Paper models how AI changes academic effort and hiring signals
The model classifies pure-strategy equilibria and uses learning simulations of applicants and recruiters.
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The model classifies pure-strategy equilibria and uses learning simulations of applicants and recruiters.
The path-following algorithm reached 10^{-5} precision on all 5600 random games, from 2-player 128-action to 128-player 2-action.
Across 300 simulated dialogues, adaptive play was 28.9–79.7% closer to Nash equilibrium than static baselines.
Selecting LLMs for strategic games is game- and opponent-specific; a stationary bandit beats more complex selectors but not the best fixed model.
A game-theoretic model shows obscured systems suffer more successful attacks in equilibrium than open systems.
A Stackelberg model finds when red-team feedback and repairs suffice to defend finite AI attack surfaces.
Multiplicatively Optimistic Regret Matching gives near-constant external regret in general-sum games under self-play.
MEFPIA searches quantum-game equilibria faster, with lower error than matrix multiplicative-weights updates on tested instances.
Researchers give the first algorithm for computing epsilon-approximate history-dependent equilibria in state-adversarial Markov decision processes with observation-perturbing adversaries.
Researchers propose node-specific variable proof-of-work to curb transaction spamming in DAG-based distributed ledgers, proving a Nash equilibrium enforces prescribed node behavior.
Paper models multi-agent LLM orchestration as a bilevel game, proving transcript-only gating limits and introducing grounded-memory SRMA.

Import AI covers 23 IFP policy ideas for automated AI R&D risks and MIT/Columbia's game theory of AI racing slowdowns.
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