Paper proposes EIP-1559 extension admitting some transactions below the base fee
Original title: Temporal Liquidity Crossing for Blockchains: An EIP-1559 Extension for Admission Below the Base Fee
Selected early-execution consumers fund providers that opt out of the early region, with surplus burned and eight properties proved.
A cs.CR paper introduces temporal liquidity markets so Ethereum transactions seeking early-block execution can fund transactions that accept later placement. In a block-local EIP-1559 extension, those providers may be admitted below the base-fee floor, while their funding-conditioned, capacity-capped gas is kept out of the ordinary controller input. The authors state an adversary model with strategic senders and builders and prove eight properties, including validator-checked rule validity, full base-fee burn, and no subsidy. Synthetic experiments are said to raise total utilization with funded gas.
- EIP-1559's base fee is treated as a hard admission floor.
- Counting provider gas in the controller raises the base fee and displaces ordinary demand.
- An inserted consumer bid cannot raise any other consumer's charge.
- Surplus after funding provider shortfalls is burned.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgTransactions differ in how their value changes with execution time and relative position. Ethereum's EIP-1559 lets them compete through fee fields, but a fee bid gives no enforceable claim to an earlier position in the block, and no way to express willingness to accept a later one. Its base fee is a hard admission floor.
By Duanyang Dan Guo · arxiv.org
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