Google recounts QUIC stateless-reset loops after a CLDAP flood
Original title: Blog: Preventing Cross-Service UDP Loops in QUIC
About 400 CLDAP servers reflected Reset packets, sustaining roughly 20 million packets per second between them and Google.
A Google Bug Hunters post by Damian Menscher, dated March 26, 2024, explains how QUIC Stateless Reset packets can loop if a Reset is answered with another Reset. Years earlier, a 10-minute CLDAP amplification attack spoofed Google as the source of 86-byte queries that drew responses of about 3,000 bytes. Roughly 400 servers reflected Google’s small Reset packets instead of dropping them, and Google answered with new Resets. A March 19, 2024 advisory had flagged other unreported UDP loop methods, including buggy DNS servers.
Unconfirmed: The post cuts off before listing the specific postmortem fixes.
- The loop clue was small packets still sourced from CLDAP port 389.
- Google reproduced the bug by spoofing a request from an echo server.
- QUIC omits a fixed Reset marker so middleboxes cannot spot Resets.
- The post says several mitigations followed, but the list is cut off.
Impact: Sustained UDP packet loop and bandwidth flood
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| Google QUIC | — |
- 1.Do not send a QUIC Stateless Reset in response to a Reset.
From the original article
7 min read at bughunters.google.comReporting Rules & Rewards Learn Leaderboard Open Source Security Blog Infinite loops between servers are something that must be carefully avoided to prevent performance degradation or network overload. Methods of avoiding loops vary: • The ping utility is implemented using two different ICMP packet types to prevent looping: ECHOREQUEST and ECHORESPONSE.
By bughunters.google.com via freddyb · bughunters.google.com
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