TERM paper proposes inference-time jailbreak defense without steering
First merged summary.
A new paper describes TERM, an inference-time jailbreak defense tested on Llama, Qwen, and Gemma with low reported over-refusal.
Researchers propose Target-free Entropy-guided Residual Modulation (TERM), an inference-time defense against jailbreak prompts. It calibrates attention entropy to each prompt’s prefill baseline and uses that signal to bound scaling of the model’s own residual updates, without a predefined safety direction or learned safety region. The authors compare TERM with seven defenses on seven jailbreak attacks and two over-refusal benchmarks across Llama, Qwen, and Gemma models, including Qwen3 from 0.6B to 32B. They report stronger robustness, low over-refusal on benign safety-sensitive requests, and modest inference overhead. Intervention strength is set by adaptive scale normalization and temporal accumulation.
- TERM scales residual updates using prompt-calibrated attention-entropy deviations.
- No predefined steering direction or learned safety region is used.
- Tests cover seven defenses, seven attacks, and two over-refusal benchmarks.
- Models include Llama, Qwen, and Gemma, plus Qwen3 from 0.6B to 32B.
- Authors report modest inference overhead and low over-refusal.
What each outlet adds
beyond the shared facts- arXiv cs.CRNames scale normalization and temporal accumulation as strength controls.
- arXiv cs.CR (second item)Item title says POEM, but the abstract body describes TERM.
Coverage
oldest first · one row per article · UTCTERM jailbreak defense modulates residuals from attention entropy
Compared with seven defenses on seven attacks, it reports stronger robustness and low over-refusal at modest inference cost.
Item titled POEM describes the TERM jailbreak defense
The supplied abstract is TERM, tested against seven jailbreaks on Llama, Qwen, and Gemma, including Qwen3 from 0.6B to 32B.