Decentralized network congestion control for DAG-based distributed ledger system
Researchers propose node-specific variable proof-of-work to curb transaction spamming in DAG-based distributed ledgers, proving a Nash equilibrium enforces prescribed node behavior.
The paper proposes a variable, behavior-based node-specific proof-of-work model for DAG-based distributed ledger networks, where congestion is mainly driven by transaction spamming rather than user growth or token launches. The model grants equal opportunity to stakeholders regardless of computational resources and penalizes nodes issuing more than a prescribed number of transactions. System behavior is modeled as a non-cooperative game over finite network resources, and the authors prove existence of a Nash equilibrium enforcing the prescribed behavior.
- Targets congestion caused by transaction spamming in DAG-based DLT networks.
- Node-specific variable PoW inside the consensus framework deters network spamming.
- Grants equal opportunity to stakeholders regardless of computational resources.
- Nash equilibrium proof shows the model enforces prescribed node behavior.
Full article236 words · extracted from arxiv.org · click to collapse
We propose a variable and behavior-based node-specific proof-of-work (PoW) model for a directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledger technology (DLT) network to mitigate decentralized network congestion control. Network congestion control for centralized communication systems is an established field of study, with detailed and continuous research being done on the subject. However, attention to congestion control in decentralized networks is relatively recent and underexplored, especially with DLT, such as blockchain and DAG-based networks. For the DLT networks, the network congestion is caused by factors such as transaction spamming, an increase in the user base, and the launch of new tokens. We focus on the congestion caused by the spamming of transactions within the blockchain and DAG-based DLT network. Based on the network throughput of transactions per second and consensus procedure, the DAG-based DLT needs to control network spamming more than the blockchain network. The PoW model within the DLT consensus framework is a limited deterrent against spamming. Our model provides equal opportunities for all stakeholders regardless of their computational resources. It prevents and penalizes any node that attempts to spam or dominate the network with more than the prescribed number of transactions. Since the system nodes compete to issue transactions with finite network resources, we display the system behavior through a non-cooperative game. Further, we show that our model enforces prescribed behavior amongst the nodes through the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in the game.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09961