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Russia-linked APT28 compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters to facilitate cyber operations

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-35394
Remote Code Execution via Memory Corruption in Realtek Jungle SDK

Realtek's Jungle SDK, a software development kit used to build firmware for a wide range of consumer and small-office networking devices (most notably routers), contains multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities that can be triggered remotely over the network; public disclosure tied the flaws to unauthenticated network-facing components bundled with the SDK, such as its UPnP and DHCP handling. An attacker who sends crafted packets to a vulnerable device can corrupt memory and, per the associated weakness types (CWE-78 command injection, CWE-138 improper neutralization), end up executing arbitrary code or operating-system commands with the privileges of the vulnerable service, effectively taking over the device. Because the SDK is licensed into many vendors' products rather than sold as a standalone application, exposure spans numerous router and embedded-device vendors, and end users may not even know their device relies on it. Exact affected SDK version ranges and per-vendor firmware lists were not specified in the available data, so defenders should rely on the latest vendor advisories. The vulnerability was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10, indicating confirmed exploitation in the wild; ransomware use is unknown and no public proof-of-concept is flagged in the available data.

Do: Per CISA's required action, apply firmware updates per your device vendor's instructions, since patches are distributed by the vendors that build on the SDK rather than by Realtek directly. Identify whether your router or embedded device uses Realtek Jungle SDK-based firmware (check the vendor's model/advisory pages) and prioritize updating internet-facing devices. Where patched firmware is not yet available, restrict direct internet exposure (firewall the WAN side) and disable or limit UPnP/DHCP-related exposed services if the vendor supports doing so, while monitoring vendor advisories.

9.8100% KEV PoC
  • Realtek Jungle Software Development Kit (SDK)
mass≈ millions of devices (SDK embedded in consumer router/IoT firmware across many vendors; at least ~100,000 likely internet-exposed)
CVE-2021-36260
Unauthenticated Command Injection in Hikvision Device Web Server

CVE-2021-36260 is a command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web server embedded in a wide range of Hikvision security camera and related devices, caused by insufficient input validation. An attacker triggers it by sending a crafted HTTP request to the device's web management interface, allowing commands to be executed on the device without authentication. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated remote code execution on the camera or recorder, letting an attacker take control of the device, pivot into the surrounding network, or use the devices as a botnet platform. Any Hikvision device running the affected web server firmware is at risk, which includes cameras, recorders, and other surveillance hardware deployed in homes, businesses, and government facilities. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-01-10 and carries a 99.9% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days, while no public proof-of-concept code is cataloged in the provided data and no CVSS score has been issued yet.

Do: Apply firmware updates issued by Hikvision per the vendor's instructions, as required by CISA's KEV listing for this vulnerability. Restrict the device web management interface to trusted networks or VPN access and avoid direct internet exposure. Review web server logs for anomalous HTTP requests to the device interface and signs of command execution, and prioritize internet-facing devices for patching first.

9.8100% KEV PoC ×3
  • Hikvision Embedded web server of Hikvision security cameras and related surveillance devices
massmillions of installed devices, with roughly hundreds of thousands to over a million Hikvision web interfaces exposed to the internet
CVE-2022-46169
Unauthenticated Command Injection in Cacti (CVE-2022-46169)

Cacti, a widely used open-source network monitoring and graphing platform, contains a command injection flaw (CWE-74) that lets a completely unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary commands on the Cacti server. The bug is reachable through the web-facing remote_agent.php script, where an attacker can spoof a trusted poller address (e.g., via a forwarded-client HTTP header) to bypass authentication and inject shell metacharacters into parameters used to build polling commands. Successful exploitation yields code execution in the context of the web server, giving an attacker a foothold on a monitoring system that typically has broad network visibility and stored credentials for many managed devices. Any Cacti deployment running vulnerable code is affected, with internet-exposed instances at greatest risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild — the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-02-16, and EPSS assigns it a 99.8% probability of exploitation.

Do: Apply CISA's required action by upgrading Cacti to the patched release (1.2.23 or later per vendor guidance). Until patched, restrict access to remote_agent.php to known poller source addresses and monitor web access and Cacti logs for signs of exploitation. Prioritize internet-exposed Cacti servers, since KEV listing confirms active exploitation and ransomware use is listed as unknown.

9.8100% KEV PoC
  • Cacti CISA data lists no explicit version range; public advisories describe releases prior to 1.2.23 as vulnerable
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed instances (roughly 10,000-50,000 Cacti web frontends visible in public scans), plus an unknown additional population of…
CVE-2023-23397
Zero-Click Elevation of Privilege in Microsoft Outlook (Forced NTLM Credential Leak)

CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook caused by improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with authentication bypass via spoofed authentication data on the channel (CWE-294), allowing an attacker to force Outlook to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server. It is triggered when Outlook processes a crafted email or calendar object — for example a meeting or task reminder whose sound property points to an attacker-supplied UNC path — and requires no user interaction. That authentication exchange leaks the victim's NTLM credential hash, which the attacker can crack offline or relay to authenticate as the victim and access resources such as Exchange mailboxes, effectively escalating privileges. Affected software spans Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft Office (including the Long Term Servicing Channel), and Microsoft Outlook, which are deployed across enterprises, governments, and militaries worldwide. It is actively exploited in the wild — added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-03-14 with a 97.4% EPSS — and Microsoft has warned of exploitation by Russia-aligned threat actors in campaigns against government and military mail servers, with patches shipped in Microsoft's March 2023 security updates.

Do: Apply Microsoft's March 2023 security updates to Microsoft 365 Apps, Office/LTSC, and Outlook immediately, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, enable Extended Protection for Authentication or add accounts to the Protected Users group to block the NTLM credential leak, and audit calendar and task reminder sound properties for UNC paths (Microsoft published an audit/cleanup script for this) while watching for unexpected outbound SMB/WebDAV connections from hosts running Outlook.

9.897% KEV
  • Microsoft 365 Apps Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Long Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • +1 more
masson the order of hundreds of millions of users (Outlook ships with Microsoft Office/Microsoft 365, the dominant enterprise and government email suite)
Full article899 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

Pierluigi Paganini February 28, 2024

Russian cyberspies are compromising Ubiquiti EdgeRouters to evade detection, warns a joint advisory published by authorities.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), US Cyber Command, and international partners released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn that Russia-linked threat actors are using compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters (EdgeRouters) to evade detection in cyber operations worldwide.

The US agencies and international partners (peers from Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, South Korea, and the United Kingdom) observed multiple Russia-linked threat actors (the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS), also known as APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard (Strontium)) using a botnet of compromised EdgeRouters devices, named Moobot, worldwide to harvest credentials, collect NTLMv2 digests, proxy network traffic, and host spear-phishing landing pages and custom tools.

“As early as 2022, APT28 actors had utilized compromised EdgeRouters to facilitate covert cyber operations against governments, militaries, and organizations around the world.” reads the joint report. “These operations have targeted various industries, including Aerospace & Defense, Education, Energy & Utilities, Governments, Hospitality, Manufacturing, Oil & Gas, Retail, Technology, and Transportation. Targeted countries include Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, Jordan, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and the US[1][2]. Additionally, the actors have strategically targeted many individuals in Ukraine.”

In February 2024, a court order allowed US authorities to neutralize the Moobot botnet, a network of hundreds of small office/home office (SOHO) routers under the control of the Russia-linked group APT28.

The Russian state-sponsored hackers used the botnet to carry out a broad range of attacks.

“A January 2024 court-authorized operation has neutralized a network of hundreds of small office/home office (SOHO) routers that GRU Military Unit 26165, also known as APT28, Sofacy GroupForest BlizzardPawn StormFancy Bear, and Sednit, used to conceal and otherwise enable a variety of crimes.” reads the press release published by DoJ. “These crimes included vast spearphishing and similar credential harvesting campaigns against targets of intelligence interest to the Russian government, such as U.S. and foreign governments and military, security, and corporate organizations. In recent months, allegations of Unit 26165 activity of this type has been the subject of a private sector cybersecurity advisory and a Ukrainian government warning.”

The Moobot botnet was composed of hundreds of compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers, it was initially created by a known cyber criminal group and later controlled by the Russia-linked APT group.

The Mirai-based Moobot botnet was first documented by Palo Alto Unit 42 researchers in February 2021, in November 2021, it started exploiting a critical command injection flaw (CVE-2021-36260) in the webserver of several Hikvision products. Since September 2022, Moobot botnet was spotted targeting vulnerable D-Link routers.

In April 2023, FortiGuard Labs researchers observed a hacking campaign targeting Cacti (CVE-2022-46169) and Realtek (CVE-2021-35394) vulnerabilities to spread ShellBot and Moobot malware.

The court order allowed authorities to use the Moobot malware to copy and delete stolen and malicious data and files from compromised routers. The US government operation blocked access to the routers by Russian cyberspies. The operation reversibly modified the routers’ firewall rules to block remote management access to the devices.

Researchers observed the MooBot botnet targeting routers with default or weak credentials to deploy OpenSSH trojans. Attackers replaced binaries on compromised EdgeRouters with trojanized OpenSSH server binaries allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication.

APT28 group deployed Python scripts on compromised EdgeRouters to collect and validate stolen webmail account credentials. The webmail account credentials were collected via cross-site scripting and browser-in-the-browser spear-phishing campaigns.

APT28 was also observed exploiting the critical privilege escalation vulnerability CVE-2023-23397 (CVSS score: 9.8) in Microsoft Outlook, which could allow an attacker to steal NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hashes and mount a relay attack without requiring any user interaction.

“Additionally, an FBI investigation revealed that as early as 2022, APT28 actors had exploited CVE2023-23397, a zero-day vulnerability at the time, to collect NTLMv2 digests from targeted Outlook accounts [T1203]. Per a Microsoft blog post[3] published in March 2023, CVE-2023-23397 is a critical elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook on Windows wherein Net-NTLMv2 hashes are leaked to actor-controlled infrastructure [T1119, T1020].” continues the report.

In December 2023, the Russia-linked APT28 developed a compact Python backdoor dubbed MASEPIE that allows operators to execute arbitrary commands on compromised machines. APT28 had utilized compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters as a command-and-control infrastructure for MASEPIE backdoors. Communication to and from the EdgeRouters involved encryption using a randomly generated 16-character AES key. It’s essential to emphasize that APT28 doesn’t install MASEPIE directly on EdgeRouters but instead deploys it on systems associated with the targeted individuals and organizations.

“In summary, with root access to compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, APT28 actors have unfettered access to Linux-based operating systems to install tooling and to obfuscate their identity while conducting malicious campaigns.” concludes the report.

Below are some of the mitigations provided by the report, the government experts pointed out that rebooting a compromised EdgeRouter will not remove the malware:

  • Perform a hardware factory reset to flush file systems of malicious files.
  • Upgrade to the latest firmware version.
  • Change any default usernames and passwords.
  • Implement strategic firewall rules on WAN-side interfaces to prevent the unwanted exposure of remote management services.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ubiquiti EdgeRouters)



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