MI5 Warns Over 100 Academics Helped China's Espionage Plans
MI5 warned that over 100 UK-linked academics unknowingly aided MSS espionage via projects funded through China's CGTRI/CAGT front organization.
MI5 issued a rare espionage alert on September 30 warning that more than 100 UK-linked academics contributed to projects funded by China's Ministry of State Security via the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI), also known as China Academy of General Technology (CAGT). Research topics included artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, covert communications systems, and steganography, which MI5 says directly improves MSS technical capability. The agency urged academic institutions to review collaborations, trace funding sources, and use RCAT and NPSA Trusted Research guidance, warning that violations could fall under sections 3 and 17 of the National Security Act 2023. The MSS has been linked to hacking groups such as Silk Typhoon and Salt Typhoon.
- Over 100 UK academics contributed to MSS-funded research via CGTRI/CAGT
- Projects covered AI, cybersecurity, covert communications, and steganography
- MI5 urges universities to audit collaborations and trace Chinese funding sources
- Violations can trigger National Security Act 2023 sections 3 and 17 charges
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The UK’s domestic security agency has warned that over 100 academics have helped Beijing’s spies to improve their espionage capabilities.
MI5 issued the rare espionage alert on September 30, calling out the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI), or China Academy of General Technology (CAGT), for its connection to China's Ministry of State Security (MSS).
Unusually for a security agency, the MSS handles both domestic/counterintelligence and foreign intelligence. It is thought to employ hundreds of thousands of workers, including many hackers that have been responsible for some of China’s most audacious campaigns, via ‘groups’ such as Silk Typhoon and Salt Typhoon.
MI5’s missive is designed to warn academics that the “primary purpose” of CGTRI/CAGT is to fund research that “directly improves MSS technical capability” for this espionage activity.
“MI5 has identified that more than 100 UK-linked academics have contributed to projects funded by MSS via CGTRI. In some cases, academics may not be aware that CGTRI is funding the Chinese research project they are contributing to,” it said.
“UK academics have contributed to CGTRI-funded projects on topics including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, covert communications systems and steganography. This activity supports MSS espionage, which poses a threat to UK national security.”
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The UK’s security agency “strong advised” the country’s academic institutions to review any current or planned collaboration with CGTRI, and trace the funding source of any research collaboration with Chinese institutions to make sure there isn’t a CGTRI link.
“When scoping any research collaborations, institutions should make full use of HMG’s Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) and Trusted Research guidance produced by the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), and consider taking their own independent legal advice,” it added.
Potential Criminal Consequences
MI5’s warning also came with a reminder of the legal consequences of collaboration with foreign spies, citing sections 3 and 17 of the National Security Act 2023.
These relate to the crimes of “Assisting a Foreign Intelligence Service” and “Obtaining a Material Benefit from a Foreign Intelligence Service” respectively.
Graeme Stewart, head of public sector at Check Point, branded UK universities a part of the country’s “national security perimeter” and “an obvious target” given the valuable research, IP and expertise they host.
“If I were running security at a university today, I would be asking three questions: who has access to our most sensitive research, what can they access, and do we really know who ultimately sits behind those relationships?” he said.
“That has to go beyond checking the names on research agreements. Universities need to understand who can access networks, datasets, source code, AI models and intellectual property, how that access is controlled, and whether they would spot unusual movement of sensitive information.”