AuditTeam uses OpsAgent to encrypt files and demand an audit fee
Original title: The forced audit: how AuditTeam’s OpsAgent framework masks ransomware as consulting
Kaspersky says dozens of organizations in at least seven countries were hit from January through October 2026.
Kaspersky says AuditTeam has used the OpsAgent framework since January 2026, infecting dozens of organizations in Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Senegal, Finland and China. OpsAgent supports injection, keylogging, screenshots and pivoting, and a cryptor encrypts files with AES-CBC or ChaCha20. The ransom note calls payment an “Audit & Consulting fee” and threatens to publish stolen data; seeing the note means files are already encrypted.
Unconfirmed: The leak site’s claims of victims in seven further countries are not confirmed in the report.
- GitHub history places the campaign start on January 5, 2026.
- The leak site’s first listed victim is dated February 21, 2026.
- An AV killer uses a signed Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus driver.
- C2 addresses are fetched from a public GitHub repository via CloudFront.
- OpsAgent was rewritten from C++ to Rust and reached version 5.2.8.
Impact: Encrypts files and threatens to publish stolen data
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | d19v1tntmz2i98.cloudfront.net | .sys C:\Windows\System32\drivers\kvcore.sys Domains and IPs d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net 157.20.104[.]111 GitH |
| domain | d35htktbyt7nxc.cloudfront.net | vcore.sys Domains and IPs d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net 157.20.104[.]111 GitHub page with C2 hxxps://github[.]c |
| ipv4 | 157.20.104.111 | mz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net 157.20.104[.]111 GitHub page with C2 hxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm19 |
| md5 | 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4 | 7af1325ea340c4326d0 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6 Driver 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4 # driver of a legitimate antivirus product File paths C:\Pr |
| md5 | 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1 | ceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857 bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1 f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a7 |
| md5 | 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6 | ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1 f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6 Driver 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4 # driver of a legit |
| md5 | bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc | romise File hashes Stagers d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857 bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1 f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c |
| md5 | d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857 | architectures. Indicators of compromise File hashes Stagers d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857 bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529 |
| md5 | f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0 | 7ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1 f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6 Driver 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4 |
| md5 | f4bb8c7e15d8b98d535eb20b09176b3d | in an encrypted form using AES‑CBC with the SHA‑256 hash of f4bb8c7e15d8b98d535eb20b09176b3d as the key and a zero initialization vector. The encrypted |
| url | https://github.com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage | btain its C2 address by reading a public GitHub repository: hxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage . The address is stored in an encrypted form using AES‑CB |
From the original article
11 min read at securelist.com
How does a ransomware gang sell a “forced audit”? We break down AuditTeam’s OpsAgent implant, its Rust rewrite, and the extortion model demanding a consulting fee to delete stolen data.
By Vladimir Nestor · securelist.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.