AI analysis
OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1 fails to enforce project scoping or an administrator-only policy on the V2 lease listing operation (GET /v2/leases), a CWE-862 missing-authorization flaw. Any authenticated user who can reach the Blazar REST API can retrieve leases belonging to every project, exposing lease IDs, reservation IDs, resource IDs, and reservation metadata. The disclosed lease IDs also enable the companion object-level authorization bypass, letting an attacker modify or delete other tenants' enumerated leases. Only OpenStack deployments running the optional Blazar reservation service are affected, and only where tenants can access the Blazar API. No public proof-of-concept or in-the-wild exploitation is currently known.
What to do: Upgrade Blazar to 17.0.1 or later, which adds project scoping/policy enforcement to the lease listing endpoint. Until patched, restrict network access to the Blazar API to trusted administrators and audit lease records for unauthorized cross-tenant modifications or deletions. If lease IDs were exposed, treat all enumerated leases as potentially tamperable and rotate or review reservations accordingly.
Affected
| OpenStack Foundation OpenStack Blazar | before 17.0.1 |
Estimated exposure
nichelikely hundreds to a few thousand tenant users (Blazar is an optional OpenStack reservation service deployed by only a minority of clouds) — Blazar is a specialized, optional OpenStack component not present in most cloud deployments and absent from public internet-exposed service censuses, so the affected population is limited to tenants of the small set of clouds that run it;…
Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.
Description
In OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1, the V2 lease listing operation (GET /v2/leases) returns leases for every project without enforcing project scoping or an administrator-only policy. Any authenticated user with access to the Blazar REST API can enumerate leases belonging to other tenants, exposing lease IDs, reservation IDs, resource IDs, and reservation metadata. The exposed lease IDs also enable the object-level authorization bypass tracked in the companion request, allowing an attacker to then modify or delete the enumerated leases.