Lightweight Zero Trust via Automotive SDN
Researchers map automotive SDN with MACsec/MKA and CORECONF/YANG to NIST SP 800-207, satisfying five of seven Zero Trust tenets without added infrastructure.
Zonal in-vehicle networks ship Ethernet, MACsec, and TSN but treat the network itself as trusted, with no standardized runtime way to revoke access, rotate keys, or contain a compromised ECU. The paper first analyzes what Open Alliance TC17 v1.0 MACsec/MKA with pre-shared CAKs already provides against the seven NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust tenets. It then adds CORECONF/YANG management per Open Alliance TC19, mapping the SDN Controller and Agents one-to-one onto NIST's PE, PA, and PEP, and instantiates a YANG-based network-access-control flow and key-management scheme. The result fully covers five of the seven tenets and partially covers two, without any ZTA-specific infrastructure.
- In-vehicle networks lack standardized runtime access revocation and compromised-ECU containment.
- Maps SDN Controller and Agents onto NIST PE, PA, and PEP.
- Adds YANG-based network-access-control and key-management flows via CORECONF.
- Covers five of seven ZTA tenets fully and two partially with no new infrastructure.
- Organizations
- NISTOpen Alliance
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgZonal in-vehicle networks ship Ethernet, MACsec, and TSN, but treat the network itself as trusted: once configured at the factory, there is no standardized runtime way to easily revoke access, rotate keys, or contain a compromised ECU.
By Friedrich Wiemer · arxiv.org
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