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Stately Taurus Activity in Southeast Asia Links to Bookworm Malware

Palo Alto Unit 42by Robert Falcone ()11 min read2
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 links Stately Taurus APT activity in ASEAN region and Myanmar to the decade-old Bookworm malware family via infrastructure overlaps.

Unit 42 connected Stately Taurus (aka Mustang Panda) espionage activity targeting ASEAN-affiliated organizations and Myanmar to the Bookworm malware family, first published in 2015. Earlier attacks delivered the PubLoad stager via DLL sideloading, with a PubLoad variant communicating with C2 at 123.253.32[.]15 while mimicking Windows Update URLs. Three previously unreported loader samples from 2021-2022 used UUID-decoded shellcode loaded via heap allocation and API callbacks, ultimately decrypting and loading Bookworm DLLs. A ToneShell backdoor variant shared debug paths with Bookworm loaders, and the January 2024 CSIRT CTI post corroborated the Myanmar attacks.

Key facts
  • Bookworm malware definitively linked to Stately Taurus after nearly a decade
  • PubLoad stager uses DLL sideloading and Windows Update URL mimicry
  • UUID-decoded shellcode loaders employ heap allocation and API callback execution
  • Overlaps found with Myanmar government attack reported January 2024
  • ToneShell and Bookworm samples share debug symbol paths, 8 weeks apart
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Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainb8pjmgd6.compdate.fjke5oe[.]com www.i5y3dl[.]com www.hbsanews[.]com www.b8pjmgd6[.]com www.zimbra[.]page www.ggrdl4[.]com www.gm4rys[.]com Archi
domainfjke5oe.comanhlab.exe C:\Users\hack\Desktop\uuid\uu\Release\uu.pdb www.fjke5oe[.]com Nov. 9, 2022 5064b2a8fcfc58c18f53773411f41824b7f6c2675c1d
domainggrdl4.comwww.hbsanews[.]com www.b8pjmgd6[.]com www.zimbra[.]page www.ggrdl4[.]com www.gm4rys[.]com Archives Related to PubLoad Using V6-win
domaingm4rys.comm www.b8pjmgd6[.]com www.zimbra[.]page www.ggrdl4[.]com www.gm4rys[.]com Archives Related to PubLoad Using V6-winsp1-wuredir SHA25
domainhbsanews.com, an IP address linked to the known Bookworm C2 domain www.hbsanews[.]com . We also found a recent ToneShell sample compiled on Jan
domaini5y3dl.comm Infrastructure www.fjke5oe[.]com update.fjke5oe[.]com www.i5y3dl[.]com www.hbsanews[.]com www.b8pjmgd6[.]com www.zimbra[.]page w
domainuvfr4ep.com, the IP address 103.27.202[.]68 resolved to the domain www.uvfr4ep[.]com . This domain hosted the C2 server for a ToneShell sample
domainzimbra.pagewww.i5y3dl[.]com www.hbsanews[.]com www.b8pjmgd6[.]com www.zimbra[.]page www.ggrdl4[.]com www.gm4rys[.]com Archives Related to Pub
ipv4103.27.202.68ch resolved to 103.27.202[.]80 . The latter URL switched to 103.27.202[.]68 in December 2022. Earlier in January 2022, the IP address
ipv4103.27.202.80e[.]com or update.fjke5oe[.]com , both of which resolved to 103.27.202[.]80 . The latter URL switched to 103.27.202[.]68 in December
ipv4103.27.202.87the ToneShell C2 domain www.uvfr4ep[.]com also resolved to 103.27.202[.]87 , an IP address linked to the known Bookworm C2 domain ww
ipv4123.253.32.15with its C2 server by directly connecting to the IP address 123.253.32[.]15 . The payload then issues an HTTP request that looks like
ipv4123.253.35.23190f2b2b3ea84fadb69c55efa171 april 27 updated party list.zip 123.253.35[.]231 167a842b97d0434f20e0cd6cf73d07079255a743d26606b94fc785a0f
sha256167a842b97d0434f20e0cd6cf73d07079255a743d26606b94fc785a0f3c6736e9c55efa171 april 27 updated party list.zip 123.253.35[.]231 167a842b97d0434f20e0cd6cf73d07079255a743d26606b94fc785a0f3c6736e notice re uec, (04-25-2023 day).zip 123.253.35[.]231 4fbfbf
sha256243b92959cd9aa03482f3398fbe81b4874c50a5945fe6b0c0abb432a33db853f2a8fcfc58c18f53773411f41824b7f6c2675c1d531ffa109dc4f842119b 243b92959cd9aa03482f3398fbe81b4874c50a5945fe6b0c0abb432a33db853f a0887fa90f88dd002b025a97b3a57e4fdb7f5fdd725490d96776f8626f5
sha2562a00d95b658e11ca71a8de532999dd33ddee7f80432653427eaa885b611ddd87load a malicious payload with a filename of BrMod104.dll ( 2a00d95b658e11ca71a8de532999dd33ddee7f80432653427eaa885b611ddd87 ). This malicious payload is a variant of PubLoad, which is
sha2562bae8b07f5098e1ca8fb5a5776eb874072ace4e19734cba4af4450eeccde7f89831368e6420b90210e15f72cea9171478391e15efdd608ad22fe916cea8 2bae8b07f5098e1ca8fb5a5776eb874072ace4e19734cba4af4450eeccde7f89 a229a2943cf8d1b073574f0c050ca06392d0525b2028f4b4b04d1e4b401
sha2563cef0b5f069cc1d15d36aa83d54d2a7be79b29b02081b6592dd4714639ad0a66f1dbe6a82488db161a7f57cd74f2dd282a9522587f18313b4e9835dc558 3cef0b5f069cc1d15d36aa83d54d2a7be79b29b02081b6592dd4714639ad0a66 43de1831368e6420b90210e15f72cea9171478391e15efdd608ad22fe91
sha2563e137da41cb509412ee230c6d7aac3d69361358b28c3a09ec851d3c0f3853326456eb3a1a51116d9c2991aae3b0982acc1a9b30efee92a4f102dc4d2927 3e137da41cb509412ee230c6d7aac3d69361358b28c3a09ec851d3c0f3853326 fdad627a21a95ea2a6136c264c6a6cc2f0910a24881118b6eabc2d6509d
sha25641276827827b95c9b5a9fbd198b7cff2aef6f90f2b2b3ea84fadb69c55efa1718 analysis of the third meeting of ndsc.zip 123.253.32[.]15 41276827827b95c9b5a9fbd198b7cff2aef6f90f2b2b3ea84fadb69c55efa171 april 27 updated party list.zip 123.253.35[.]231 167a842b97
sha25643de1831368e6420b90210e15f72cea9171478391e15efdd608ad22fe916cea8b5f069cc1d15d36aa83d54d2a7be79b29b02081b6592dd4714639ad0a66 43de1831368e6420b90210e15f72cea9171478391e15efdd608ad22fe916cea8 2bae8b07f5098e1ca8fb5a5776eb874072ace4e19734cba4af4450eeccd
sha2564a92fa725adc57d7b501f33e87230a8291cf8ad22d4d3a830293abcc0ac10d121c1ab42186a46e08b914d66253440af2d2be6b497c34fe4b1770c3b5e01 4a92fa725adc57d7b501f33e87230a8291cf8ad22d4d3a830293abcc0ac10d12 da8ef50fe5e571d0143a758c7c66bb55653f1f2d04f16464fc857226441
sha2564fbfbf1cd2efaef1906f0bd2195281b77619b9948e829b4d53bf1f198ba81dc5c6736e notice re uec, (04-25-2023 day).zip 123.253.35[.]231 4fbfbf1cd2efaef1906f0bd2195281b77619b9948e829b4d53bf1f198ba81dc5 biography of…
sha2565064b2a8fcfc58c18f53773411f41824b7f6c2675c1d531ffa109dc4f842119bsktop\uuid\uu\Release\uu.pdb www.fjke5oe[.]com Nov. 9, 2022 5064b2a8fcfc58c18f53773411f41824b7f6c2675c1d531ffa109dc4f842119b ltdis13n.dll E:\WhiteFile\LTDIS13n\Release\LTDIS13n.pdb www
sha25651bf329ba04a042789bad3b395092488a3d89130dc72818985cde11fb85f83899a82715b4d3b6c37c7e5be1b729cd8e6f01f feareade HTTP.dll 0x13 51bf329ba04a042789bad3b395092488a3d89130dc72818985cde11fb85f8389 fdafgravfdrafra WinINetwork.dll 0x17 Table 3. Contemporary
sha2566804b10aefe8fdb2b33ecf3bc5a93f49413ef66001b561e6fc121990d703d7800b36bbd128a71ddcd858b4b3c67ba78f516 Coder.dll Coder.dll 0xA 6804b10aefe8fdb2b33ecf3bc5a93f49413ef66001b561e6fc121990d703d780 999999.000 Digest.dll 0xB 72aa72a4a4bdb09146c587304c6639eae
sha25672aa72a4a4bdb09146c587304c6639eae65900cb2ea26911540a77d1f9b7acf69413ef66001b561e6fc121990d703d780 999999.000 Digest.dll 0xB 72aa72a4a4bdb09146c587304c6639eae65900cb2ea26911540a77d1f9b7acf6 AES.dll AES.dll 0xC fb25a69ffc18b79ee664462e0717cf5e7082094
sha2569192a1c1ab42186a46e08b914d66253440af2d2be6b497c34fe4b1770c3b5e012943cf8d1b073574f0c050ca06392d0525b2028f4b4b04d1e4b40110c66 9192a1c1ab42186a46e08b914d66253440af2d2be6b497c34fe4b1770c3b5e01 4a92fa725adc57d7b501f33e87230a8291cf8ad22d4d3a830293abcc0ac
sha256a0887fa90f88dd002b025a97b3a57e4fdb7f5fdd725490d96776f8626f528ef22959cd9aa03482f3398fbe81b4874c50a5945fe6b0c0abb432a33db853f a0887fa90f88dd002b025a97b3a57e4fdb7f5fdd725490d96776f8626f528ef2 a2452456eb3a1a51116d9c2991aae3b0982acc1a9b30efee92a4f102dc4
sha256a08e0d1839b86d0d56a52d07123719211a3c3d43a6aa05aa34531a72ed1207dc. This domain hosted the C2 server for a ToneShell sample ( a08e0d1839b86d0d56a52d07123719211a3c3d43a6aa05aa34531a72ed1207dc ) installed by Stately Taurus at the Southeast Asian govern
sha256a229a2943cf8d1b073574f0c050ca06392d0525b2028f4b4b04d1e4b40110c66b07f5098e1ca8fb5a5776eb874072ace4e19734cba4af4450eeccde7f89 a229a2943cf8d1b073574f0c050ca06392d0525b2028f4b4b04d1e4b40110c66 9192a1c1ab42186a46e08b914d66253440af2d2be6b497c34fe4b1770c3
sha256a2452456eb3a1a51116d9c2991aae3b0982acc1a9b30efee92a4f102dc4d2927fa90f88dd002b025a97b3a57e4fdb7f5fdd725490d96776f8626f528ef2 a2452456eb3a1a51116d9c2991aae3b0982acc1a9b30efee92a4f102dc4d2927 3e137da41cb509412ee230c6d7aac3d69361358b28c3a09ec851d3c0f38
sha256ab54af1dbe6a82488db161a7f57cd74f2dd282a9522587f18313b4e9835dc55827a21a95ea2a6136c264c6a6cc2f0910a24881118b6eabc2d6509dc8dd7 ab54af1dbe6a82488db161a7f57cd74f2dd282a9522587f18313b4e9835dc558 3cef0b5f069cc1d15d36aa83d54d2a7be79b29b02081b6592dd4714639a
sha256ab9d8f1021f2a99c74aa66f8ddb52996ac2337da9de2676d090b87e19ce93033hell. SHA256 Family Callback Function Called By UUID Format ab9d8f1021f2a99c74aa66f8ddb52996ac2337da9de2676d090b87e19ce93033 ToneShell EnumSystemLocalesA ASCII cf61b7a9bdde2a39156d88f3
sha256b382cc85eee95a620fc11370309ff76de9a3bcaefb645790434d8251a3b9fce1orm samples, we found a variant of the ToneShell backdoor ( b382cc85eee95a620fc11370309ff76de9a3bcaefb645790434d8251a3b9fce1 ) that had the same debug symbol path as the Bookworm loade
sha256b7e042d2accdf4a488c3cd46ccd95d6ad5b5a8be71b5d6d76b8046f17debaa18lated to PubLoad Using V6-winsp1-wuredir SHA256 Filename C2 b7e042d2accdf4a488c3cd46ccd95d6ad5b5a8be71b5d6d76b8046f17debaa18 analysis of the third meeting of ndsc.zip 123.253.32[.]15 4
sha256bbf12ee2cd71dbcf2948adf64f354ad7c69d6b6ff0b78ea76b3df2d02b08ed0fdf154bb60fcf24d0ab5297d0c6beaca0f Leader.dll Leader.dll 0x0 bbf12ee2cd71dbcf2948adf64f354ad7c69d6b6ff0b78ea76b3df2d02b08ed0f dafdsafdsaa3 Resolver.dll 0x1 fa739724a4b6f7a766a2d7695d7da
sha256cf61b7a9bdde2a39156d88f309f230a7d44e9feaf0359947e1f96e069eca4e86Compiled SHA256 Filename Debug Symbol Path C2 Dec. 23, 2021 cf61b7a9bdde2a39156d88f309f230a7d44e9feaf0359947e1f96e069eca4e86 anhlab.exe C:\Users\hack\Desktop\uuid\uu\Release\uu.pdb www
sha256d7dbfb2b755418842fea4fca5628f0b36bbd128a71ddcd858b4b3c67ba78f516ac834672c1b544dd555c93600a637 fjdasljguafa KBLogger.dll 0x5 d7dbfb2b755418842fea4fca5628f0b36bbd128a71ddcd858b4b3c67ba78f516 Coder.dll Coder.dll 0xA 6804b10aefe8fdb2b33ecf3bc5a93f49413
sha256da8ef50fe5e571d0143a758c7c66bb55653f1f2d04f16464fc857226441d79b2a725adc57d7b501f33e87230a8291cf8ad22d4d3a830293abcc0ac10d12 da8ef50fe5e571d0143a758c7c66bb55653f1f2d04f16464fc857226441d79b2 f0df09513dcf292264b3336269952c7e9ff685df8180a2035bee9f3143b
sha256dcc349a1b624f6b949f181a7dd859a82715b4d3b6c37c7e5be1b729cd8e6f01f0820948d5d2ca4c192fac8b1ede91c2 yyrtytr.565 Network.dll 0xE dcc349a1b624f6b949f181a7dd859a82715b4d3b6c37c7e5be1b729cd8e6f01f feareade HTTP.dll 0x13 51bf329ba04a042789bad3b395092488a3d8
sha256f0df09513dcf292264b3336269952c7e9ff685df8180a2035bee9f3143b3660950fe5e571d0143a758c7c66bb55653f1f2d04f16464fc857226441d79b2 f0df09513dcf292264b3336269952c7e9ff685df8180a2035bee9f3143b36609 Bookworm Modules SHA256 Module fa739724a4b6f7a766a2d7695d7d
sha256f7b024196ac50bd0f7ed362a532e83edf154bb60fcf24d0ab5297d0c6beaca0frrent Module Name Related Bookworm Module Current Module ID f7b024196ac50bd0f7ed362a532e83edf154bb60fcf24d0ab5297d0c6beaca0f Leader.dll Leader.dll 0x0 bbf12ee2cd71dbcf2948adf64f354ad7c
sha256fa739724a4b6f7a766a2d7695d7da7b33a6ac834672c1b544dd555c93600a637d6b6ff0b78ea76b3df2d02b08ed0f dafdsafdsaa3 Resolver.dll 0x1 fa739724a4b6f7a766a2d7695d7da7b33a6ac834672c1b544dd555c93600a637 fjdasljguafa KBLogger.dll 0x5 d7dbfb2b755418842fea4fca5628f
sha256fb25a69ffc18b79ee664462e0717cf5e70820948d5d2ca4c192fac8b1ede91c2c6639eae65900cb2ea26911540a77d1f9b7acf6 AES.dll AES.dll 0xC fb25a69ffc18b79ee664462e0717cf5e70820948d5d2ca4c192fac8b1ede91c2 yyrtytr.565 Network.dll 0xE dcc349a1b624f6b949f181a7dd859a8
sha256fbc67446daaa0a0264ed7a252ab42413d6a43c2e5ab43437c2b3272daec85e81DIS13n\Release\LTDIS13n.pdb www.fjke5oe[.]com Oct. 26, 2022 fbc67446daaa0a0264ed7a252ab42413d6a43c2e5ab43437c2b3272daec85e81 ltdis13n.dll C:\Users\hack\Documents\WhiteFile\LTDIS13n\Rel
sha256fdad627a21a95ea2a6136c264c6a6cc2f0910a24881118b6eabc2d6509dc8dd7da41cb509412ee230c6d7aac3d69361358b28c3a09ec851d3c0f3853326 fdad627a21a95ea2a6136c264c6a6cc2f0910a24881118b6eabc2d6509dc8dd7 ab54af1dbe6a82488db161a7f57cd74f2dd282a9522587f18313b4e9835

From the original article

11 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

While analyzing infrastructure related to Stately Taurus activity targeting organizations in countries affiliated with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Unit 42 researchers observed overlaps with infrastructure used by a variant of the Bookworm malware.

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Robert Falcone · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.