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ShadowCloud uses MeshAgent and DLL sideloading to plant GitDoor

Original title: Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1

Kaspersky Securelistby Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab ()14 min read
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesKaspersky details Operation ShadowCloud backdoors against governmentsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Loaders decrypt config.ini and inject backdoors whose command traffic is hidden in GitHub, SharePoint, and Ably.

Kaspersky says Operation ShadowCloud, found in early 2026, hit government targets in Asia and Africa. Attackers ran MeshCentral Agent in a Taiwanese organization, then side-loaded malicious DLLs through legitimate binaries to decrypt and inject GitDoor and GraphDoor. The implants fetch plug-ins and shellcode in memory and proxy traffic with modified Erfrp and Ably clients. How the agent was first installed is unknown.

Unconfirmed: The initial entry point is unknown; Kaspersky infers reuse of an earlier infection.

Key facts
  • MeshCentral Agent MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b used wss://27.102.66.162:443/agent.ashx.
  • Observed loader names include jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll.
  • Type 1 loaders apply custom Base64, RC4, then a sample-specific XOR.
  • Sophos had previously described only a fragment of the campaign.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Remote control and in-memory payloads on government hosts

Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
ipv427.102.66.162tral Agent was hard‑coded to reach a remote server at wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx . Once the C2 session was established, the
md514ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952ap code together with a backdoor executable (GraphDoor MD5: 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952), which can be either an EXE or a DLL. The bootstrap code r
md532151547d912488ac5242731057170a3by using a straight XOR operation alone. Type 1 Loader (MD5 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3) The loader jli.dll reads the file config.ini (MD5: 3896d44
md53896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a3157170a3) The loader jli.dll reads the file config.ini (MD5: 3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31) located next to it using the native NtCreateFile/NtReadFil
md5552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035e The resulting data is a backdoor executable (GitDoor MD5: 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035). The loader allocates memory in the current process, copie
md56a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1se checks, it reads an encrypted blob from config.ini (MD5: 6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1) located in the module’s directory. Then it transforms the
md574b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835bvered two separate instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5: 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b), which were launched inside a Taiwanese organization. Mesh
md584802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22ee8608fba13c8c3a4), a Python application (pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22), and the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, M
md58b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29mate binaries: the OpenJDK platform binary (javaw.exe, MD5: 8b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5: be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba
md5b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763esolution. It reads an encrypted blob from config.ini (MD5: b930fb3ab14fe45b378d5acfa6e0a763), which decrypts to bootstrap code together with a backdoor
md5be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba13c8c3a409d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5: be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba13c8c3a4), a Python application (pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a
md5d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3nd the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, MD5: d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3), which the attackers started as a Windows service. Loaders
md5e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3s the allocated memory with VirtualFree. Type 2 Loader (MD5 e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3) This loader is internally named SbieDll_st.dll. Before att
md5e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439xecution from MZ bytes Another similar loader jli.dll (MD5: e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439) has a different approach to API resolution. It reads an en

From the original article

14 min read at securelist.com

In part 1 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the initial infection stage, the GitDoor backdoor using GitHub as a C2, and the shellcode families it loads.

Kaspersky Securelist

By Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab · securelist.com

Read the full article at Kaspersky Securelist

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.