The False Allure of "Security by Obscurity": A Game-Theoretic Approach
A game-theoretic model shows obscured systems suffer more successful attacks in equilibrium than open systems.
The paper models security by obscurity as a game between rational attackers and good-faith security researchers responding to open or hidden designs. It proves that, in equilibrium under the authors' realistic conditions, obscured systems are more likely to suffer successful attacks than open systems. The result is presented as theoretical support for the long-standing preference for open scrutiny over secrecy of mechanism.
- First formal game-theoretic model of security by obscurity.
- Compares rational attackers and researchers under openness versus secrecy.
- Equilibrium result favors open systems over obscured designs.
- Offers theory for a long-standing security-community belief.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.org"Security by obscurity," or the idea that hiding how a system works helps protect it from adversaries, has long been poorly regarded in the security community. Yet its intuitive appeal persists, and it has resurfaced repeatedly in industry practices and public debates over the years.
By In-Uck Park · arxiv.org
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