Iranian Threat Group Hits Thousands With Password Spray Campaign
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-26134 | Unauthenticated OGNL Injection RCE in Atlassian Confluence Server/Data Center Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center contain an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw caused by improper neutralization of expression-language (OGNL) input (CWE-917): an attacker with network access to the application can submit a crafted request that is evaluated as an expression and executed by the server. Successful exploitation lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker run arbitrary code with the privileges of the Confluence process, without any credentials. All organizations running self-managed Confluence Server or Data Center are affected, particularly instances exposed to the internet; Confluence Cloud is not listed among the affected products. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2022-06-02 with ransomware use marked as known, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). CVSS has not yet been scored in this data, but the KEV listing and known ransomware use make unpatched, internet-facing instances a top-priority patching target. Do: Immediately upgrade to the patched Confluence release specified in Atlassian's 2022-06-02 security advisory, and until patched follow the CISA required action to block all internet traffic to and from affected instances. Because in-the-wild exploitation and ransomware use are confirmed, also hunt for compromise indicators on both patched and unpatched hosts, such as webshells, unexpected child processes of the Confluence service, and unusual outbound connections. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed instances (public scan counts of roughly 60,000-90,000 Confluence Server/Data Center hosts around the June 2022… | |
| CVE-2022-47966 | Unauthenticated SAML RCE in Zoho ManageEngine On-Premise Products CVE-2022-47966 is a critical (CVSS 9.8), unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in roughly two dozen Zoho ManageEngine on-premise products caused by their bundled Apache Santuario xmlsec (XML Security for Java) 1.4.1 library, in which the XSLT features leave security protections to the application and ManageEngine did not provide them. An attacker triggers the flaw by sending a crafted SAML response containing a malicious XSLT transform to the SAML single sign-on (SSO) endpoint; exploitation is only possible if SAML SSO has ever been configured for the product (for some products, SAML SSO must be currently active). Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution in the context of the affected ManageEngine application, typically full compromise of the server and a foothold into the wider enterprise network. Any organization running an affected product version with SAML SSO enabled is affected, with internet-exposed ITSM/identity-management servers the most likely targets. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is in CISA KEV with known ransomware use, Rapid7 reported broad attacker interest, North Korea's Lazarus Group used it to deploy QuiteRAT, and Iranian government-backed actors have targeted U.S. energy and transit-sector organizations. Do: Apply vendor updates immediately, upgrading each installed product to at least the fixed version listed (e.g., ServiceDesk Plus 14004+, ADSelfService Plus 6211+, Endpoint Central/Endpoint Central MSP 10.1.2228.11+, Password Manager Pro 12124+, ServiceDesk Plus MSP 13001+, ADAudit Plus 7081+, ADManager Plus 7162+, AD360 4310+); this is a CISA KEV required action. As an interim mitigation, disable or restrict SAML SSO (or limit access to the product's SSO endpoints), since SAML SSO must have been configured for exploitation. Prioritize patching internet-exposed instances and review those servers for signs of compromise, given documented use by Lazarus Group, ransomware operators, and Iranian nation-state actors. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×6 |
| largetens of thousands of installations plausibly affected (thousands of instances internet-exposed), out of ManageEngine's very large on-prem install base |
Full article404 words · extracted from infosecurity-magazine.com · click to collapse
An Iranian state-backed APT group carried out a “wave” of cyber-espionage attacks against thousands of global targets over a six-month period, Microsoft has revealed.
The group known as Peach Sandstorm (aka APT33, Elfin, and Refined Kitten) used password spraying techniques between February and July 2023. This is a brute-force technique where threat actors try to authenticate to multiple accounts with a list of commonly used passwords.
Microsoft claimed that, although these noisy campaigns hit thousands of organizations across several sectors and geographies, subsequent activity was more “stealthy and sophisticated.”
“Many of the cloud-based tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) seen in these most recent campaigns are materially more sophisticated than capabilities used by Peach Sandstorm in the past,” it explained.
“In later stages of known compromises, the threat actor used different combinations from a set of known TTPs to drop additional tools, move laterally, and ultimately exfiltrate data from a target.”
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The report claimed that a small subset of compromised victims had data taken from their systems. It’s not clear what type of organizations these were, but APT33 has a particular interest in the satellite, defense and pharmaceutical sectors, Microsoft said.
The group used AzureHound and Roadtools to conduct reconnaissance in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) environments and deployed multiple persistence mechanisms including the use of Azure Arc.
This tool allows users “to secure, develop, and operate infrastructure, applications, and Azure services anywhere, to persist in compromised environments,” Microsoft explained.
In some cases, the group eschewed password spraying in favor of vulnerability exploitation: specifically, remote code execution bugs in Zoho (CVE-2022-47966) and Confluence (CVE-2022-26134).
In some intrusions, APT33 deployed commercial remote monitoring and management tool AnyDesk to maintain access to a target.
The end goal was to steal intelligence aligned with Iranian state interests, Microsoft claimed.
“The capabilities observed in this campaign are concerning as Microsoft saw Peach Sandstorm use legitimate credentials (gleaned from password spray attacks) to authenticate to targets’ systems, persist in targets’ environments, and deploy a range of tools to carry out additional activity,” the report concluded.
“Peach Sandstorm also created new Azure subscriptions and leveraged the access these subscriptions provided to conduct additional attacks in other organizations’ environments. While the specific effects in this campaign vary based on the threat actor’s decisions, even initial access could adversely impact the confidentiality of a given environment.”
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/iranian-threat-group-thousands/