Can Pixels Alone Reveal Image Origin? Minimax Limits and Learnable Interfaces for Passive Provenance
Paper proves pixel-only image provenance has a minimax limit and shows public CLIP verifiers fail under edits.
The paper asks whether pixels alone can identify whether an image came from a human, an aggregate AI class, or a specific generator after adversarial edits. It proves that the largest robust target-acceptance gap equals the minimum total-variation distance between the target distribution and attacked source distributions, independent of verifier architecture. If a deployed verifier can be emulated to error epsilon, a surrogate black-box attack approaches the white-box optimum within 2 epsilon plus optimization error. On same-prompt real and diffusion benchmarks, public CLIP verifiers failed under targeted pixel attacks, while a ResNet-18 victim showed partial fake-to-real transfer.
- Robust acceptance gap equals a total-variation distance independent of architecture.
- Emulable public verifiers allow surrogate attacks near the white-box optimum.
- Public CLIP verifiers failed targeted pixel attacks on diffusion benchmarks.
- ResNet-18 showed partial fake-to-real transfer; abstention cut attack success.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgPassive image provenance asks whether pixels alone can reveal where an image came from: a human, an aggregate AI class, or a particular generator. This becomes a robustness problem once a source image can be edited before the verifier sees it. We study the problem as source--target verification under adversarial distribution shift.
By Kai Yao · arxiv.org
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