She Spoofed Sea Ships by the Sea Shore: Measuring Large-Scale GPS Spoofing in Global Maritime Traffic
AIS data from 367,000 vessels show at least 22 GPS-spoofing hotspots, including earlier Red Sea interference.
This measurement study uses global AIS broadcasts from more than 367,000 vessels, collected from late November 2024 through early February 2025, to detect regional maritime GPS spoofing. A motion-aware method found 31 persistent anomalous hotspots, at least 22 with strong spoofing evidence aligned with conflict zones and sanctions. Red Sea spoofing linked to the grounding of the 75,000-ton container ship MSC Antonia was already ongoing months earlier, and spoofing in the Strait of Hormuz persisted more than a year before the 2026 Iran war disrupted commercial traffic. The authors argue GPS spoofing is a widespread, recurring threat to maritime navigation.
- AIS tracks covered more than 367,000 vessels from late 2024 to early 2025.
- Thirty-one hotspots were found; at least 22 show strong spoofing evidence.
- Red Sea spoofing preceded the MSC Antonia grounding by months.
- Hormuz spoofing persisted over a year before the 2026 Iran war.
- Victims
- MSC Antonia
- Countries
- Iran
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgGPS spoofing has emerged as a serious threat to maritime security, yet its global prevalence, persistence, and structure remain largely unmeasured. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of maritime GPS spoofing, using global Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which contain the GPS coordinates broadcasted over time by ships across the world.
By Anna Raymaker · arxiv.org
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