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GraphDoor targets government networks via Microsoft Graph and SharePoint

Original title: Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 2

Kaspersky Securelistby Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab ()14 min read
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesKaspersky details Operation ShadowCloud backdoors against governmentsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

The backdoor, client version 1.2.7, uploads encrypted host data as a fake source map and pulls three plug-ins.

Kaspersky’s second Operation ShadowCloud report examines GraphDoor, used against government networks in Asia and Africa. It collects host details through indirect API calls, authenticates a malicious app to Microsoft Graph, and stores AES-encrypted data in SharePoint. It then downloads screenshot, process-listing, and keylogger modules plus patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins. Kaspersky cites clues linking the activity to Chinese-speaking groups.

Unconfirmed: Links to Chinese-speaking groups are attribution clues, not a named confirmed actor.

Key facts
  • GraphDoor sample MD5 is 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952.
  • It posts client credentials to login.microsoftonline.com, then calls graph.microsoft.com.
  • Victim data is stored as main.<code>.js.map on buildersemp.sharepoint.com.
  • Downloaded plug-ins are scr.ts, pr.ts, and kl.ts.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Backdoor access and host data theft from government systems

Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainsharepoint.combroken down as follows: /sites/ : accesses SharePoint sites sharepoint[.]com,bbd13fe9-7971-4091-85b4-19e19a02f0d3,615825b3-4c44-473a-8
md514ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952operation to Chinese‑speaking threat groups. GraphDoor (MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952) The malware begins by opening a named pipe that it will re
md5d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c81fac4a5111e6856f333d490439). The injected Go program (MD5: d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c) acts as a proxy client and is derived from the open‑source
md5e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439loading, working much like the Type 1 loader jli.dll (MD5: e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439). The injected Go program (MD5: d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700

From the original article

14 min read at securelist.com

In part 2 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the GraphDoor backdoor, additional plug-ins, and technical attribution.

Kaspersky Securelist

By Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab · securelist.com

Read the full article at Kaspersky Securelist

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.