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China-Linked JDY Botnet Expands to 1,500+ Devices for Cyber Reconnaissance

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-36260
Unauthenticated Command Injection in Hikvision Device Web Server

CVE-2021-36260 is a command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web server embedded in a wide range of Hikvision security camera and related devices, caused by insufficient input validation. An attacker triggers it by sending a crafted HTTP request to the device's web management interface, allowing commands to be executed on the device without authentication. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated remote code execution on the camera or recorder, letting an attacker take control of the device, pivot into the surrounding network, or use the devices as a botnet platform. Any Hikvision device running the affected web server firmware is at risk, which includes cameras, recorders, and other surveillance hardware deployed in homes, businesses, and government facilities. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-01-10 and carries a 99.9% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days, while no public proof-of-concept code is cataloged in the provided data and no CVSS score has been issued yet.

Do: Apply firmware updates issued by Hikvision per the vendor's instructions, as required by CISA's KEV listing for this vulnerability. Restrict the device web management interface to trusted networks or VPN access and avoid direct internet exposure. Review web server logs for anomalous HTTP requests to the device interface and signs of command execution, and prioritize internet-facing devices for patching first.

9.8100% KEV PoC ×3
  • Hikvision Embedded web server of Hikvision security cameras and related surveillance devices
massmillions of installed devices, with roughly hundreds of thousands to over a million Hikvision web interfaces exposed to the internet
CVE-2022-32548
An issue was discovered on certain DrayTek Vigor routers before July 2022 such as the Vigor3910 before 4.3.1.1.

An issue was discovered on certain DrayTek Vigor routers before July 2022 such as the Vigor3910 before 4.3.1.1. /cgi-bin/wlogin.cgi has a buffer overflow via the username or password to the aa or ab field.

NVD description · AI analysis pending
9.834% PoC ×2
  • draytek vigor3910 firmware
  • draytek vigor1000b firmware
  • draytek vigor2962 firmware
  • +1 more
CVE-2023-20118
Authenticated Command Injection in Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers

CVE-2023-20118 is a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 routers, caused by improper validation of user input within incoming HTTP packets. An authenticated remote attacker who already holds valid administrative credentials sends a crafted HTTP request to the management interface and can execute arbitrary commands with root-level privileges, gaining full device control and access to unauthorized data. All organizations running these six small-business router models are affected, and Cisco has stated it will not release any software update, leaving only a workaround. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-03-03, carries a high EPSS score of 54.1%, and news reporting around that period describes campaigns (e.g., ViciousTrap, which built a global honeypot from roughly 5,300 compromised devices) abusing Cisco router flaws, with botnet operators such as PolarEdge also targeting Cisco small-business routers. These end-of-service devices are therefore under active, in-the-wild exploitation and should be treated as high-priority for mitigation.

Do: No firmware fix will ever be released, so apply Cisco's workaround by disabling the affected feature or restricting the web management interface to trusted management hosts only (disable remote/internet-facing management). Check device logs and configurations for signs of compromise, including unexpected configuration changes or outbound connections indicating botnet implants. Because these routers are end-of-service, plan migration to supported models and, for federal agencies, follow BOD 22-01 mitigation guidance or discontinue use.

7.254% KEV
  • Cisco RV016 Router (firmware) all firmware versions; no patched release available
  • Cisco RV042 Router (firmware) all firmware versions; no patched release available
  • Cisco RV042G Router (firmware) all firmware versions; no patched release available
  • +3 more
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed devices (order-of-magnitude estimate; at least ~5,300 already confirmed compromised in one reported campaign)
CVE-2026-35616
Unauthenticated Code Execution in Fortinet FortiClient EMS 7.4.5–7.4.6

Fortinet FortiClient EMS versions 7.4.5 through 7.4.6 contain an improper access control flaw (CWE-284) that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands by sending crafted requests over the network. The attack requires no authentication, privileges, or user interaction, making any reachable EMS management server a direct target. A successful attacker gains code execution on the EMS host, and reported campaigns have used the flaw to deploy a credential stealer. Any organization running FortiClient EMS 7.4.5 or 7.4.6 is affected. The flaw is being exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA KEV on 2026-04-06, carries a 90.7% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days, and Fortinet has released emergency hotfixes.

Do: Upgrade FortiClient EMS off 7.4.5/7.4.6 using the fixed release or emergency hotfix per Fortinet's advisory (the available data does not specify the fixed version number), prioritizing internet-exposed servers; U.S. federal agencies must follow BOD 22-01. Until patched, restrict EMS management access to trusted networks or VPN and monitor for credential-stealer activity on managed endpoints. Given confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, assume possible compromise and hunt for indicators on both EMS hosts and endpoints it manages.

9.891% KEV
  • Fortinet FortiClient EMS 7.4.5 through 7.4.6
large≈10,000–100,000 EMS deployments (order-of-magnitude estimate; exact counts not in the data)
Full article937 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

Cybersecurity researchers have warned of a "resurgence and expansion" of JDY, a covert network associated with China-nexus state-sponsored threat actors.

"The JDY botnet comprises over 1,500 SOHO [small office and home office] and IoT devices and operates as a centrally controlled, high-performance scanner used to discover, fingerprint, and continuously map exposed services at scale," Lumen's Black Lotus Labs said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

JDY was first flagged as a cluster within another botnet codenamed KV-botnet in mid-December 2023. Primarily used for broader scanning against internet targets, the stealthy network comprising compromised SOHO routers, firewalls, and IoT devices has been put to use by Chinese hacking groups like Volt Typhoon.

Following KV-botnet's takedown by the U.S. government in early 2024, the botnet operators began making behavioral changes to the network, with the second KV cluster largely going offline. It's suspected that the botnet is offered by the operators to various hacking outfits, while carrying out reconnaissance and targeting on their own.

The latest findings from Black Lotus Labs show that the malware has expanded in scope to infect a broader range of devices and act as a conduit to feed "structured reconnaissance data" into a larger scanning ecosystem for follow-on target identification and exploitation.

Specifically, the JDY cluster is being used to conduct targeted scanning and service fingerprinting with an aim to flag vulnerable infrastructure following public disclosures. This points to an industrialized reconnaissance effort, the results of which are leveraged by Chinese nation-state groups.

This has been complemented by a growth in the botnet's size, which has surged from 650 bots at the start of January 2024 to more than 1,500 compromised devices. Most of the hacked nodes are located in the U.S. and Brazil, followed by Europe and Asia. Black Lotus Labs told The Hacker News that the cluster in Brazil is reflective of the fact that "we're seeing more and more botnets made up of Brazilian victims these days."

Where previously the cluster primarily featured Cisco RV320 and RV325 routers, the present makeup of the botnet is a lot more diverse, including devices from Araknis, Mimosa Networks, Ubiquiti, Draytek, Hikvision, and Linksys.

The vast majority of the victim devices are assessed to have reached end-of-life (EoL) with known vulnerabilities. Although the exact nature of the security flaws remains unclear, it's suspected to involve the following based on the specific device models that are being exploited -

  • Cisco RV042 - Possibly vulnerable to flaws like CVE-2023-20118

  • DrayTek Vigor3900 Series - Possibly vulnerable to flaws like CVE-2022-32548

  • Araknis AN-300-RT-4L2W - Possibly vulnerable to flaws like CVE-2023-24738

  • Hikvision IP cameras - Possibly vulnerable to flaws like CVE-2021-36260

  • Linksys LRT224 - No known CVEs, but alleged zero-days have been sold on the dark web

"The botnet's large number of U.S.-based SOHO/IoT devices enables the botnet operators to evade defenses and traditional IP-based controls, such as geofencing, IP reputation-based detection, and static blocklists," Black Lotus Labs said.

"By distributing their scanning and reconnaissance activity across a wide range of IP addresses, the operators make it less likely that any single IP will be labeled as a scanner and blocked. Additionally, using compromised SOHO and IoT devices helps this activity blend in with legitimate user traffic."

The architecture that powers the botnet is best described as layered: the operators use Tor nodes to manage infected infrastructure, including both the command-and-control (C2) and payload servers. The C2 servers direct the bots to perform targeted reconnaissance and system profiling, as opposed to indiscriminate scanning. Results of the scans are sent to central servers for ongoing intelligence gathering in an effort to further Chinese threat actors' objectives.

Attack chains weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities in edge devices (e.g., CVE-2026-35616) to deliver a shell script dropper that checks if the malware is already active, and if not, proceeds to download the primary payload based on the detected processor architecture (e.g., mips, mips64, mipsel, or mipsel64). Once the malware is launched, it's deleted from disk.

The malware that facilitates scanning and target reconnaissance is designed to fingerprint the host, receive scanning tasks from a central C2 server, carry out high-volume TCP, SSL, UDP, and ICMP-assisted probing, capture responses (TLS certificates, metadata, etc.), and report the results back to the dispatch server. The goal is to conduct infrastructure reconnaissance rather than exploitation.

A noteworthy functionality of the malware is its ability to adapt its scanning methodology based on its privileges on the local system. If it can open a raw socket, an indication of root privileges, it initiates high-speed SYN scanning using custom-crafted TCP packets. If raw sockets are unavailable or if the task is a web scan, the scanning engine resorts to using standard TCP and TLS connections or employs protocols like UDP and ICMP.

This activity most likely informs asset discovery, vulnerability-targeting pipelines, and downstream exploitation or attack-orchestration systems, the cybersecurity company said.

"JDY demonstrates how IoT/SOHO botnets and covert networks of compromised devices are being used for rapid vulnerability exploitation," the company said. "JDY's growth and continued operation illustrate how modern reconnaissance networks persist despite takedowns and adapt as a durable capability within a broader adversary ecosystem."

"JDY's evolution from a supporting component of the KV-botnet to an independent, high-performance reconnaissance capability demonstrates that disruption of individual nodes or clusters does not eliminate the underlying capability. The capability persists, adapts, and continues to provide adversaries with timely targeting data, often within hours of vulnerability disclosure."

(The story was updated after publication to include additional insights from Lumen Black Lotus Labs.)

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/china-linked-jdy-botnet-expands-to-1500.html