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BadPatch

Palo Alto Unit 42by Tomer Bar, Simon Conant ()11 min read2
Analyze CVE-2012-0158 with Vani AIImpact, affected versions, exploitation, mitigations and detection

Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2012-0158
Remote Code Execution in Microsoft MSCOMCTL.OCX (Windows Common Controls)
—100%KEVRansomware—
KEV

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainads4market.netnly found one of the seven domains associated with this IP, ads4market[.]net, not associated with malware activity. We did not find an
domainmailsinfo.comerved in our earlier KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA research was mailsinfo[.]com. The first IP address that this domain resolved to from a
domainpal2me.netoad servers, and/or in associated malware code: Pal4u[.]net Pal2me[.]net Pay2earn[.]net Shop8d[.]net Ts4shope[.]net pal4news[.]net
domainpal4news.netnet Pal2me[.]net Pay2earn[.]net Shop8d[.]net Ts4shope[.]net pal4news[.]net We only found one of the seven domains associated with th
domainpal4u.net.]117. We used passive DNS (pDNS) and found the server mail.pal4u[.]net on 148.251.135[.]117 starting mid-May 2015. We also found
domainpalu4u.net195.154.216[.]74. We found six additional domains that used palu4u[.]net as NS, and which all shared the same historic IP address
domainpay2earn.netand/or in associated malware code: Pal4u[.]net Pal2me[.]net Pay2earn[.]net Shop8d[.]net Ts4shope[.]net pal4news[.]net We only found
domainpiedslibres.comir “BadPatch” Windows malware from hacked WordPress site wp.piedslibres[.]com/wp/wp-includes/js/Next.scr. SHA256 d759dcbebee18a65fda434
domainshop8d.netiated malware code: Pal4u[.]net Pal2me[.]net Pay2earn[.]net Shop8d[.]net Ts4shope[.]net pal4news[.]net We only found one of the se
domaints4shope.netcode: Pal4u[.]net Pal2me[.]net Pay2earn[.]net Shop8d[.]net Ts4shope[.]net pal4news[.]net We only found one of the seven domains ass
ipv4148.251.135.117passive DNS (pDNS) and found the server mail.pal4u[.]net on 148.251.135[.]117 starting mid-May 2015. We also found other servers on thi
ipv4195.154.216.74et as NS, and which all shared the same historic IP address 195.154.216[.]74 (Figure 2). From the seven total domains, we observed six
sha256106deff16a93c4a4624fe96e3274e1432921c56d5a430834775e5b98861c00eade show\Project1.vbp Keylogger functionality is introduced: 106deff16a93c4a4624fe96e3274e1432921c56d5a430834775e5b98861c00ea E:\work here\ ready kl send recent files\Project1.vbp New k
sha25617a4126fb1fb19885d78c82271464d82af8618b7d1b7d8901666c1121ddb2ba1dy kl send recent files\Project1.vbp New keylogger version: 17a4126fb1fb19885d78c82271464d82af8618b7d1b7d8901666c1121ddb2ba1 D:\000 work\21.3 GB\ newSpoofKL \Project1.vbp New file exfi
sha2561a65e43afaaff90b4124cbef21fadc319f10fba4843d09837219400b0dbcc285scr (The names of the beneficiaries of Finance. scr) SHA256 1a65e43afaaff90b4124cbef21fadc319f10fba4843d09837219400b0dbcc285 Filename الهباش يتحدى حماس الاعتراف.scr (Habash defies Hama
sha256224b5af4ca4de234f03408487f075f0d638826cb6f65944a3e8dcbaac4372e79t only \Project1.vbp Visual Basic versions, new downloader: 224b5af4ca4de234f03408487f075f0d638826cb6f65944a3e8dcbaac4372e79 Q:\newPatch\downloader\exe site\shop\Project1.vbp Downloade
sha2562c64a3d6b896ee1b58b9cf55531b7256de45025d60b1f4be764b385de087b52fس الاعتراف.scr (Habash defies Hamas recognition.scr) SHA256 2c64a3d6b896ee1b58b9cf55531b7256de45025d60b1f4be764b385de087b52f Filename Statement of Account-ARABBANK.exe Malware Analysis
sha2562d75335f8c7d4e956dcd637f480c94f6ed49a9870375aad0eee1e651d6e7ac022 server (e.g. pal4u[.]net or m103.pay2earn[.]net). SHA256: 2d75335f8c7d4e956dcd637f480c94f6ed49a9870375aad0eee1e651d6e7ac02 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
sha25630282a807c2ee27b0d1dda310e41487f5018bc5fc5df8af6c13d08df34f2b6dfecoy filenames tailored to the spear-phished target: SHA256 30282a807c2ee27b0d1dda310e41487f5018bc5fc5df8af6c13d08df34f2b6df Filename عاجل جدا وسري جدا.gz (Very urgent and very confide
sha25642adec426addf3fd0c6aff406b46fa82d901f5a9bed7758a243458961349a362supporting intercepting only Arabic and English characters (42adec426addf3fd0c6aff406b46fa82d901f5a9bed7758a243458961349a362). Autoit downloader / dropper This simple component downloa
sha2565c6e531738c1380ec09c1ec0f1438cee5077e6cbade8af87710b8be2f0aaaac7bserved a single variant using an obfuscated AutoIt script (5c6e531738c1380ec09c1ec0f1438cee5077e6cbade8af87710b8be2f0aaaac7). Another outlier variant was keylogger-only, supporting in
sha2566660491190525a7413b683b91a6c8b0082aa71e6dd6291d11ec26e1e3cf55a57aded the same malware from the compromised server. Filename 6660491190525a7413b683b91a6c8b0082aa71e6dd6291d11ec26e1e3cf55a57 First seen 2015-06-15 Filename تسنيم.doc (Tasneem.doc – the
sha25692a685c0c8515ef55635760026039564ddd0b299a2b0c4812df3c40aba1338122012) dropped an Adobe Flash decoy file (Figure 2): SHA256 92a685c0c8515ef55635760026039564ddd0b299a2b0c4812df3c40aba133812 Figure 2- Adobe Flash decoy Samples typically employ decoy
sha2569a8acd988089e7f9dd04f971374f766db519e854d42e8052b0d98b4c9c6b67e4test version (details are in the malware analysis section): 9a8acd988089e7f9dd04f971374f766db519e854d42e8052b0d98b4c9c6b67e4 Y:\My Work\VB 6\Get Files\ GFiles 14-09-2015 - Working tst
sha256cc8020c36156c7e5c8cfbbb32bc8d7f03536510f4e3b38b22e0abdb9ad90c90eوسري جدا.gz (Very urgent and very confidential. Gz) SHA256 cc8020c36156c7e5c8cfbbb32bc8d7f03536510f4e3b38b22e0abdb9ad90c90e Filename ,اسماء المستحقين للمالية.scr (The names of the ben
sha256d759dcbebee18a65fda434ba1da5d348c16d9d3775fe1652a1dacf983ffc93b8ite wp.piedslibres[.]com/wp/wp-includes/js/Next.scr. SHA256 d759dcbebee18a65fda434ba1da5d348c16d9d3775fe1652a1dacf983ffc93b8 First seen 2015-05-13 Filename لمستجدات.doc , (Developments
sha256d906118fb36a0cc4e83121d4d606ad685645252e8e0791f793057499d8751bf0wnloader\exe site\shop\Project1.vbp Downloader version 2.8: d906118fb36a0cc4e83121d4d606ad685645252e8e0791f793057499d8751bf0 J:\dowloader 2 8\downloader\site\Project1.vbp Version M103,
sha256d9253c808d83ace06f885479e0807246a29cb9967ea0d0855f5a3802825b13dbhe compile date of this malware was 31 March 2016. Sha256 - d9253c808d83ace06f885479e0807246a29cb9967ea0d0855f5a3802825b13db W:\newPatch\exe vb m103 30 3 2016 \Project1.vbp Conclusion

From the original article

11 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

In April 2017, in collaboration with Clearsky, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published an article about our research into targeted attacks in the Middle East. In that research we discussed two new malware families we named KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA. Since then, we have continued our research into the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA.

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Tomer Bar, Simon Conant · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.