U.S. Charges 3 Iranian Hackers and Sanctions Several Others Over Ransomware Attacks
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-13379 | Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN CVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN web portal that allows an unauthenticated attacker to download FortiOS system files via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. By traversing directories through crafted requests to the exposed web portal, the attacker can retrieve sensitive files, a technique publicly documented as yielding the SSL VPN session file containing usernames and passwords in plaintext. Any organization running the SSL VPN web portal on a FortiGate appliance is affected, and risk is highest where the portal is directly reachable from the internet. The flaw is confirmed in the wild: it was added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. No public PoC is listed in the provided data, but credential theft tied to this bug has been widely reused by threat actors. Do: Apply the patched FortiOS release per Fortinet's vendor advisory immediately, as this is a CISA KEV required action; if the fixed version is not known from this data, follow Fortinet's FG-IR-18-384 advisory for the correct upgrade path. Rotate SSL VPN credentials and review VPN access logs for path-traversal requests, since successful exploitation exposes plaintext session credentials, and restrict SSL VPN portal exposure to trusted sources where possible. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware |
| mass≈500,000 internet-exposed FortiOS SSL VPN portals (Fortinet cited ~480,000 affected devices) | |
| CVE-2019-5591 | Default-Configuration LDAP Impersonation in Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2019-5591 is a default-configuration flaw in Fortinet FortiOS (CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical function): when a FortiGate acts as an LDAP client over SSL/TLS for authentication purposes, the default configuration does not properly authenticate the LDAP server, allowing an unauthenticated attacker on the same subnet to impersonate the LDAP server. The attack requires adjacency (the attacker must be on the same network segment as the device's LDAP traffic) and only works where the device uses LDAP over TLS with the default, non-validating settings. A successful attacker can intercept sensitive authentication information, such as usernames and passwords, exchanged with the LDAP server, with high confidentiality impact but no integrity or availability impact per the CVSS score. Organizations running affected FortiOS releases with LDAP-over-TLS configured are exposed; FortiOS runs on one of the largest firewall/VPN installed bases, though the source data does not state exact affected version ranges or deployment counts. The flaw is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03) with known in-the-wild and ransomware use; late-2021 CISA and FBI advisories warned that APT actors were exploiting Fortinet bugs, including this one, for initial access, and no public PoC is known. Do: Upgrade affected FortiGate/FortiOS units to a fixed release (6.2.1+, 6.0.8+, 5.6.10+, or 5.4.12+) per Fortinet's instructions, as required by CISA's KEV listing. If patching is delayed, disable the use of SSL/TLS in the LDAP server configuration or restrict and monitor the network path between the FortiGate and the LDAP server. Inventory which devices use LDAPS for authentication and review authentication logs for signs of server impersonation or credential theft. | 6.5 | 18% | KEV ransomware |
| largetens of thousands of FortiGate deployments plausibly affected (a subset of a very large FortiOS installed base that connects to LDAP over TLS) | |
| CVE-2020-12812 | MFA Bypass via Username Case Change in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN improperly validates the second factor of authentication (FortiToken), allowing a user with valid primary credentials to log in without being prompted for their one-time token. The bypass is triggered by changing the letter case of the username (e.g., typing 'Admin' instead of 'admin'), a case-sensitivity handling flaw (CWE-178) in the authentication logic (CWE-287). An attacker who has stolen, phished, or reused a user's primary credentials can therefore gain full SSL VPN access without the multi-factor protection defenders assume is enforced. Any organization running an affected FortiOS SSL VPN portal with FortiToken two-factor authentication for users is exposed. The flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 49.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days (99th percentile); no public PoC is known. Do: Apply the FortiOS update per Fortinet's advisory, as required by CISA's KEV listing. Until patched, audit SSL VPN logs for successful logins in which no FortiToken second-factor prompt occurred (especially sessions authenticating with altered username case), and consider restricting the SSL VPN portal to trusted source addresses or disabling it temporarily. Any accounts found with second-factor-free VPN logins should have credentials rotated and be checked for follow-on compromise, given known ransomware use. | 9.8 | 49% | KEV ransomware |
| masson the order of hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed FortiOS SSL VPN portals (public scans in 2020-2021 counted roughly 150,000-500,000) | |
| CVE-2021-31207 | Security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell) enables webshell RCE CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server, classified as an unrestricted file-write issue (CWE-434) that lets an attacker bypass intended restrictions and write files of their choosing to the server. It is the final bug in the ProxyShell chain: chained with the autodiscover SSRF and PowerShell backend elevation flaws, it allows an unauthenticated attacker to reach the Exchange PowerShell API, write arbitrary files such as an ASPX webshell, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. A successful attacker gains full control of the on-premises Exchange server, including mailbox access, stolen credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement; the bug has been used to deploy ransomware and keyloggers. On-premises deployments of Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per vendor advisories) are affected, while Exchange Online/cloud mailboxes are not. Exploitation is essentially certain and ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, public ProxyShell PoC/exploit code is available, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%. Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 security updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (or any later security/cumulative update) per vendor instructions, and restrict untrusted access to Exchange's autodiscover and PowerShell endpoints. Hunt for ASPX webshells under the Exchange FrontEnd directories and review IIS logs for autodiscover.json requests chaining PowerShell, since many servers were compromised before patching. Given known ransomware use and KEV listing, treat any server that was unpatched or internet-exposed during the exploitation window as potentially compromised. | 6.6 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| massHundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (public scans around the July 2021 ProxyShell disclosure showed roughly 400,000-600,000 internet-exposed… | |
| CVE-2021-34473 +1 in the same advisory: …34523 | SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell) Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity. | 9.1 group max | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,… | |
| CVE-2021-44228 | JNDI Injection Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell) Apache Log4j2, an extremely widely used Java logging library, fails to protect its JNDI lookup feature against attacker-controlled JNDI-related endpoints (CWE-20, CWE-502), so crafted text processed by the logger causes the Java runtime to fetch and load attacker-supplied objects, leading to remote code execution. The flaw is triggered whenever attacker-controlled input reaches the logging API and is parsed for JNDI lookups, a pattern common in web servers and enterprise Java applications that log user-supplied fields such as headers or form values. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the affected application, giving attackers a foothold for lateral movement, data theft, and ransomware deployment. Any Java application or product that ships or bundles an affected Apache Log4j2 release is exposed, making this one of the most broadly deployed vulnerabilities ever disclosed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Inventory all Java applications and dependencies for Apache Log4j2 and apply the vendor's patched updates, or remove affected assets from the network, as required by CISA's KEV catalog. Where updates are not yet available, use the temporary mitigations in CISA's ED-22-02 recommended-mitigation guidance, such as disabling message lookups, only until patches are applied. Prioritize internet-facing and business-critical systems and hunt for exploitation activity given known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×9 |
| masshundreds of millions of Java applications/devices, with hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed services | |
| CVE-2021-45046 | Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j2 via Incomplete Log4Shell Fix CVE-2021-45046 is a remote code execution and information disclosure flaw in Apache Log4j2 (CWE-917) that resulted from an incomplete fix to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell), leaving the Thread Context Lookup Pattern vulnerable in certain non-default configurations. It is triggered when an application logs attacker-controlled data using layouts or patterns that perform Thread Context (MDC) lookups, allowing crafted lookup expressions to be evaluated against untrusted input. A successful attacker can achieve remote code execution, or potentially information disclosure, on the affected service. Any deployment of Apache Log4j2 that relies on the affected non-default lookup configurations is exposed, which given Log4j2's ubiquity in Java applications and embedded products means a very large installed base. Exploitation is confirmed: the flaw is in CISA KEV (added 2023-05-01) with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Upgrade Log4j2 to 2.17.0 or later per vendor instructions (or 2.12.3/2.3.1 for the legacy 2.12/2.3 branches), since the 2.16.0 fix was itself incomplete in some non-default configurations. Where upgrading is not immediately possible, remove the JndiLookup class from the Log4j2 jar or disable lookup processing, and audit applications and dependencies that bundle Log4j2 while following the CISA KEV required action to apply vendor updates. | 9.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware |
| massmillions of Java deployments worldwide, with hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed services observed in public scans during the Log4Shell campaign | |
| CVE-2021-45105 | Apache Log4j2 versions 2.0-alpha1 through 2.16.0 (excluding 2.12.3 and 2.3.1) did not protect from uncontrolled recursion from self-referential lookups. Apache Log4j2 versions 2.0-alpha1 through 2.16.0 (excluding 2.12.3 and 2.3.1) did not protect from uncontrolled recursion from self-referential lookups. This allows an attacker with control over Thread Context Map data to cause a denial of service when a crafted string is interpreted. This issue was fixed in Log4j 2.17.0, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1. NVD description · AI analysis pending | 5.9 | 100% |
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Full article858 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse
The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on Wednesday announced sweeping sanctions against ten individuals and two entities backed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for their involvement in ransomware attacks at least since October 2020.
The agency said the cyber activity mounted by the individuals is partially attributable to intrusion sets tracked under the names APT35, Charming Kitten, Nemesis Kitten, Phosphorus, and TunnelVision.
"This group has launched extensive campaigns against organizations and officials across the globe, particularly targeting U.S. and Middle Eastern defense, diplomatic, and government personnel, as well as private industries including media, energy, business services, and telecommunications," the Treasury said.
The Nemesis Kitten actor, which is also known as Cobalt Mirage, DEV-0270, and UNC2448, has come under the scanner in recent months for its pattern of ransomware attacks for opportunistic revenue generation using Microsoft's built-in BitLocker tool to encrypt files on compromised devices.
Microsoft and Secureworks have characterized DEV-0270 as a subgroup of Phosphorus (aka Cobalt Illusion), with ties to another actor referred to as TunnelVision. The Windows maker also assessed with low confidence that "some of DEV-0270's ransomware attacks are a form of moonlighting for personal or company-specific revenue generation."
What's more, independent analyses from the two cybersecurity firms as well as Google-owned Mandiant has revealed the group's connections to two companies Najee Technology (which functions under the aliases Secnerd and Lifeweb) and Afkar System, both of which have been subjected to U.S. sanctions.
It's worth noting that Najee Technology and Afkar System's connections to the Iranian intelligence agency were first flagged by an anonymous anti-Iranian regime entity called Lab Dookhtegan earlier this year.
"The model of Iranian government intelligence functions using contractors blurs the lines between the actions tasked by the government and the actions that the private company takes on its own initiative," Secureworks said in a new report detailing the activities of Cobalt Mirage.
While exact links between the two companies and IRGC remain unclear, the method of private Iranian firms acting as fronts or providing support for intelligence operations is well established over the years, including that of ITSecTeam (ITSEC), Mersad, Emennet Pasargad, and Rana Intelligence Computing Company.
On top of that, the Secureworks probe into a June 2022 Cobalt Mirage incident showed that a PDF file containing the ransom note was created on December 17, 2021, by an "Ahmad Khatibi" and timestamped at UTC+03:30 time zone, which corresponds to the Iran Standard Time. Khatibi, incidentally, happens to be the CEO and owner of the Iranian company Afkar System.
Ahmad Khatibi Aghda is also part of the 10 individuals sanctioned by the U.S., alongside Mansour Ahmadi, the CEO of Najee Technology, and other employees of the two enterprises who are said to be complicit in targeting various networks globally by leveraging well-known security flaws to gain initial access to further follow-on attacks.
Some of the exploited flaws, according to a joint cybersecurity advisory released by Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., as part of the IRGC-affiliated actor activity are as follows -
- Fortinet FortiOS path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379)
- Fortinet FortiOS default configuration vulnerability (CVE-2019-5591)
- Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN 2FA bypass vulnerability (CVE-2020-12812)
- ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207), and
- Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021-45105)
"Khatibi is among the cyber actors who gained unauthorized access to victim networks to encrypt the network with BitLocker and demand a ransom for the decryption keys," the U.S. government said, in addition to adding him to the FBI's Most Wanted list.
"He leased network infrastructure used in furtherance of this malicious cyber group's activities, he participated in compromising victims' networks, and he engaged in ransom negotiations with victims."
Coinciding with the sanctions, the Justice Department separately indicted Ahmadi, Khatibi, and a third Iranian national named Amir Hossein Nickaein Ravari for engaging in a criminal extortion scheme to inflict damage and losses to victims located in the U.S., Israel, and Iran.
All three individuals have been charged with one count of conspiring to commit computer fraud and related activity in connection with computers; one count of intentionally damaging a protected computer; and one count of transmitting a demand in relation to damaging a protected computer. Ahmadi has also been charged with one more count of intentionally damaging a protected computer.
That's not all. The U.S. State Department has also announced monetary rewards of up to $10 million for any information about Mansour, Khatibi, and Nikaeen and their whereabouts.
"These defendants may have been hacking and extorting victims – including critical infrastructure providers – for their personal gain, but the charges reflect how criminals can flourish in the safe haven that the Government of Iran has created and is responsible for," Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen said.
The development comes close on the heels of sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and its Minister of Intelligence, Esmaeil Khatib, for engaging in cyber-enabled activities against the nation and its allies.
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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/us-charges-3-iranian-hackers-and.html