This is a supply-chain compromise, not a traditional bug: version 1.00 of the Perl CPAN distribution IO::Socket::SSL::SelfCertificate ships embedded malware (CWE-506) rather than legitimate code. When the module's generate_certificate function runs, it executes a Python script disguised as a sample certificate file (lib/IO::Socket::SSL/SelfCertificate/sample/cert.pem), which decodes a base64-obfuscated hardcoded HTTP URL, downloads code from it, and executes the response body directly in memory, leaving no dropped script on the host. An attacker gains arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user who installed or ran the module. Anyone who downloaded and installed the 1.00 release (tarballs with the published SHA-256 digests ba24ee8e... or d483cb7b...) is affected; the release has no test scripts or build hooks, suggesting the payload may be intended to fire after installation. This mirrors the same scheme as CVE-2026-95831 in the module Crypt::SelfCertificate; no fixed version exists because the entire release is malicious, and no public PoC, CISA KEV listing, or confirmed mass exploitation has been reported.
What to do: Uninstall IO::Socket::SSL::SelfCertificate 1.00 immediately — do not upgrade, as no clean release exists — and treat any copy matching the published SHA-256 digests as compromised. Sweep hosts, CI runners, and container images for the path IO/Socket/SSL/SelfCertificate/sample/cert.pem (digest 821d38830e5eb8607738421c25ac25f59fff02a6ab67daa32fbd020429454dac) and hunt for Python child processes spawned from Perl contexts making outbound plain-HTTP connections, rotating any credentials on affected machines. Also check environments for the sibling malicious module Crypt::SelfCertificate tied to CVE-2026-95831, which uses the same dropper technique.
| Product | Affected |
|---|
| IO::Socket::SSL::SelfCertificate (Perl module) | 1.00 (only release; both IO-Socket-SSL-SelfCertificate-1.00.tar.gz and IO-Socket-SSL-SelfCertificate-1.00-upload.tar.gz are malicious) |
Estimated exposure
nicheLikely on the order of tens of installations — only users who downloaded the 1.00 tarball from CPAN — No active-install telemetry exists for Perl modules, but obscure, newly published CPAN distributions of this kind typically receive very few downloads, so exposure is plausibly limited to a small number of developers and build systems that…
Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.