Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour
Researchmedium

Emulated fault injection bypasses CHERI-RISC-V memory-safety checks

Original title: CHERI under Fault Injection: An Emulation-Based Security Evaluation of Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions

arXiv cs.CRby Eva Sophia Schreyer ()1 min read
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

One or two targeted faults enabled overflows, control-flow hijacks, data-only attacks, and use-after-free in QEMU.

A thesis tests whether fault injection can break CHERI's spatial and temporal memory safety in a pure-capability CHERI-RISC-V environment, a threat the architecture's model excludes. Using QEMU, the authors flip capability-metadata bits and skip checks on capability store instructions. Four scenarios succeed with one or two faults, and check skipping alone can hijack control flow or enable data-only attacks with one fault. CHERI still requires fault injection and a valid tagged capability or a second fault because of sentries. Proposed defenses include ECC-protected capability memory, field authentication codes, redundant checks, and revocation-bitmap verification.

Unconfirmed: Reported fault counts are lower bounds from emulation, not measurements on physical hardware.

Key facts
  • Bit flips corrupt capability metadata; a second class skips capability-store checks.
  • Check skipping needs a minimum of one fault for two attack classes.
  • A single fault can bypass spatial safety, temporal safety, or control-flow integrity.
  • Sentries force a valid tagged capability or a second fault to restore the tag.
Security assessment · AI, from the articlePublic proof of concept

Impact: One fault can bypass spatial, temporal, or control-flow safety

ProductAffected
CHERI-RISC-Vpure-capability environment
What to do
  1. 1.Consider ECC on capability memory and authentication codes for capability fields.
  2. 2.Redundantly execute security-critical checks and verify revocation-bitmap integrity.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Memory-safety vulnerabilities continue to dominate real-world exploit chains despite decades of research into software mitigations. CHERI is a hardware architecture that enforces spatial and temporal memory safety by augmenting pointers with hardware-checked metadata, thus preventing software-based exploitation, but its threat model explicitly excludes fault injection.

arXiv cs.CR

By Eva Sophia Schreyer · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.