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Falcon C2 used to steal government mail, passwords, and cookies

Original title: Hackers Use Falcon C2 to Hijack Government Browsers and Steal Passwords, Emails, and Session Cookies

Cyber Security Newsby Tushar Subhra Dutta ()4 min read1
Part of a story covered by 3 sourcesFalcon C2 hijacked government browsers in five countriesMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 says the framework hit ministries in five unnamed countries from March to May 2026 and delivered Antino.

Unit 42 documented Falcon, also called XG or Xiàng Gē, a browser command-and-control framework used against government webmail and internal applications. Injected JavaScript loaded session-specific implants, while Chrome and Firefox extensions posing as a PDF viewer collected credentials, cookies, messages, and could proxy the victim’s browser. In April 2026, Falcon was found in 39 Roundcube instances at a Middle Eastern foreign ministry. A fake Adobe Flash update delivered the separate Rust-based Antino implant, which uses Microsoft OneDrive.

Unconfirmed: Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that Falcon and PeckBirdy are the same framework; the extension installer was not recovered.

Key facts
  • Targets included foreign affairs, defense, interior, and law enforcement bodies.
  • The affected countries were not named.
  • The analyzed Chrome extension requested 40 permissions.
  • Antino uses OneDrive for commands, status, and file transfers.
  • One justice-related extension communicated for more than three weeks.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: theft of passwords, email, cookies, and messages

What to do
  1. 1.Investigate unauthorized developer-mode extensions and unexpected scripts in internal portals.
  2. 2.Review unusual browser WebSocket connections and OneDrive activity involving outside tenants.
  3. 3.Block unapproved extensions and review portal integrity.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainavbliud.comn fonts.chrorne[.]com Falcon infrastructure C2 domain robot.avbliud[.]com Falcon infrastructure Payload domain microsoft-flash[.]co
domainchrorne.comts.tarotfree101[.]top Falcon infrastructure C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com Falcon infrastructure C2 domain robot.avbliud[.]com Falco
domainmicrosoft-flash.comin robot.avbliud[.]com Falcon infrastructure Payload domain microsoft-flash[.]com Payload delivery Payload domain wps-cn[.]com Payload deli
domaintarotfree101.topof compromise (IoCs):- Type Indicator Role C2 domain fonts.tarotfree101[.]top Falcon infrastructure C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com Falco
domainwps-cn.comomain microsoft-flash[.]com Payload delivery Payload domain wps-cn[.]com Payload delivery Extension ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohc
sha256065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ced781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072c Chrome/Firefox icon128.png 065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce Chrome/Firefox icon16.png 3eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab06
sha2560c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bde59cab76b50b4128f7 Windows flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe 0c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bd Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged
sha25624d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f7d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da2 Firefox twitter-dm.js 24d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f7 Windows flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe 0c39264337a1186b2e
sha256265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e07a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb Chrome/Firefox sandbox.html 265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0 Chrome sandbox.js 66e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef
sha2562ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c05750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92 Firefox background.js 2ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c0575 Chrome content-script.js 88e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66
sha2562ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcd6bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7 Chrome/Firefox offscreen.html 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcd Chrome offscreen.js 356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b63893
sha25632af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f457f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6 Chrome/Firefox page.html 32af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4 Chrome/Firefox page.js e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a4
sha256356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00cf986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcd Chrome offscreen.js 356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c Firefox offscreen.js 898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a8
sha2563e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9ion. Platform File SHA-256 Chrome/Firefox analytics-core.js 3e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9 Chrome background.js f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07
sha2563e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da286681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce Chrome twitter-dm.js 3e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da2 Firefox twitter-dm.js 24d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fa
sha2563eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef7320165b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce Chrome/Firefox icon16.png 3eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016 Chrome/Firefox icon48.png 5711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5
sha2565711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016 Chrome/Firefox icon48.png 5711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2 Chrome manifest.json b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a
sha25666e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442da8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0 Chrome sandbox.js 66e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d Firefox sandbox.js b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67
sha256857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072cc66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862 Firefox content-script.js 857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072c Chrome/Firefox icon128.png 065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5
sha25688e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae08628817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c0575 Chrome content-script.js 88e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862 Firefox content-script.js 857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed
sha256898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c Firefox offscreen.js 898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6 Chrome/Firefox page.html 32af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f
sha256b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad72da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda Firefox manifest.json b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7 Chrome/Firefox offscreen.html 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986
sha256b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d Firefox sandbox.js b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce Chrome twitter-dm.js 3e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd563
sha256b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fdacf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2 Chrome manifest.json b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda Firefox manifest.json b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986b
sha256e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbbe6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4 Chrome/Firefox page.js e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb Chrome/Firefox sandbox.html 265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1
sha256f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b923e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9 Chrome background.js f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92 Firefox background.js 2ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93
urlhttps://microsoft-flash.com/download/Adobe_installer.exehpoacojjbmfpohcimjji Malicious Chrome extension Payload URL hxxps[:]//microsoft-flash[.]com/download/Adobe_installer.exe Fake Flash update Browser storage Hm_lvt_$ Falcon sessi

From the original article

4 min read at cybersecuritynews.com

Hackers have compromised government webmail portals and internal applications using Falcon C2, a browser-based command-and-control framework that steals passwords, emails, session cookies, and private communications. By planting malicious JavaScript inside trusted websites, the attackers turned routine browsing into an entry point for surveillance and account compromise.

Cyber Security News

By Tushar Subhra Dutta · cybersecuritynews.com

Read the full article at Cyber Security News

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.