US Gov dismantled the Moobot botnet controlled by Russia
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-35394 | Remote Code Execution via Memory Corruption in Realtek Jungle SDK Realtek's Jungle SDK, a software development kit used to build firmware for a wide range of consumer and small-office networking devices (most notably routers), contains multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities that can be triggered remotely over the network; public disclosure tied the flaws to unauthenticated network-facing components bundled with the SDK, such as its UPnP and DHCP handling. An attacker who sends crafted packets to a vulnerable device can corrupt memory and, per the associated weakness types (CWE-78 command injection, CWE-138 improper neutralization), end up executing arbitrary code or operating-system commands with the privileges of the vulnerable service, effectively taking over the device. Because the SDK is licensed into many vendors' products rather than sold as a standalone application, exposure spans numerous router and embedded-device vendors, and end users may not even know their device relies on it. Exact affected SDK version ranges and per-vendor firmware lists were not specified in the available data, so defenders should rely on the latest vendor advisories. The vulnerability was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10, indicating confirmed exploitation in the wild; ransomware use is unknown and no public proof-of-concept is flagged in the available data. Do: Per CISA's required action, apply firmware updates per your device vendor's instructions, since patches are distributed by the vendors that build on the SDK rather than by Realtek directly. Identify whether your router or embedded device uses Realtek Jungle SDK-based firmware (check the vendor's model/advisory pages) and prioritize updating internet-facing devices. Where patched firmware is not yet available, restrict direct internet exposure (firewall the WAN side) and disable or limit UPnP/DHCP-related exposed services if the vendor supports doing so, while monitoring vendor advisories. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV PoC |
| mass≈ millions of devices (SDK embedded in consumer router/IoT firmware across many vendors; at least ~100,000 likely internet-exposed) | |
| CVE-2021-36260 | Unauthenticated Command Injection in Hikvision Device Web Server CVE-2021-36260 is a command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web server embedded in a wide range of Hikvision security camera and related devices, caused by insufficient input validation. An attacker triggers it by sending a crafted HTTP request to the device's web management interface, allowing commands to be executed on the device without authentication. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated remote code execution on the camera or recorder, letting an attacker take control of the device, pivot into the surrounding network, or use the devices as a botnet platform. Any Hikvision device running the affected web server firmware is at risk, which includes cameras, recorders, and other surveillance hardware deployed in homes, businesses, and government facilities. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-01-10 and carries a 99.9% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days, while no public proof-of-concept code is cataloged in the provided data and no CVSS score has been issued yet. Do: Apply firmware updates issued by Hikvision per the vendor's instructions, as required by CISA's KEV listing for this vulnerability. Restrict the device web management interface to trusted networks or VPN access and avoid direct internet exposure. Review web server logs for anomalous HTTP requests to the device interface and signs of command execution, and prioritize internet-facing devices for patching first. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV PoC ×3 |
| massmillions of installed devices, with roughly hundreds of thousands to over a million Hikvision web interfaces exposed to the internet | |
| CVE-2022-46169 | Unauthenticated Command Injection in Cacti (CVE-2022-46169) Cacti, a widely used open-source network monitoring and graphing platform, contains a command injection flaw (CWE-74) that lets a completely unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary commands on the Cacti server. The bug is reachable through the web-facing remote_agent.php script, where an attacker can spoof a trusted poller address (e.g., via a forwarded-client HTTP header) to bypass authentication and inject shell metacharacters into parameters used to build polling commands. Successful exploitation yields code execution in the context of the web server, giving an attacker a foothold on a monitoring system that typically has broad network visibility and stored credentials for many managed devices. Any Cacti deployment running vulnerable code is affected, with internet-exposed instances at greatest risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild — the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-02-16, and EPSS assigns it a 99.8% probability of exploitation. Do: Apply CISA's required action by upgrading Cacti to the patched release (1.2.23 or later per vendor guidance). Until patched, restrict access to remote_agent.php to known poller source addresses and monitor web access and Cacti logs for signs of exploitation. Prioritize internet-exposed Cacti servers, since KEV listing confirms active exploitation and ransomware use is listed as unknown. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV PoC |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed instances (roughly 10,000-50,000 Cacti web frontends visible in public scans), plus an unknown additional population of… |
Full article529 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse
Pierluigi Paganini
February 15, 2024

The US authorities dismantled the Moobot botnet, which was controlled by the Russia-linked cyberespionage group APT28.
A court order allowed US authorities to neutralize the Moobot botnet, a network of hundreds of small office/home office (SOHO) routers under the control of the Russia-linked group APT28.
The botnet was used by the Russian state-sponsored hackers to carry out a broad range of attacks.
“A January 2024 court-authorized operation has neutralized a network of hundreds of small office/home office (SOHO) routers that GRU Military Unit 26165, also known as APT28, Sofacy Group, Forest Blizzard, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, and Sednit, used to conceal and otherwise enable a variety of crimes.” reads the press release published by DoJ. “These crimes included vast spearphishing and similar credential harvesting campaigns against targets of intelligence interest to the Russian government, such as U.S. and foreign governments and military, security, and corporate organizations. In recent months, allegations of Unit 26165 activity of this type has been the subject of a private sector cybersecurity advisory and a Ukrainian government warning.”
The Moobot botnet was composed of hundreds of compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers, it was initially created by a known cyber criminal group and later controlled by the Russia-linked APT group.
The Mirai-based Moobot botnet was first documented by Palo Alto Unit 42 researchers in February 2021, in November 2021, it started exploiting a critical command injection flaw (CVE-2021-36260) in the webserver of several Hikvision products. Since September 2022, Moobot botnet was spotted targeting vulnerable D-Link routers.
In April 2023, FortiGuard Labs researchers observed a hacking campaign targeting Cacti (CVE-2022-46169) and Realtek (CVE-2021-35394) vulnerabilities to spread ShellBot and Moobot malware.
The court order allowed authorities to use the Moobot malware to copy and delete stolen and malicious data and files from compromised routers. The US government operation blocked access to the routers by Russian cyberspies. The operation reversibly modified the routers’ firewall rules to block remote management access to the devices.
“The Department’s court-authorized operation leveraged the Moobot malware to copy and delete stolen and malicious data and files from compromised routers.” continues the press release. “Additionally, in order to neutralize the GRU’s access to the routers until victims can mitigate the compromise and reassert full control, the operation reversibly modified the routers’ firewall rules to block remote management access to the devices, and during the course of the operation, enabled temporary collection of non-content routing information that would expose GRU attempts to thwart the operation.”
According to court documents, the government extensively tested the operation on the relevant Ubiquiti Edge OS routers. The DoJ pointed out that apart from hindering the GRU’s ability to access the routers, the operation did not affect the routers’ normal functionality or gather legitimate user content information. The court order also allowed the authorities to disconnect the routers from the Moobot network; users can revert the firewall rule changes by performing factory resets of their routers or accessing their routers through the local network.
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(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Moobot botnet)
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