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ScreenConnect campaign compromises MSPs and customer endpoints

Original title: Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations

BleepingComputerby Lawrence Abrams ()3 min read
Part of a story covered by 12 sourcesSCKit campaign hits 288 ScreenConnect endpoints at 48 organizationsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Huntress is tracking six MSPs and 286 endpoints across 47 organizations, with the count still rising.

ConnectWise is investigating a malware campaign that uses compromised ScreenConnect environments to deploy rogue remote-access clients on customer devices. Huntress says six managed service providers and at least 286 endpoints at 47 organizations are affected. Current telemetry points to stolen credentials and hijacked support sessions; whether a software flaw is involved is unclear. ConnectWise told partners to avoid interactive sessions to suspect devices, review activity, revoke sessions, and reset credentials.

Unconfirmed: Initial access is unconfirmed, and it is unclear whether the July script is the same campaign.

Key facts
  • Huntress says activity began around 17:47 UTC on Wednesday.
  • Attacker relay listed is 185.99.255.28, hostname screen.
  • Rogue client IDs include 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091.
  • A Social Security-themed script uploaded July 25, 2026 referenced one ID.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Remote access to MSP-managed customer devices outside legitimate environments

ProductAffected
ConnectWise ScreenConnect—
What to do
  1. 1.Avoid interactive ScreenConnect sessions to suspected compromised devices.
  2. 2.Review Run Command history, revoke sessions, and reset credentials from a trusted device.
  3. 3.Hunt for the listed rogue client IDs, relay, and C2 domains.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainamexsafekeyupdate.coms Startup folder and the Run registry key. It then contacts amexsafekeyupdate.com to retrieve installation commands for two separate installe
domaincdn007-digitaldownloads.comns[.]org , soxnewwork.homedns[.]org Possible additional C2: cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com Secondary C2: sc.payproofkit[.]com ( 155.94.150[.]39 , ho
domaindigitaldownloads.comwnloads[.]com and cyberrexdesign.screenconnect[.]com , with digitaldownloads[.]com listed by Huntress as a potential IOC. DigitalDownloads S
domaingotdns.orgy: 185.99.255[.]28 (hostname: screen) C2 domains: newnewnew.gotdns[.]org , soxnewwork.homedns[.]org Possible additional C2: cdn007
domainhomedns.orgme: screen) C2 domains: newnewnew.gotdns[.]org , soxnewwork.homedns[.]org Possible additional C2: cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com Sec
domainmo7sen.dev94.150[.]39 , hostname: WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) Stager: hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs: 2588ef5c1595
domainpayproofkit.comditional C2: cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com Secondary C2: sc.payproofkit[.]com ( 155.94.150[.]39 , hostname: WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) Stager: hx
domainscreenconnect.comllers from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com and cyberrexdesign.screenconnect[.]com , with digitaldownloads[.]com listed by Huntress as a pot
ipv4155.94.150.39digitaldownloads[.]com Secondary C2: sc.payproofkit[.]com ( 155.94.150[.]39 , hostname: WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) Stager: hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]
ipv4185.99.255.28d by the attackers. The indicators include: Attacker relay: 185.99.255[.]28 (hostname: screen) C2 domains: newnewnew.gotdns[.]org , s
urlhttps://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php?p=4]com ( 155.94.150[.]39 , hostname: WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) Stager: hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs: 2588ef5c15954b10 , ed630c

From the original article

3 min read at bleepingcomputer.com

ConnectWise is investigating an active malware campaign targeting managed service providers (MSPs) that uses compromised ScreenConnect environments to deploy rogue remote-access clients to customer devices. [...]

BleepingComputer

By Lawrence Abrams · bleepingcomputer.com

Read the full article at BleepingComputer

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.