability a CVSS score of 8.1 and the identifier CVE-2026-50696.
What your vendor says about PQC tells you if they are ready
Allot CTO outlines a telecom post-quantum migration playbook: inventory crypto, deploy hybrid ML-KEM on TLS first, and avoid missed interfaces.
Dr. Yaakov Stein, VP CTO of Allot, explains how mobile operators should triage post-quantum migration by data shelf life, protecting subscriber identity mappings, billing records, and call metadata that stay sensitive for years. He recommends starting with a comprehensive crypto inventory, then hybrid ML-KEM key exchange on TLS-protected 5G SBA and management interfaces, followed by IPsec backhaul and roaming links. Stein warns that migrations most often fail operationally through missed legacy interfaces such as SSH, RADIUS, or forgotten load balancers, and cites the early Kyber multi-packet TLS client hello issue as an example of middlebox incompatibility.