TeamPCP Worm Exploits Cloud Infrastructure to Build Criminal Infrastructure
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-29927 | Middleware Authorization Bypass in Vercel Next.js (CVE-2025-29927) CVE-2025-29927 is a critical (CVSS 9.1) authorization bypass in Vercel's Next.js, a widely used React framework for full-stack web applications: when an application performs its authorization checks in middleware, a remote unauthenticated attacker can bypass those checks by sending a request containing the x-middleware-subrequest header, which causes the middleware to be skipped. Successful exploitation grants access to otherwise protected routes and resources without valid credentials, with high impact on confidentiality and integrity and no availability impact (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). All Next.js releases starting in version 1.11.4 and prior to the branch-specific fixed versions 12.3.5, 13.5.9, 14.2.25, and 15.2.3 are affected, so any Next.js application that relies on middleware for authorization is exposed. Exploitation is not yet confirmed in the provided data: the flaw is not in CISA KEV and no public proof-of-concept is catalogued, but EPSS assigns a 99.2% (100th percentile) probability of exploitation within 30 days, and national authorities such as the UK NCSC are urging immediate patching. Do: Upgrade Next.js to 12.3.5, 13.5.9, 14.2.25, or 15.2.3, matching your application's release branch. If patching is infeasible, block or strip the x-middleware-subrequest header from external requests at the reverse proxy, CDN, or WAF before they reach the Next.js application. Audit whether your applications perform authorization checks in middleware, and verify that protected routes cannot be reached without authentication after remediation. | 9.1 | 99% |
| masspotentially millions of Next.js deployments worldwide, with plausibly hundreds of thousands of sites/apps actually exposed (only those using middleware for… | ||
| CVE-2025-55182 | Unauthenticated RCE in React Server Components (React2Shell) CVE-2025-55182 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) pre-authentication remote code execution flaw (CWE-502, deserialization of untrusted data) in React Server Components, specifically the react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack, and react-server-dom-webpack packages in versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0. It is triggered when the vulnerable code unsafely deserializes payloads from HTTP requests sent to Server Function endpoints, requiring no authentication or user interaction. An attacker gains arbitrary code execution on the affected server (CVSS scope changed, with high impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and reporting notes a campaign in which hackers used the flaw to breach 766 Next.js hosts and steal credentials. Any React/Next.js application exposing Server Functions with the affected React versions is in scope, which given the ubiquity of React and Next.js is a very large deployed base. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-12-05 with known ransomware use, EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%, multiple public PoC/scanner repositories are available, and coverage has dubbed the flaw React2Shell. Do: Upgrade the react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack packages to the vendor-patched releases (any version later than the vulnerable 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0 line) and update Next.js per Vercel's advisory; as a KEV entry, U.S. federal agencies must apply vendor mitigations per BOD 22-01 or discontinue use. Audit internet-exposed Server Function endpoints for the vulnerable React versions and review logs for exploitation activity, including the reported campaign that breached 766 Next.js hosts and stole credentials, then rotate any exposed credentials. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×7 |
| mass≈1M+ internet-facing Next.js/React Server Components deployments (order-of-magnitude estimate) |
Full article783 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse
Cybersecurity researchers have called attention to a "massive campaign" that has systematically targeted cloud native environments to set up malicious infrastructure for follow-on exploitation.
The activity, observed around December 25, 2025, and described as "worm-driven," leveraged exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Ray dashboards, and Redis servers, along with the recently disclosed React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182, CVSS score: 10.0) vulnerability. The campaign has been attributed to a threat cluster known as TeamPCP (aka DeadCatx3, PCPcat, PersyPCP, and ShellForce).
TeamPCP is known to be active since at least November 2025, with the first instance of Telegram activity dating back to July 30, 2025. The TeamPCP Telegram channel currently has over 700 members, where the group publishes stolen data from diverse victims across Canada, Serbia, South Korea, the U.A.E., and the U.S. Details of the threat actor were first documented by Beelzebub in December 2025 under the name Operation PCPcat.
"The operation's goals were to build a distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure at scale, then compromise servers to exfiltrate data, deploy ransomware, conduct extortion, and mine cryptocurrency," Flare security researcher Assaf Morag said in a report published last week.
TeamPCP is said to function as a cloud-native cybercrime platform, leveraging misconfigured Docker APIs, Kubernetes APIs, Ray dashboards, Redis servers, and vulnerable React/Next.js applications as main infection pathways to breach modern cloud infrastructure to facilitate data theft and extortion.
In addition, the compromised infrastructure is misused for a wide range of other purposes, ranging from cryptocurrency mining and data hosting to proxy and command-and-control (C2) relays.
Rather than employing any novel tradecraft, TeamPCP leans on tried-and-tested attack techniques, such as existing tools, known vulnerabilities, and prevalent misconfigurations, to build an exploitation platform that automates and industrializes the whole process. This, in turn, transforms the exposed infrastructure into a "self-propagating criminal ecosystem," Flare noted.
Successful exploitation paves the way for the deployment of next-stage payloads from external servers, including shell- and Python-based scripts that seek out new targets for further expansion. One of the core components is "proxy.sh," which installs proxy, peer-to-peer (P2P), and tunneling utilities, and delivers various scanners to continuously search the internet for vulnerable and misconfigured servers.
"Notably, proxy.sh performs environment fingerprinting at execution time," Morag said. "Early in its runtime, it checks whether it is running inside a Kubernetes cluster."
"If a Kubernetes environment is detected, the script branches into a separate execution path and drops a cluster-specific secondary payload, indicating that TeamPCP maintains distinct tooling and tradecraft for cloud-native targets rather than relying on generic Linux malware alone."
A brief description of the other payloads is as follows -
- scanner.py, which is designed to find misconfigured Docker APIs and Ray dashboards by downloading Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) lists from a GitHub account named "DeadCatx3," while also featuring options to run a cryptocurrency miner ("mine.sh").
- kube.py, which includes Kubernetes-specific functionality to conduct cluster credential harvesting and API-based discovery of resources such as pods and namespaces, followed by dropping "proxy.sh" into accessible pods for broader propagation and setting up a persistent backdoor by deploying a privileged pod on every node that mounts the host.
- react.py, which is designed to exploit the React flaw (CVE-2025-29927) to achieve remote command execution at scale.
- pcpcat.py, which is designed to discover exposed Docker APIs and Ray dashboards across large IP address ranges and automatically deploy a malicious container or job that executes a Base64-encoded payload.
Flare said the C2 server node located at 67.217.57[.]240 has also been linked to the operation of Sliver, an open-source C2 framework that's known to be abused by threat actors for post-exploitation purposes.
Data from the cybersecurity company shows that the threat actors mainly single out Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure environments. The attacks are assessed to be opportunistic in nature, primarily targeting infrastructure that supports its goals rather than going after specific industries. The result is that organizations that run such infrastructure become "collateral victims" in the process.
"The PCPcat campaign demonstrates a full lifecycle of scanning, exploitation, persistence, tunneling, data theft, and monetization built specifically for modern cloud infrastructure," Morag said. "What makes TeamPCP dangerous is not technical novelty, but their operational integration and scale. Deeper analysis shows that most of their exploits and malware are based on well-known vulnerabilities and lightly modified open-source tools."
"At the same time, TeamPCP blends infrastructure exploitation with data theft and extortion. Leaked CV databases, identity records, and corporate data are published through ShellForce to fuel ransomware, fraud, and cybercrime reputation building. This hybrid model allows the group to monetize both compute and information, giving it multiple revenue streams and resilience against takedowns."
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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/teampcp-worm-exploits-cloud.html