ShadowCloud uses MeshAgent and DLL sideloading to plant GitDoor
Original title: Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1
Loaders decrypt config.ini and inject backdoors whose command traffic is hidden in GitHub, SharePoint, and Ably.
Kaspersky says Operation ShadowCloud, found in early 2026, hit government targets in Asia and Africa. Attackers ran MeshCentral Agent in a Taiwanese organization, then side-loaded malicious DLLs through legitimate binaries to decrypt and inject GitDoor and GraphDoor. The implants fetch plug-ins and shellcode in memory and proxy traffic with modified Erfrp and Ably clients. How the agent was first installed is unknown.
Unconfirmed: The initial entry point is unknown; Kaspersky infers reuse of an earlier infection.
- MeshCentral Agent MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b used wss://27.102.66.162:443/agent.ashx.
- Observed loader names include jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll.
- Type 1 loaders apply custom Base64, RC4, then a sample-specific XOR.
- Sophos had previously described only a fragment of the campaign.
Impact: Remote control and in-memory payloads on government hosts
- Products
- MeshCentral
- Organizations
- Kaspersky
- Countries
- Taiwan
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | 27.102.66.162 | tral Agent was hard‑coded to reach a remote server at wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx . Once the C2 session was established, the |
| md5 | 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952 | ap code together with a backdoor executable (GraphDoor MD5: 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952), which can be either an EXE or a DLL. The bootstrap code r |
| md5 | 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3 | by using a straight XOR operation alone. Type 1 Loader (MD5 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3) The loader jli.dll reads the file config.ini (MD5: 3896d44 |
| md5 | 3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31 | 57170a3) The loader jli.dll reads the file config.ini (MD5: 3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31) located next to it using the native NtCreateFile/NtReadFil |
| md5 | 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035 | e The resulting data is a backdoor executable (GitDoor MD5: 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035). The loader allocates memory in the current process, copie |
| md5 | 6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1 | se checks, it reads an encrypted blob from config.ini (MD5: 6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1) located in the module’s directory. Then it transforms the |
| md5 | 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b | vered two separate instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5: 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b), which were launched inside a Taiwanese organization. Mesh |
| md5 | 84802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22 | ee8608fba13c8c3a4), a Python application (pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22), and the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, M |
| md5 | 8b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29 | mate binaries: the OpenJDK platform binary (javaw.exe, MD5: 8b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5: be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba |
| md5 | b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763 | esolution. It reads an encrypted blob from config.ini (MD5: b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763), which decrypts to bootstrap code together with a backdoor |
| md5 | be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba13c8c3a4 | 09d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5: be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba13c8c3a4), a Python application (pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a |
| md5 | d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3 | nd the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, MD5: d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3), which the attackers started as a Windows service. Loaders |
| md5 | e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3 | s the allocated memory with VirtualFree. Type 2 Loader (MD5 e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3) This loader is internally named SbieDll_st.dll. Before att |
| md5 | e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439 | xecution from MZ bytes Another similar loader jli.dll (MD5: e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439) has a different approach to API resolution. It reads an en |
From the original article
14 min read at securelist.com
In part 1 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the initial infection stage, the GitDoor backdoor using GitHub as a C2, and the shellcode families it loads.
By Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab · securelist.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.