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New Mozi P2P Botnet targets Netgear, D-Link, Huawei routers

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2014-8361
Improper Input Validation in Realtek SDK miniigd SOAP Service Enables Remote RCE

The Realtek SDK, a software development kit embedded in routers, gateways, and similar network equipment sold under many OEM brands, contains an improper input validation flaw (CWE-20) in its miniigd UPnP SOAP service. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger it by sending a crafted NewInternalClient request to the vulnerable SOAP interface, causing execution of malicious code on the device. Successful exploitation gives attackers control of affected devices, which can be used for botnet recruitment, staging further attacks, or ransomware operations. Affected parties are owners of devices built on the Realtek SDK, particularly routers and gateways with the UPnP service exposed to the internet. Exploitation is ongoing: CISA added the flaw to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-09-18 and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, though ransomware use is not confirmed.

Do: Inventory devices that use the Realtek SDK and check whether the miniigd UPnP/SOAP service is reachable from untrusted networks; apply firmware updates from your device vendor as soon as available, or per CISA's required action, disable UPnP or block the service from internet exposure if mitigations are unavailable. No patch level is published in this dataset, so verify fix status against OEM advisories and review device logs for crafted NewInternalClient SOAP requests.

100% KEV
  • Realtek SDK
mass≈1,000,000+ devices (hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed hosts observed in public scans; SDK embedded in many OEM routers)
CVE-2017-17215
Huawei HG532 with some customized versions has a remote code execution vulnerability.

Huawei HG532 with some customized versions has a remote code execution vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could send malicious packets to port 37215 to launch attacks. Successful exploit could lead to the remote execution of arbitrary code.

NVD description · AI analysis pending
8.878%
  • huawei hg532 firmware
CVE-2018-10562
+1 in the same advisory: …10561
Unauthenticated RCE in Dasan GPON Routers (CVE-2018-10562)

CVE-2018-10562 is an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web management interface of Dasan GPON home routers. When chained with the companion authentication bypass CVE-2018-10561, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can send crafted requests that execute arbitrary commands on the device. Successful exploitation yields full control of the router, enabling device takeover, botnet enrollment, and, per CISA, use in ransomware operations. Anyone operating an affected Dasan GPON router — many of which were deployed by internet service providers — is affected, and CISA notes the impacted products are end-of-life. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2022-03-31) with known ransomware use and a 100% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Because the product line is end-of-life and CISA's required action is to disconnect impacted devices if still in use, retire or replace affected routers rather than patching in place. If replacement must wait, block or firewall the web management interface from the internet, check the device for signs of compromise, and ensure the related authentication-bypass path CVE-2018-10561 is also closed.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Dasan Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON) routers
mass≈1 million internet-exposed devices (public scan counts around the 2018 disclosure)
Full article546 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

Pierluigi Paganini December 25, 2019

A new Mozi P2P botnet is actively targeting Netgear, D-Link, and Huawei routers by probing for weak Telnet passwords to compromise them.

Security experts from 360 Netlab spotted a new Mozi P2P botnet that is actively targeting Netgear, D-Link, and Huawei routers by probing for weak Telnet passwords to compromise them.

According to the researchers, in the last months, the botnet was mainly involved in DDoS attacks, experts also noticed that the sample borrows part of code from the Gafgyt malware.

The botnet implements a custom extended Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol that provides a lookup service similar to a hash table ([key, value]).

“Mozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network.” reads the analysis published by the experts. “The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits (see the list below). In terms of functions, the execution of the instructions of each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a Payload called Config issued by the Botnet Master.”

This kind of implementation makes it simple to add/remove nodes with minimum workaround re- keys.

The Mozi Botnet uses its own implementation of the extended DHT protocol to build a P2P network.

The malware spreads by attempting to guess Telnet passwords of target devices and leveraging known exploits. Once gained access to the device, the bot attempt to execute a malicious payload and the bot will automatically join the Mozi P2P network.

The botnet supports implements the following capabilities:

  • DDoS attack
  • Collecting Bot Information
  • Execute the payload of the specified URL
  • Update the sample from the specified URL
  • Execute system or custom commands

“After Mozi establishes the p2p network through the DHT protocol, the config file is synchronized, and the corresponding tasks are started according to the instructions in the config file,” continues the analysis.

In order to avoid the botnet takeover by security experts or law enforcement agencies networks, the Mozi botnet implements a signature verification on each synchronized config.

Nodes belonging to the Mozi P2P botnet only accept commands that pass the verification process. The main commands implemented by Mozi bot allow it to:

Launch DDoS attacks (this module reuses Gafgyt’s attack code, supports HTTP, TCP, UDP, and other attacks)
• Collect and exfiltrate bot info (Bot ID, IP, PORT, filename (full path), gateway, CPU architecture)
• Execute payload from URL
• Update from the specified URL
• Execute system or bot custom commandsOpen Energy di Enel EnergiaAd by ENELSee More

The bot targets the following devices:

Affected DeviceVulnerability
Eir D1000 RouterEir D1000 Wireless Router RCI
Vacron NVR devicesVacron NVR RCE
Devices using the Realtek SDKCVE-2014-8361
Netgear R7000 and R6400Netgear cig-bin Command Injection
DGN1000 Netgear routersNetgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE
MVPower DVRJAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution
Huawei Router HG532CVE-2017-17215
D-Link DevicesHNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution
GPON RoutersCVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562
D-Link DevicesUPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution
CCTV DVRCCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution

Additional information on the Mozi P2P botnet, including IoCs, are available in the Netlab report. 

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – Mozi botnet, malware)

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/95608/malware/mozi-p2p-botnet.html