Microsoft enforces defenses preventing NTLM relay attacks
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-23397 | Zero-Click Elevation of Privilege in Microsoft Outlook (Forced NTLM Credential Leak) CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook caused by improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with authentication bypass via spoofed authentication data on the channel (CWE-294), allowing an attacker to force Outlook to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server. It is triggered when Outlook processes a crafted email or calendar object — for example a meeting or task reminder whose sound property points to an attacker-supplied UNC path — and requires no user interaction. That authentication exchange leaks the victim's NTLM credential hash, which the attacker can crack offline or relay to authenticate as the victim and access resources such as Exchange mailboxes, effectively escalating privileges. Affected software spans Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft Office (including the Long Term Servicing Channel), and Microsoft Outlook, which are deployed across enterprises, governments, and militaries worldwide. It is actively exploited in the wild — added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-03-14 with a 97.4% EPSS — and Microsoft has warned of exploitation by Russia-aligned threat actors in campaigns against government and military mail servers, with patches shipped in Microsoft's March 2023 security updates. Do: Apply Microsoft's March 2023 security updates to Microsoft 365 Apps, Office/LTSC, and Outlook immediately, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, enable Extended Protection for Authentication or add accounts to the Protected Users group to block the NTLM credential leak, and audit calendar and task reminder sound properties for UNC paths (Microsoft published an audit/cleanup script for this) while watching for unexpected outbound SMB/WebDAV connections from hosts running Outlook. | 9.8 | 97% | KEV |
| masson the order of hundreds of millions of users (Outlook ships with Microsoft Office/Microsoft 365, the dominant enterprise and government email suite) | |
| CVE-2023-36563 | Information Disclosure in Microsoft WordPad Exploited in the Wild CVE-2023-36563 is an information disclosure flaw (CWE-20, improper input validation) in Microsoft WordPad, the lightweight word processor bundled with supported Windows releases; Microsoft has published limited technical detail and CISA describes the flaw as unspecified. An attacker triggers it by persuading a user to open a specially crafted document in WordPad, where improper handling of the document content (including URL/remote-resource references) causes information to be disclosed to the attacker. A successful attacker gains access to sensitive information from the affected system rather than code execution, and exploitation requires user interaction with a malicious file. Any Windows installation with WordPad is potentially affected, making the population essentially the entire supported Windows installed base. Exploitation is confirmed: CISA added the flaw to its KEV catalog on 2023-10-10 and its advisory notes no public proof-of-concept is known and ransomware use is unknown; EPSS is 20.7% (97th percentile), indicating elevated near-term exploitation likelihood. Do: Apply Microsoft's October 10, 2023 Windows security updates, which include the WordPad fix, prioritizing systems where users open untrusted documents; until patched, follow Microsoft's mitigation guidance to disable the WordPad URL protocol handler via the published registry change. Note that WordPad has since been removed entirely in Windows 11 24H2, so those systems are no longer exposed; per CISA, any ransomware linkage is unknown. | 5.5 | 21% | KEV |
| mass≈1.4 billion Windows devices (WordPad ships by default with Windows) | |
| CVE-2024-21413 | Improper Input Validation RCE in Microsoft Outlook (MonikerLink) CVE-2024-21413 is an improper input validation flaw (CWE-20) in Microsoft Outlook, publicly dubbed "MonikerLink", in which Outlook mishandles a specially crafted hyperlink (a file:// moniker link) and bypasses the security prompt normally applied before opening such links. The flaw is triggered when a user opens or clicks a maliciously crafted link in an email, causing Outlook to invoke the target outside its protected handling. A successful attack can leak the user's NTLM credentials and can achieve remote code execution in the context of the current user; the flaw carries a critical CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8. Anyone running affected Outlook clients — Microsoft 365 Apps, Office 2016, Office 2019, and Office LTSC — is exposed, and the issue was fixed in Microsoft's February 2024 Patch Tuesday release. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-02-06, EPSS assigns a ~95% exploitation probability (100th percentile), and a public PoC is available. Do: Apply Microsoft's February 2024 (or later) security updates for Microsoft 365 Apps, Office 2016, Office 2019, and Office LTSC, and verify Outlook builds are current, per the KEV required action to apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use. As interim mitigation, restrict outbound SMB/NTLM from endpoints (e.g., block outbound port 445 or disable NTLM where feasible) to blunt credential leakage from crafted file:// links. Hunt for signs of exploitation, such as unexpected outbound SMB connections or NTLM authentication events following users clicking links in email. | 9.8 | 95% | KEV PoC |
| masshundreds of millions of users |
Full article417 words · extracted from helpnetsecurity.com · click to collapse
Since making Kerberos the default Windows authentication protocol in 2000, Microsoft has been working on eventually retiring NTLM, its less secure and obsolete counterpart.

Until NTLM gets disabled by default, Microsoft is working on shoring up defenses against NTLM relay attacks.
How do NTLM relay attacks work?
NTLM is a suite of Microsoft protocols that authenticate users and computers based on a challenge/response mechanism between the client (which seeks to be authenticated) and server (which makes sure the the correct user/computer is authenticated).
The response by the client to the server’s challenge involves the use of the hash of the user’s pasword as an encryption key – and it’s that hash of the users’ login credentials that attackers can misuse.
NTLM relay attacks allow attackers to send on the NTLM hash without needing to decrypt it and extract the user’s password.
“Office documents and emails sent through Outlook serve as effective entry points for attackers to exploit NTLM coercion vulnerabilities, given their ability to embed UNC links within them. Recent vulnerabilities involving NTLM and Office applications include CVE-2024-21413, CVE-2023-23397, and CVE-2023-36563,” Microsoft noted.
EPA enabled by default on Windows Server 2025
Microsoft’s efforts to increase users’ and systems’ security have reached another important milestone earlier this month, when the company released Windows Server 2025 with Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) enabled by default, and channel binding enabled by default for the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).
“Note that the current default setting for EPA in Server 2025 is Enabled – When Supported, to allow clients that do not support channel bindings to omit them. A stronger EPA security setting for enterprises who do not need to support legacy clients is Enabled – Always, and we hope to move the needle further in future versions of Windows,” Microsoft noted.
“Additionally, Administrators on Windows Server 2022 and 2019 can manually enable EPA for AD CS and Channel binding for LDAP. We have enabled auditing support for LDAP to identify machines that do not support channel binding to help IT administrators move towards enabling channel binding by default by upgrading to versions that support channel binding.”
Microsoft has switched on EPA by default for new and existing installs of Exchange Server 2019 earlier this year, and introduced Extended Protection support – as an optional feature, enabled via script – for Exchange Server 2016.

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2024/12/11/ntlm-relay-attacks-defenses-windows-server-exchange/