Zbtlink router firmware ships an embedded remote-control implant, ENDLESSDOORS, present in every published build across the product line. It is the open-source ycsunjane/rctl tool built in as an OpenWrt package (librctl.so), started at boot and run as root under the process name kworker to blend in with the kernel's [kworker/*] threads. It opens no listening port; it phones home over cleartext TCP to a hardcoded command-and-control server (command channel 7000, interactive-shell callback 7001) with no authentication and no transport encryption, re-attempting contact roughly every 35 seconds. Its command handler passes any received string to popen() as uid=0, and a reserved rctlbash command returns an interactive root shell. Because the channel is unauthenticated and cleartext, control is not limited to whoever planted it: any party that answers at the C2 address, occupies the network path (DNS or route hijack), or acquires the hardcoded fallback domain obtains unauthenticated remote code execution as root.
VulnCheck discloses two factory implants, SPEAKINGSTONE and DARKLANTERN, in ZBT router firmware granting unauthenticated remote attackers root command execution.
Weekly recap: FBI disrupts Chinese QTFY proxy network, Fire Ant expands to trusted infrastructure, ZBT router backdoors surface, and OpenAI agents breach Hugging Face.
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