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MalwarehighExploited in the wild

SCKit worm infects 288 ScreenConnect endpoints at 48 organizations

Original title: New SCKit Worm Targets ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Infecting 288 Endpoints Across 48 Organizations

GBHackersby Divya ()4 min read1
Part of a story covered by 12 sourcesSCKit campaign hits 288 ScreenConnect endpoints at 48 organizationsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Huntress says all 288 hosts were hit within 90 minutes and the console-takeover jump has not succeeded.

Huntress says a worm-like toolkit, SCKit, compromised at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations through abused ConnectWise ScreenConnect panels, starting about 17:47 UTC on November 11, 2026. Attackers used Run Command as SYSTEM to install a rogue client, stop the legitimate service, and set a TrapWatch task meant to steal technician session cookies. ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions in about 400 partner environments and says it found no ScreenConnect vulnerability. Huntress later tied the activity to RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, which accepted a blank access key.

Unconfirmed: ConnectWise says initial access is still under investigation and reports no ScreenConnect vulnerability.

Key facts
  • About one third of the 288 hosts were hit in the first 10 minutes.
  • Named builds include ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783.
  • RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key when none was configured.
  • Huntress has not seen the technician-to-panel jump succeed.
  • Defenders should not open suspected hosts in an interactive ScreenConnect session.
Security assessment · AI, from the articleExploited in the wild

Impact: Persistent remote access and theft of technician session cookies

ProductAffected
RMM+1.0.31 and 1.0.32
ConnectWise ScreenConnect26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783
What to do
  1. 1.Do not connect to suspected hosts via ScreenConnect; use EDR live response or WinRM.
  2. 2.Isolate affected hosts and remove the rogue client, TrapWatch task, and RelayTrap artifacts.
  3. 3.Revoke ScreenConnect and identity sessions, rotate credentials, and leave disabled extensions off.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domaincdn007-digitaldownloads.comomain sc.payproofkit[.]com Attacker-controlled panel Domain cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com C2 domain URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Stager
domaingotdns.orgScreenConnect panel (sc.payproofkit[.]com) Domain newnewnew.gotdns[.]org Attacker relay, resolves to 185.99.255[.]28 Domain soxnew
domainhomedns.orgtacker relay, resolves to 185.99.255[.]28 Domain soxnewwork.homedns[.]org Attacker relay (port 81) Domain sc.payproofkit[.]com Atta
domainmo7sen.devmain cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com C2 domain URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Stager URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?
domainpayproofkit.comstaller IP 155.94.150[.]39 Attacker ScreenConnect panel (sc.payproofkit[.]com) Domain newnewnew.gotdns[.]org Attacker relay, resolves t
ipv4155.94.150.39tacker ScreenConnect server; serves the client installer IP 155.94.150[.]39 Attacker ScreenConnect panel (sc.payproofkit[.]com) Domai
ipv4185.99.255.28ble is compiled on each host. Type Indicator Description IP 185.99.255[.]28 Attacker ScreenConnect server; serves the client installe
sha2560bd84c776dc01f784a617e73fc77b269f847fc4a062ffd489e4692869724bf08f9163c61c2f96bb2d2b9fb45 Recover-ExecutionPolicy.cmd SHA256 0bd84c776dc01f784a617e73fc77b269f847fc4a062ffd489e4692869724bf08 Lab-context.json SHA256 454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb3
sha2563c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d LabConfig.ps1 SHA256 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4 RelayTrap.cs SHA256 d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858
sha25643b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db9534c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0 Stop-LabTrap.bat SHA256 43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95 Run-Lateral-Full.bat SHA256 50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf
sha256454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a269f847fc4a062ffd489e4692869724bf08 Lab-context.json SHA256 454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a TRAP-PROOF.bat SHA256 5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5
sha2564a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b7ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a TrapWatch.ps1 SHA256 4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b install.ps1 SHA256 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c76
sha25650659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed6183084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95 Run-Lateral-Full.bat SHA256 50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61 runnew.cmd Host desktop-vmc0ifs, send, sc-observation-lab M
sha2565dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0a2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a TRAP-PROOF.bat SHA256 5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0 Stop-LabTrap.bat SHA256 43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383
sha2567a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ecab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11 Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 SHA256 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec Panel-Lateral.ps1 SHA256 b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d
sha25681cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f78141cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956 Lite-Alert.ps1 SHA256 81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781 Stage0Loader.ps1 SHA256 c31e6f075cd77e01839aebce32ed35659a9
sha2568cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06afdfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b install.ps1 SHA256 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af ToolboxRelayUploader.exe SHA256 cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de
sha25694b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11t.ClientSetup.msi?…&c=Exploited<N> Installer pattern SHA256 94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11 Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 SHA256 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13c
sha256b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec Panel-Lateral.ps1 SHA256 b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d LabConfig.ps1 SHA256 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349
sha256c31e6f075cd77e01839aebce32ed35659a9ee962d102aca53040bb5e297410a929ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781 Stage0Loader.ps1 SHA256 c31e6f075cd77e01839aebce32ed35659a9ee962d102aca53040bb5e297410a9 Release-Machine.cmd SHA256 deda7c30d798a19b6699a45fbcba503c
sha256cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af ToolboxRelayUploader.exe SHA256 cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956 Lite-Alert.ps1 SHA256 81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df
sha256d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a4dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4 RelayTrap.cs SHA256 d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a TrapWatch.ps1 SHA256 4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e398
sha256deda7c30d798a19b6699a45fbcba503cf778594df9163c61c2f96bb2d2b9fb459a9ee962d102aca53040bb5e297410a9 Release-Machine.cmd SHA256 deda7c30d798a19b6699a45fbcba503cf778594df9163c61c2f96bb2d2b9fb45 Recover-ExecutionPolicy.cmd SHA256 0bd84c776dc01f784a617e73
urlhttps://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php?p=4ed panel Domain cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com C2 domain URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Stager URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=5 Delivers
urlhttps://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php?p=5domain URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Stager URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=5 Delivers SQLite tool for cookie theft Client ID 2588ef5c1

From the original article

4 min read at gbhackers.com

A worm-like toolkit called SCKit has compromised at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations through abused ConnectWise ScreenConnect panels. Huntress researchers say the operator pushed rogue clients through cloud-hosted panels, giving the attacker persistent remote access and a trap for stealing technician session cookies. The affected builds include the latest releases, 26.

GBHackers

By Divya · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.