Researchers model protocol-conformant vehicles from a malicious maker
Original title: Janus Vehicles: Entity-Centric Threat Modelling of Protocol-Conformant Vehicles under a Malicious-Manufacturer Assumption
The model says authenticity does not prove declared purpose, and hidden functions can evade peer-visible checks.
The paper proposes an entity-centric threat model for vehicles that stay authentic and protocol-conformant while a malicious manufacturer hides sensing, communication, or context-triggered actuation. It defines four malign-entity archetypes and a behaviour-locus matrix across hardware, software, and network. For purpose-malicious but peer-benign vehicles, a behavioural interaction model describes how hidden capabilities are activated, acted on, and possibly observed or concealed.
- Archetypes include purpose-malicious, compromised, reappropriated, and imitated entities.
- Authenticity is argued not to establish declared-purpose conformance.
- Reappropriated genuine parts can keep identities outside authorised contexts.
- A behaviour-locus matrix covers covert, overt, and concealment actions.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgAutomotive cybersecurity commonly assumes benign end-product manufacturers and design authorities, focusing on supply-chain threats, external attacks, and compromised network participants observable through misbehaviour. This assumption overlooks malicious-by-design vehicles that remain authentic and protocol-conformant while performing undeclared sensing, communication, or context-triggered actuation.
By Jaeung Franciskus Yoo · arxiv.org
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