EITest Campaign Evolution: From Angler EK to Neutrino and Rig
Unit 42 details the EITest campaign's shift from Angler to Neutrino and Rig exploit kits while distributing ransomware, downloaders, and banking trojans.
Unit 42 updated its tracking of the EITest campaign, first identified in October 2014, which compromises websites with injected scripts that redirect victims through a gate to exploit kits. After Angler EK disappeared in June 2016, EITest switched to Neutrino and then primarily used Rig EK by August 2016. In September 2016 the campaign began using hex-obfuscated JavaScript and simplified gate URLs, while continuing to distribute payloads including Gootkit, Cerber, Bart, CryptFile2, Vawtrak, Ursnif, and Tinba. Gate infrastructure consistently reused IP blocks such as 85.93.0.0/24 even as domain names changed.
- EITest switched from Angler EK to Neutrino after Angler vanished in June 2016, then primarily used Rig EK by August 2016.
- In September 2016, EITest adopted hex-obfuscated JavaScript and replaced long gate URLs with simplified HTTP requests.
- Observed Rig EK payloads include Gootkit, Cerber, Bart, CryptFile2, Vawtrak, Ursnif, Tinba, and possible Andromeda or Zeus variants.
- Gate infrastructure reuses IP blocks like 85.93.0.0/24 even as domain names change constantly.
- ATT&CK
- T1189 Drive-by CompromiseT1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionT1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- Vendors
- Palo Alto Networks
- Threat actors
- EITest
- Organizations
- Unit 42
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | 104.129.198.32 | r their first seen date. 2015-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 8 |
| ipv4 | 194.165.16.202 | 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016- |
| ipv4 | 194.165.16.203 | 6-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016- |
| ipv4 | 194.165.16.204 | 8-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016- |
| ipv4 | 31.184.192.188 | 9-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187 |
| ipv4 | 31.184.193.168 | 9-01: 194.165.16.203 2016-09-02: 194.165.16.204 2016-09-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187 |
| ipv4 | 31.184.193.187 | 9-08: 31.184.193.168 2016-09-14: 31.184.192.188 2016-09-19: 31.184.193.187 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.110 | 3 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09-01: 194.165.16.203 2016- |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.12 | 1 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.13 | 2 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 85.93.0.110 2016-08-30: 194.165.16.202 2016-09- |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.32 | ly reappeared well after their first seen date. 2015-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-1 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.33 | 15-12-29: 85.93.0.32 2016-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 8 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.34 | 16-02-03: 104.129.198.32 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 8 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.43 | 8 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 85.93.0.13 2016-08-25: 8 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.68 | 2 2016-02-24: 85.93.0.33 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 8 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.72 | 4 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 85.93.0.12 2016-08-17: 8 |
| ipv4 | 85.93.0.81 | 3 2016-03-16: 85.93.0.34 2016-04-01: 85.93.0.68 2016-05-18: 85.93.0.81 2016-06-06: 85.93.0.72 2016-06-11: 85.93.0.43 2016-07-18: 8 |
From the original article
4 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
EITest is a long-running campaign that uses exploit kits (EKs) to distribute a variety of malware. This campaign was first identified in October 2014 , and we reviewed how the EITest campaign evolved in a March 2016 blog post. In this blog post, I’ll give an update of how the EITest campaign has evolved since March including the changes in patterns and the chain of events that lead to a successful infection.
By Brad Duncan · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.