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Campaign Evolution: Darkleech to Pseudo

Palo Alto Unit 42by Brad Duncan ()5 min read1 · 1 read
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 traces the pseudo-Darkleech campaign, which compromises websites to inject scripts redirecting visitors to exploit kits delivering ransomware.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 analyzed the evolution of the pseudo-Darkleech campaign, which injects malicious script into compromised Apache, IIS and WordPress sites to redirect visitors to exploit kits such as Angler and Neutrino. The original Darkleech Apache module infected thousands of servers starting in 2012 and delivered Blackhole EK until that kit disappeared after Paunch's 2013 arrest. From 2015 onward, pseudo-Darkleech delivered ransomware families like CryptoWall and TeslaCrypt, and by early 2016 its injected scripts added obfuscated numeric blocks with frequently changing separator characters. Unit 42 tracks these patterns to help defenders identify compromised websites.

Key facts
  • Pseudo-Darkleech compromises WordPress, Apache, and IIS sites, injecting scripts that point visitors directly to exploit kit landing pages.
  • Original Darkleech infected thousands of Apache servers from 2012 and delivered Blackhole EK until Paunch's 2013 arrest.
  • After Angler EK's decline, pseudo-Darkleech alternated between Angler and Neutrino kits, delivering CryptoWall and TeslaCrypt ransomware.
  • Since February 2016, injected scripts added large obfuscated numeric blocks whose separator characters changed almost weekly.
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Indicators of compromise

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TypeIndicatorContext
domainddns.netleech pattern was pointing to No-IP.com domains (hopto.org, ddns.net, myftp.biz, serveftp.com, etc). These No-IP domains were ei
domainhopto.orge same Darkleech pattern was pointing to No-IP.com domains (hopto.org, ddns.net, myftp.biz, serveftp.com, etc). These No-IP domai
domainmyftp.bizern was pointing to No-IP.com domains (hopto.org, ddns.net, myftp.biz, serveftp.com, etc). These No-IP domains were either gates
domainno-ip.com. By early 2014, the same Darkleech pattern was pointing to No-IP.com domains (hopto.org, ddns.net, myftp.biz, serveftp.com, etc)
domainserveftp.comnting to No-IP.com domains (hopto.org, ddns.net, myftp.biz, serveftp.com, etc). These No-IP domains were either gates to an EK, or t

From the original article

5 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

In 2015, Sucuri published two blog posts, one in March describing a pseudo-Darkleech campaign targeting WordPress sites, and another about its evolution the following December. Sites compromised by this campaign redirected unsuspecting users to an exploit kit (EK). The Sucuri posts describe patterns in the injected script related to this campaign.

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Brad Duncan · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.