Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour
Threat actorlowExploited in the wild

EITest Campaign Evolution: From Angler EK to Neutrino and Rig

Palo Alto Unit 42by Brad Duncan ()4 min read2
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 details the EITest campaign's shift from Angler to Neutrino and Rig exploit kits while distributing ransomware, downloaders, and banking trojans.

Unit 42 updated its tracking of the EITest campaign, first identified in October 2014, which compromises websites with injected scripts that redirect victims through a gate to exploit kits. After Angler EK disappeared in June 2016, EITest switched to Neutrino and then primarily used Rig EK by August 2016. In September 2016 the campaign began using hex-obfuscated JavaScript and simplified gate URLs, while continuing to distribute payloads including Gootkit, Cerber, Bart, CryptFile2, Vawtrak, Ursnif, and Tinba. Gate infrastructure consistently reused IP blocks such as 85.93.0.0/24 even as domain names changed.

Key facts
  • EITest switched from Angler EK to Neutrino after Angler vanished in June 2016, then primarily used Rig EK by August 2016.
  • In September 2016, EITest adopted hex-obfuscated JavaScript and replaced long gate URLs with simplified HTTP requests.
  • Observed Rig EK payloads include Gootkit, Cerber, Bart, CryptFile2, Vawtrak, Ursnif, Tinba, and possible Andromeda or Zeus variants.
  • Gate infrastructure reuses IP blocks like 85.93.0.0/24 even as domain names change constantly.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
ipv4104.129.198.32r their first seen date. 2015-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 8
ipv4194.165.16.2022016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-
ipv4194.165.16.2036-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-
ipv4194.165.16.2048-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-
ipv431.184.192.1889-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187
ipv431.184.193.1689-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187
ipv431.184.193.1879-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187
ipv485.93.0.1103 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-
ipv485.93.0.121 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30:
ipv485.93.0.132 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-
ipv485.93.0.32ly reappeared well after their first seen date. 2015-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-1
ipv485.93.0.3315-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 8
ipv485.93.0.3416-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 8
ipv485.93.0.438 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 8
ipv485.93.0.682 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 8
ipv485.93.0.724 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 8
ipv485.93.0.813 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 8

From the original article

4 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

EITest is a long-running campaign that uses exploit kits (EKs) to distribute a variety of malware. This campaign was first identified in October 2014 , and we reviewed how the EITest campaign evolved in a March 2016 blog post. In this blog post, I’ll give an update of how the EITest campaign has evolved since March including the changes in patterns and the chain of events that lead to a successful infection.

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Brad Duncan · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.