Keystream capping improves dynamic logic locking against SAT and structural attacks
Original title: Evaluating Structural and SAT Attack Resilience in Cryptographic Dynamic Logic Locking via Keystream Capping
Internal key-gate placement with keystream reuse capping raises attack search space to over 10^45 and prevents key extraction.
Untrusted third-party semiconductor supply chain exposes hardware IP. Static key-gates are vulnerable to SAT and structural removal attacks. Dynamic schemes like STREAMLOCK use cryptographic keystreams for near 50% Hamming distance corruption under incorrect keys. The work distributes key-gates internally via fault-propagation analysis and adds keystream-bit reuse capping. This delivers joint resilience against structural bypasses and bounded SAT attacks across ISCAS'85 benchmarks.
- Raises uninformed attacker's search space to over 10^45 for largest benchmark
- Keystream reuse cap prevents algebraic key extraction
- Near 50% Hamming distance output corruption under incorrect keys
- Evaluated on three ISCAS'85 benchmarks
- Integrates fault-aware placement with keystream capping
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgUntrusted third-party entities throughout the semiconductor supply chain expose proprietary hardware intellectual property to reverse engineering, piracy, and overproduction. While logic locking counters this threat by embedding key-dependent logic, conventional static key-gates remain vulnerable to both oracle-guided SAT attacks and structural removal attacks due to their time-invariant netlist signatures.
By Nahush Tambe · arxiv.org
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