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Rackspace: Play Ransomware gang used a previously unknown exploit to access its Hosted Exchange email environment

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2022-41040
+1 in the same advisory: …41082
Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyNotShell)

CVE-2022-41040 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server, publicly tracked under the name "ProxyNotShell" together with CVE-2022-41082. It is triggered when an attacker sends crafted HTTP requests to exposed Exchange web endpoints (such as Autodiscover), causing the server to issue attacker-influenced requests to itself. On its own the SSRF coerces authenticated server-side requests, but when chained with the CVE-2022-41082 remote code execution flaw it gives the attacker code execution on the Exchange server, typically followed by web shells, data access, and — in observed campaigns — ransomware deployment. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server are affected; the source data lists only Microsoft Exchange Server and does not specify affected version ranges, and hosted Exchange Online is a separate product not listed here. The vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-09-30 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days; no public PoC is listed.

Do: Apply Microsoft's Exchange Server security updates per vendor instructions immediately, as required by the CISA KEV catalog. As interim mitigation, restrict or block untrusted internet access to Exchange web endpoints (e.g., Autodiscover, OWA, ECP), and review IIS logs for suspicious crafted requests indicating SSRF or the chained CVE-2022-41082 exploitation. Given documented ransomware use, prioritize any internet-facing Exchange server and hunt for web shells and post-exploitation activity.

8.8
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Exchange Server
mass≈250,000+ internet-exposed Exchange servers (public scans of exposed OWA/ECP/Exchange endpoints)
CVE-2022-41080
Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Exploited in Ransomware Campaigns

CVE-2022-41080 is an elevation-of-privilege flaw in Microsoft Exchange Server that stems from improper handling of requests to the server's Autodiscover component, allowing an attacker with any valid authenticated mailbox account to escalate privileges on the server. It is triggered by sending crafted authenticated HTTP requests to the Autodiscover endpoint, and it lets attackers bypass the URL-rewrite mitigations defenders had deployed against the earlier ProxyNotShell SSRF. When chained with the related PowerShell remote-code-execution bug CVE-2022-41082, privilege escalation becomes full remote code execution on the Exchange server. Any organization running on-premises Exchange Server with the Autodiscover component reachable — especially internet-exposed OWA/Autodiscover endpoints — is affected. The flaw is actively exploited: it was added to CISA's KEV catalog on 2023-01-10, is known to be used by ransomware operators, and has been tied to the Play ransomware gang, including the attack that took Rackspace's hosted Exchange environment offline.

Do: Apply Microsoft Exchange Server security updates per vendor instructions (this CVE was fixed in Microsoft's November 2022 Exchange security updates — verify your servers are fully patched through the January 2023 rollups and that no Exchange builds predate the fix). Until patched, apply and verify the Autodiscover URL-rewrite/allow-list mitigation, knowing this flaw is a known bypass vector, and restrict Autodiscover/OWA exposure where feasible. Hunt for compromise in IIS logs for unusual requests to /autodiscover/autodiscover.json followed by PowerShell (CVE-2022-41082) activity, and treat any suspicious authenticated sessions as potential ransomware precursor activity.

8.877% KEV ransomware
  • microsoft exchange server
large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed on-premises Exchange servers
Full article548 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

Cloud services provider Rackspace confirmed that the recent data breach was the result of the Play Ransomware gang’s attack.

Cloud services provider Rackspace announced this week that the recent data breach was the result of an attack conducted by the Play ransomware group.

The ransomware attack took place on December 2, 2022, threat actors exploited a previously unknown security exploit, dubbed OWASSRF by Crowdstrike, to gain initial access to the Rackspace Hosted Microsoft Exchange. The company pointed out that no other Rackspace products, platforms, solutions, or businesses were impacted by the security incident.

The new exploit chain bypasses Microsoft’s mitigations for ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities.

The ProxyNotShell flaws are:

  • CVE-2022-41040 – Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
  • CVE-2022-41082 – Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

they impact Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019, an authenticated attacker can trigger them to elevate privileges to run PowerShell in the context of the system and gain arbitrary or remote code execution on vulnerable servers.

Microsoft addressed both vulnerabilities with the release of Patch Tuesday updates for November 2022 security updates.

In previous attacks conducted by the Play ransomware group, the exploit was used by attackers to bypass URL rewrite mitigations for the Autodiscover endpoint implemented by Microsoft in response to ProxyNotShell. Then the ransomware gang leveraged legitimate Plink and AnyDesk executables to maintain access, and performed anti-forensics techniques on the Microsoft Exchange server in an attempt to hide their activity.

“While there has been widespread speculation that the root cause of this incident was the result of the ProxyNotShell exploit, we can now definitively state that is not accurate.” reads an update provided by the company. “The forensic investigation determined that the threat actor, known as PLAY, used a previously unknown security exploit to gain initial access to the Rackspace Hosted Exchange email environment. This zero-day exploit is associated with CVE-2022-41080. Microsoft disclosed CVE-2022-41080 as a privilege escalation vulnerability and did not include notes for being part of a Remote Code Execution chain that was exploitable.”

The experts at Rackspace discovered that the threat actors accessed the Personal Storage Table (.PST) of 27 customers out of nearly 30,000 customers on the Hosted Microsoft Exchange environment.

The company already notified the impacted customers, it also added that there is no evidence that the threat actor actually viewed, obtained, misused, or disseminated emails or data in the customers’ PSTs.

Rackspace announced it is going to retire its Hosted Exchange platform to migrate to Microsoft 365.

“Finally, the Hosted Exchange email environment will not be rebuilt as a go-forward service offering. Even prior to the recent security incident, the Hosted Exchange email environment had already been planned for migration to Microsoft 365, which has a more flexible pricing model, as well as more modern features and functionality. There will be no price increase for our Hosted Exchange customers if they choose to move to Microsoft 365 and select a plan with the same capabilities as they currently have.” concludes the update. “Every Hosted Exchange customer has the option to migrate and pay exactly what they are paying today or even slightly lower costs and have the same capabilities.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Rackspace)

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/140410/data-breach/rackspace-data-breach-play-ransomware.html