Cybersecurity agencies warn of China
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-26084 | Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) Injection Vulnerability CVE-2021-26084 is an OGNL injection vulnerability (CWE-917) in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center that may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. Any organization running Confluence Server or Data Center is potentially affected. It is significant because it is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100.0% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Apply updates to Confluence Server and Data Center per Atlassian's instructions, which is the required action in the CISA KEV listing. Prioritize remediation given confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and known ransomware use. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| — | |
| CVE-2021-31207 | Security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell) enables webshell RCE CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server, classified as an unrestricted file-write issue (CWE-434) that lets an attacker bypass intended restrictions and write files of their choosing to the server. It is the final bug in the ProxyShell chain: chained with the autodiscover SSRF and PowerShell backend elevation flaws, it allows an unauthenticated attacker to reach the Exchange PowerShell API, write arbitrary files such as an ASPX webshell, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. A successful attacker gains full control of the on-premises Exchange server, including mailbox access, stolen credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement; the bug has been used to deploy ransomware and keyloggers. On-premises deployments of Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per vendor advisories) are affected, while Exchange Online/cloud mailboxes are not. Exploitation is essentially certain and ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, public ProxyShell PoC/exploit code is available, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%. Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 security updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (or any later security/cumulative update) per vendor instructions, and restrict untrusted access to Exchange's autodiscover and PowerShell endpoints. Hunt for ASPX webshells under the Exchange FrontEnd directories and review IIS logs for autodiscover.json requests chaining PowerShell, since many servers were compromised before patching. Given known ransomware use and KEV listing, treat any server that was unpatched or internet-exposed during the exploitation window as potentially compromised. | 6.6 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| massHundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (public scans around the July 2021 ProxyShell disclosure showed roughly 400,000-600,000 internet-exposed… | |
| CVE-2021-34473 +1 in the same advisory: …34523 | SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell) Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity. | 9.1 group max | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,… | |
| CVE-2021-44228 | JNDI Injection Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell) Apache Log4j2, an extremely widely used Java logging library, fails to protect its JNDI lookup feature against attacker-controlled JNDI-related endpoints (CWE-20, CWE-502), so crafted text processed by the logger causes the Java runtime to fetch and load attacker-supplied objects, leading to remote code execution. The flaw is triggered whenever attacker-controlled input reaches the logging API and is parsed for JNDI lookups, a pattern common in web servers and enterprise Java applications that log user-supplied fields such as headers or form values. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the affected application, giving attackers a foothold for lateral movement, data theft, and ransomware deployment. Any Java application or product that ships or bundles an affected Apache Log4j2 release is exposed, making this one of the most broadly deployed vulnerabilities ever disclosed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Inventory all Java applications and dependencies for Apache Log4j2 and apply the vendor's patched updates, or remove affected assets from the network, as required by CISA's KEV catalog. Where updates are not yet available, use the temporary mitigations in CISA's ED-22-02 recommended-mitigation guidance, such as disabling message lookups, only until patches are applied. Prioritize internet-facing and business-critical systems and hunt for exploitation activity given known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×9 |
| masshundreds of millions of Java applications/devices, with hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed services |
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Multiple cybersecurity agencies released a joint advisory warning about a China-linked group APT40 ‘s capability to rapidly exploit disclosed security flaws.
Cybersecurity agencies from Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the U.K., and the U.S. released a joint advisory warning about the China-linked group APT40 (aka TEMP.Periscope, TEMP.Jumper, Bronze Mohawk, Gingham Typhoon, ISLANDDREAMS, Kryptonite Panda, Red Ladon, TA423, and Leviathan) and its capability to rapidly exploit disclosed flaws
The China-linked group was able to exploit vulnerabilities within hours or days of the public disclosure.
APT40 has previously targeted organizations in countries like Australia and the United States. The group is able to rapidly adapt vulnerability proofs of concept (POCs) for their operations. They identify new exploits in widely used public software, such as Log4J, Atlassian Confluence, and Microsoft Exchange, to target the associated infrastructure.
“APT 40 has previously targeted organizations in various countries, including Australia and the United States. Notably, APT 40 possesses the ability to quickly transform and adapt vulnerability proofs of concept (POCs) for targeting, reconnaissance, and exploitation operations.” reads the advisory. “APT 40 identifies new exploits within widely used public software such as Log4J, Atlassian Confluence and Microsoft Exchange to target the infrastructure of the associated vulnerability.“
In July 2021, the U.S. Justice Department (DoJ) indicted four members of the cyber espionage group APT40 (aka TEMP.Periscope, TEMP.Jumper, and Leviathan) for hacking tens of government organizations, private businesses and universities around the world between 2011 and 2018.
The APT40 group has been active since at least 2013, it is focused on targeting countries important to the country’s Belt and Road Initiative (i.e. Cambodia, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom).
The group appears to be focused on supporting the naval modernization efforts of the Government of Beijing. Threat actors target engineering, transportation, and defense sectors, experts observed a specific interest in maritime technologies.
The cyberspies also targeted research centres and universities involved in naval research with the intent to access advanced technology to push the growth of the Chinese naval industry. The list of victims of the APT40 group also includes organizations with operations in Southeast Asia or involved in South China Sea disputes.
Three of the defendants are said to be officers in a provincial arm of the MSS and one was an employee of a front company that was used to obfuscate the government’s role in the hacking campaigns.
“APT40 regularly conducts reconnaissance against networks of interest, including networks in the authoring agencies’ countries, looking for opportunities to compromise its targets. This regular reconnaissance postures the group to identify vulnerable, end-of-life or no longer maintained devices on networks of interest, and to rapidly deploy exploits. APT40 continues to find success exploiting vulnerabilities from as early as 2017.” continues the joint advisory. “APT40 rapidly exploits newly public vulnerabilities in widely used software such as Log4J (CVE-2021-44228), Atlassian Confluence (CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-26084) and Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473). ASD’s ACSC and the authoring agencies expect the group to continue using POCs for new high-profile vulnerabilities within hours or days of public release.”
APT40 use to exploit vulnerable public-facing infrastructure over other hacking techniques like phishing. They prioritize obtaining valid credentials for subsequent activities. The group often relies on web shells to maintain persistence early in an intrusion. Persistence is established early in an intrusion, making it likely to be observed in all cases, regardless of the level of compromise or further actions taken.
In the past, the APT40 was observed using compromised Australian websites as C2 servers, however he recently evolved this technique.
“APT40 has embraced the global trend of using compromised devices, including small-office/home-office (SOHO) devices, as operational infrastructure and last-hop redirectors [T1584.008] for its operations in Australia. This has enabled the authoring agencies to better characterize and track this group’s movements.” continues the report.
Many of the compromised SOHO devices are end-of-life or unpatched that can be easily hacked using N-day exploits. Compromised SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) devices provide attackers with a platform to launch attacks by mimicking legitimate traffic.
The report provides details about Tactics, Techniques, and Procesured associated by the the group and detection and mitigation recommendations.
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