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Microsoft Uncovers Sandworm Subgroup's Global Cyber Attacks Spanning 15+ Countries

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-34473
SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell)

Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).

Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity.

9.1100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Exchange Server deployments not yet patched with Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) security updates; the source data does not enumerate specific vers
masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,…
CVE-2022-41352
Path Traversal Arbitrary File Upload in Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite

CVE-2022-41352 is an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload flaw in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0, rooted in a path traversal weakness (CWE-22) in how the amavis mail scanner hands archives to the cpio utility. An attacker sends a specially crafted archive via email; cpio follows traversal entries and extracts attacker-controlled files into the web root at /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/zimbra/public. Uploaded files in that web-accessible directory can lead to remote code execution and incorrect access to other users' accounts, giving network-level attackers high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CVSS 9.8). Any ZCS 8.8.15 or 9.0 deployment that processes mail with cpio is affected, particularly on Red Hat/CentOS 7 and later where the pax utility (which Zimbra recommends as the safe alternative) is not installed by default. The flaw is actively exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on 2022-10-20 with known ransomware use, carries a 95.5% EPSS score, and public reporting ties Zimbra exploitation to campaigns including Russia-linked Sandworm/Seashell Blizzard access operations.

Do: Apply updates per vendor instructions, and as an immediate mitigation install the pax package on the Zimbra host (amavis automatically prefers pax over cpio once it is present; note pax is not in default Red Hat installations after RHEL/CentOS 6, while it is a prerequisite on Ubuntu). Also inspect /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/zimbra/public for unexpected uploaded files and review mail flow logs for suspicious archive attachments, given confirmed in-the-wild and ransomware-related exploitation.

9.895% KEV ransomware PoC
  • synacor zimbra collaboration suite 8.8.15 and 9.0 (deployments where amavis extracts archives with cpio instead of pax)
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed Zimbra servers (public scan counts have shown roughly 40,000-60,000 exposed instances)
CVE-2023-23397
Zero-Click Elevation of Privilege in Microsoft Outlook (Forced NTLM Credential Leak)

CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook caused by improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with authentication bypass via spoofed authentication data on the channel (CWE-294), allowing an attacker to force Outlook to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server. It is triggered when Outlook processes a crafted email or calendar object — for example a meeting or task reminder whose sound property points to an attacker-supplied UNC path — and requires no user interaction. That authentication exchange leaks the victim's NTLM credential hash, which the attacker can crack offline or relay to authenticate as the victim and access resources such as Exchange mailboxes, effectively escalating privileges. Affected software spans Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft Office (including the Long Term Servicing Channel), and Microsoft Outlook, which are deployed across enterprises, governments, and militaries worldwide. It is actively exploited in the wild — added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-03-14 with a 97.4% EPSS — and Microsoft has warned of exploitation by Russia-aligned threat actors in campaigns against government and military mail servers, with patches shipped in Microsoft's March 2023 security updates.

Do: Apply Microsoft's March 2023 security updates to Microsoft 365 Apps, Office/LTSC, and Outlook immediately, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, enable Extended Protection for Authentication or add accounts to the Protected Users group to block the NTLM credential leak, and audit calendar and task reminder sound properties for UNC paths (Microsoft published an audit/cleanup script for this) while watching for unexpected outbound SMB/WebDAV connections from hosts running Outlook.

9.897% KEV
  • Microsoft 365 Apps Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Long Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • +1 more
masson the order of hundreds of millions of users (Outlook ships with Microsoft Office/Microsoft 365, the dominant enterprise and government email suite)
CVE-2023-32315
Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Ignite Realtime Openfire Admin Console

CVE-2023-32315 is an unauthenticated path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Ignite Realtime Openfire XMPP server that allows a remote attacker to reach pages of the Openfire Admin Console that are reserved for administrative users. It is triggered by sending a crafted HTTP request to the admin console web interface containing path traversal sequences, which bypasses the authentication check protecting those restricted pages. Successful exploitation exposes administrative console functionality to an unauthenticated attacker, potentially enabling further compromise of the server and the chat environment it hosts. Any organization running Openfire is affected, particularly instances whose admin console interface is reachable from the internet. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-08-24 and carries an EPSS probability of 100% (top percentile), indicating active exploitation in the wild; ransomware use is not yet documented.

Do: Upgrade Openfire to the patched release recommended in the Ignite Realtime advisory for CVE-2023-32315, per the CISA KEV required action; if patching must be delayed, restrict the admin console (default ports 9090/9091) to trusted networks or place it behind a VPN. Review access logs for requests to admin console pages containing traversal sequences, and check for unauthorized admin accounts or configuration changes, since KEV listing confirms exploitation in the wild.

7.5100% KEV PoC ×2
  • Ignite Realtime Openfire
large≈ tens of thousands of internet-exposed Openfire servers (~30,000–40,000 per public scans)
CVE-2023-42793
Authentication bypass in JetBrains TeamCity enables unauthenticated RCE

JetBrains TeamCity Server, a widely used CI/CD build server, contains an authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-288) that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker gain administrative access without valid credentials. By sending crafted requests to the TeamCity server over the network, the attacker bypasses authentication and can then execute arbitrary code on the server via administrative and build features, achieving full remote code execution. An attacker gains control of the build server and, with it, access to source code, build artifacts, stored secrets and credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement or ransomware deployment. Any organization running an affected TeamCity Server is affected, especially instances reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to its KEV catalog on 2023-10-04 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Upgrade TeamCity Server to 2023.05.4 or later per JetBrains' instructions, or apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use if patching is not possible (per the CISA KEV required action). Also take unpatched instances off the public internet, and hunt for signs of compromise such as unauthorized administrator accounts, unexpected changes in audit logs and build configurations, and stored secrets or tokens that may have been stolen, given known ransomware exploitation.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • JetBrains TeamCity (TeamCity Server) On-premises TeamCity Server prior to the fixed release (2023.05.4 per the vendor advisory); the CISA entry lists the affected product without a version range
largeTens of thousands of TeamCity Server deployments, of which several thousand are internet-exposed
CVE-2023-48788
Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Fortinet FortiClient EMS

Fortinet FortiClient EMS — the central management server for FortiClient endpoint deployments — contains a SQL injection flaw (CWE-89) in versions 7.0.1 through 7.0.10 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.2. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) shows it can be triggered remotely with no credentials and no user interaction: an unauthenticated attacker sends specially crafted packets to the vulnerable management server and can execute unauthorized code or commands. Successful exploitation effectively yields remote code execution on the EMS server and access to its database, enabling follow-on actions such as credential theft, abuse of endpoint management functions, and ransomware deployment. Any organization running the affected EMS versions is exposed, especially where the management server is reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the bug to the KEV catalog on 2024-03-25 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a ~98.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).

Do: Upgrade FortiClient EMS to the fixed releases per Fortinet's advisory for this CVE (7.2.3 and 7.0.11 or later, i.e., beyond the 7.2.2 and 7.0.10 affected ranges); the CISA KEV required action is to apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use if mitigations are unavailable. Until patched, limit exposure of the EMS web interface to untrusted networks and hunt for signs of compromise — anomalous requests to the management console, unexpected database or admin activity, and follow-on ransomware behavior — since exploitation with known ransomware use is confirmed.

9.898% KEV ransomware
  • fortinet FortiClient Enterprise Management Server (EMS) 7.2.0 through 7.2.2 and 7.0.1 through 7.0.10
largetens of thousands of EMS deployments worldwide, with a smaller subset (likely thousands) internet-exposed
CVE-2024-1709
Authentication Bypass in ConnectWise ScreenConnect Creates Rogue Admin Accounts

ConnectWise ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control), a widely used remote-access and remote-monitoring tool, contains an authentication bypass (CWE-288) in its management interface. An attacker needs only network access to the management interface to trigger the flaw, with no valid credentials or user interaction required. A successful attacker gains administrative control of the ScreenConnect server by creating a new administrator-level account, providing a foothold that has already been used in ransomware campaigns against downstream managed environments. Any organization running ConnectWise ScreenConnect is affected, especially managed service providers and IT teams whose management interface is reachable from the internet; the source data specifies affected products but no version ranges. Exploitation is confirmed and urgent: CISA added the flaw to the KEV on 2024-02-22 with known ransomware use, EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, and ConnectWise warned that no patch was available at the time of disclosure.

Do: Follow ConnectWise's instructions immediately: no patch existed at disclosure, so apply the vendor's mitigations or, per the CISA KEV required action, restrict internet exposure of the management interface or discontinue use until mitigations are available, then upgrade to the vendor's patched release as soon as it ships. Audit ScreenConnect servers for unexpectedly created administrator-level accounts and unusual remote sessions, which are the attack's artifacts. Prioritize any instance whose management interface is reachable from the internet, given confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and known ransomware use.

10.0100% KEV ransomware PoC ×3
  • ConnectWise ScreenConnect
masstens of thousands of internet-exposed ScreenConnect servers (on the order of 10,000-30,000 instances in public internet scans at disclosure), managing millions…
Full article1,258 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

A subgroup within the infamous Russian state-sponsored hacking group known as Sandworm has been attributed to a multi-year initial access operation dubbed BadPilot that stretched across the globe.

"This subgroup has conducted globally diverse compromises of Internet-facing infrastructure to enable Seashell Blizzard to persist on high-value targets and support tailored network operations," the Microsoft Threat Intelligence team said in a new report shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication.

The geographical spread of the initial access subgroup's targets include the whole of North America, several countries in Europe, as well as others, including Angola, Argentina, Australia, China, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.

The development marks a significant expansion of the hacking group's victimology footprint over the past three years, which is otherwise known to be concentrated around Eastern Europe -

  • 2022: Energy, retail, education, consulting, and agriculture sectors in Ukraine
  • 2023: Sectors in the United States, Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East that provided material support to the war in Ukraine or were geopolitically significant
  • 2024: Entities in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom

Sandworm is tracked by Microsoft under the moniker Seashell Blizzard (formerly Iridium), and by the broader cybersecurity community under the names APT44, Blue Echidna, FROZENBARENTS, Grey Tornado, Iron Viking, Razing Ursa, Telebots, UAC-0002, and Voodoo Bear. Active since at least 2013, the group is assessed to be affiliated with Unit 74455 within the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).

The adversarial collective has been described by Google-owned Mandiant as a "highly adaptive" and "operationally mature" threat actor that engages in espionage, attack, and influence operations. It also has a track record of mounting disruptive and destructive attacks against Ukraine over the past decade.

Campaigns mounted by Sandworm in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war have leveraged data wipers (KillDisk aka HermeticWiper), pseudo-ransomware (Prestige aka PRESSTEA), and backdoors (Kapeka), in addition to off-the-shelf malware families like DarkCrystal RAT (aka DCRat) that allow the threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to infected hosts.

It has also been observed relying on a variety of Russian companies and criminal marketplaces to source and sustain its offensive capabilities, highlighting a growing trend of cybercrime facilitating state-backed hacking.

"The group has used criminally sourced tools and infrastructure as a source of disposable capabilities that can be operationalized on short notice without immediate links to its past operations," the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said in an analysis.

"Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, APT44 has increased its use of such tooling, including malware such as DarkCrystal RAT (DCRat), Warzone, and RADTHIEF ('Rhadamanthys Stealer'), and bulletproof hosting infrastructure such as that provided by the Russian-speaking actor 'yalishanda,' who advertises in cybercriminal underground communities."

Microsoft said the Sandworm subgroup has been operational since at least late 2021, exploiting various known security flaws to obtain initial access, followed by a series of post-exploitation actions aimed at collecting credentials, achieving command execution, and supporting lateral movement.

"Observed operations following initial access indicate that this campaign enabled Seashell Blizzard to obtain access to global targets across sensitive sectors including energy, oil and gas, telecommunications, shipping, arms manufacturing, in addition to international governments," the tech giant noted.

"This subgroup has been enabled by a horizontally scalable capability bolstered by published exploits that allowed Seashell Blizzard to discover and compromise numerous Internet-facing systems across a wide range of geographical regions and sectors."

Since early last year, the sub-cluster is said to have weaponized vulnerabilities in ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709) and Fortinet FortiClient EMS (CVE-2023-48788) to infiltrate targets in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Attacks carried out by the subgroup involve a combination of both opportunistic "spray and pray" attacks and targeted intrusions that are designed to maintain indiscriminate access and perform follow-on actions to either expand network access or obtain confidential information.

It's believed that the wide array of compromises offer Seashell Blizzard a way to meet Kremlin's ever-evolving strategic objectives, permitting the hacking outfit to horizontally scale their operations across diverse sectors as new exploits are disclosed.

As many as eight different known security vulnerabilities have been exploited by the subgroup to date -

A successful foothold is succeeded by the threat actor establishing persistence through three different methods -

  • February 24, 2024 – present: Deployment of legitimate remote access software such as Atera Agent and Splashtop Remote Services, in some cases abusing the access to drop additional payloads for credential acquisition, data exfiltration, and other tools for maintaining access like OpenSSH and a bespoke utility dubbed ShadowLink that allows the compromised system to be accessible via the TOR anonymity network
  • Late 2021 – present: Deployment of a web shell named LocalOlive that allows for command-and-control and serves as a conduit for more payloads, such as tunneling utilities (e.g., Chisel, plink, and rsockstun)
  • Late 2021 – 2024: Malicious modifications to Outlook Web Access (OWA) sign-in pages to inject JavaScript code that can harvest and exfiltrate credentials back to the threat actor in real-time, and DNS A-record configuration changes likely in an effort to intercept credentials from critical authentication services

"This subgroup, which is characterized within the broader Seashell Blizzard organization by its near-global reach, represents an expansion in both the geographical targeting conducted by Seashell Blizzard and the scope of its operations," Microsoft said.

"At the same time, Seashell Blizzard's far-reaching, opportunistic access methods likely offer Russia expansive opportunities for niche operations and activities that will continue to be valuable over the medium term."

The development comes as Dutch cybersecurity company EclecticIQ linked the Sandworm group to another campaign that leverages pirated Microsoft Key Management Service (KMS) activators and fake Windows updates to deliver a new version of BACKORDER, a Go-based downloader that's responsible for fetching and executing a second-stage payload from a remote server.

BACKORDER, per Mandiant, is usually delivered within trojanized installer files and is hard-coded to execute the original setup executable. The end goal of the campaign is to deliver DarkCrystal RAT.

"Ukraine's heavy reliance on cracked software, including in government institutions, creates a major attack surface," security researcher Arda Büyükkaya said. "Many users, including businesses and critical entities, have turned to pirated software from untrusted sources, giving adversaries like Sandworm (APT44) a prime opportunity to embed malware in widely used programs."

Further infrastructure analysis has uncovered a previously undocumented RDP backdoor codenamed Kalambur that's disguised as a Windows update, and which utilizes the TOR network for command-and-control, as well as to deploy OpenSSH and enable remote access via the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on port 3389.

Interestingly, Kalambur shares some level of functional overlap with ShadowLink. "When launched, [ShadowLink] installs TOR hidden services on the device, turning it into a TOR network server with a unique .onion domain," per Microsoft. "The threat actor can connect to this domain using a pre-configured port number, which in this case is port 3389, redirecting traffic to the device's Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) service."

"By leveraging trojanized software to infiltrate ICS environments, Sandworm (APT44) continues to demonstrate its strategic objective of destabilizing Ukraine's critical infrastructure in support of Russian geopolitical ambitions," Büyükkaya said.

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2025/02/microsoft-uncovers-sandworm-subgroups.html