Emulated fault injection bypasses CHERI-RISC-V memory-safety checks
One or two targeted faults enabled overflows, control-flow hijacks, data-only attacks, and use-after-free in QEMU.
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One or two targeted faults enabled overflows, control-flow hijacks, data-only attacks, and use-after-free in QEMU.
The author argues capability-based security, as in CHERI and Cloudflare Workers, limits confused-deputy abuse of model instructions.
ACM Queue paper explains how CHERIoT uses CHERI hardware capabilities to give microcontroller-class IoT devices memory and privilege isolation without an MMU.
Entities are extracted by the model from each article. First seen , last mentioned . Watching keeps it in this browser only (no account); the watchlist page and dashboard alerts use it.
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